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A Stakeholder Reporting Model for Semi-Autonomous Public Sector 
Agencies: The Case of the Workers' Compensation Agency in 
Newfoundland, Canada. 
Daphne Louise Rixon 
Thesis Summary 
There is increased public pressure for governments to be more accountable for 
their actions. A particular area of concern relates to the trend of many 
governments to delegate responsibility for certain public services to agencies. This 
thesis develops a reporting model that can be used by public sector agencies to 
demonstrate accountability to their stakeholders. The model encompasses three 
main strands of accountability: financial reporting, performance outcome 
reporting and stakeholder consultation. 
Stakeholders are identified using Clarkson's (1984) primary/secondary typology 
and are further delineated through Mitchell, Agle and Wood's (1997) salience 
framework. The prominence of financial reporting in a stakeholder reporting 
model is examined through a discussion of the application of commercial versus 
public sector accounting standards. Non-financial performance outcome reporting 
is a ftindamental element of a stakeholder accountability model. 
Stewart's (1994) Ladder of Accountability is utilized to identify the various 
aspects of accountability: probity/legality, process, performance, programme and 
policy. An important element of accountability centers on stakeholder consultation 
and involvement. The thesis employs Friedman and Miles' (2006) Ladder of 
Stakeholder Management and Engagement as an approach not only to elicit 
feedback from stakeholders, but to truly engage them in the accountability 
process. 
This research study examines how the conceptual frameworks, convergence of 
accounting standards, designation of a government organization as a government 
business enterprise (GBE) and the introduction of accountability legislation 
impacts the ability of an agency to adequately demonstrate accountability to its 
stakeholders. 
This study uses the case of the workers' compensation agency in the Province of 
Newfoundland, Canada to develop a stakeholder accountability model which 
addresses the needs of stakeholders. This is one of the oldest public sector 
agencies in Newfoundland, and it operates at arm's length from government 
owing to its legislative right to levy its own revenue to ftind programs. Further, as 
it is a mandatory system for the funders (employers) and beneficiaries (injured 
workers), arguably it should be held to a higher level of accountability. 
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TERMINOLOGY 
This section provides definitions for some of the workers' compensation 
terminology, acronyms and abbreviations used throughout this research: 
TERM DEFINITION 
AASB Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (Canada) 
AASOC Auditing Assurance Oversights Council (Canada) 
AcSB Accounting Standards Board (Canada) 
AOCI Accumulated Other Comprehensive Income 
AsSOC Accounting Standards Oversight Council (Canada) 
AWCBC Association of Workers Compensation Boards of Canada 
BSC Balanced Scorecard 
Case Manager The adjudicator determines whether or not a claim is accepted and the case 
manager manages the claim until the claimant returns to work or is placed 
on long-term disability benefits. 
CALM Canadian Asset Liability Method 
CIA Canadian Institute of Actuaries 
CICA Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants 
CPI Consumer Price Index 
CPP Canada Pension Plan. This is a retirement plan administered by the federal 
Government. All employees in Canada contribute to this plan and are 
eligible to receive benefits upon retirement. Benefits are based on wage at 
retirement and level of contributions made. 
CRA Canada Revenue Agency - Canadian taxation department 
El Employment Insurance - benefits provided by government to workers who 
become unemployed 
ESRTW Early and Safe Retum-to-Work 
FASB Financial Accounting Standards Board 
GAAP Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 
GBE Government Business Enterprise (as defined by the CICA) 
IAIABC International Association of Industrial Accident Boards and Commissions. 
IASB International Accounting Standards Board 
IFRS International Financial Reporting Standards 
KPI Key Performance Indicator 
KSM Key Statistical Measure 
LTD Long-term Disability 
MDA Management Discussion and Analysis 
NLHC Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro Corporation 
NPM New Public Management 
OHS Occupational Health and Safety 
PSAB Public Sector Accounting Board (Canada) 
RTW Retum-to-Work 
WCB Workers' Compensation Board 
WCBSU Workers' Compensation Board Staff Union 
WHSCC Workplace Health, Safety and Compensation Commission 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.0 Introduction 
The thesis examines a stakeholder accountability model for government agencies. 
Public sector accountability in Canada has come to the forefront of Canadian 
politics over the past five years as a result the federal govermnent's Sponsorship 
Program. The federal Liberal goverm-nent started this program in 1994 to promote 
national unity in the Province of Quebec; this was done to counteract separatism, 
as evidenced by that province's 1995 referendum on whether to separate from 
Canada. The federal government aimed to increase its visibility and promote the 
advantages of a unified country through advertising. During the period 1994-2003 
total spending on the Sponsorship Program amounted to $332 million, of which 
$147 was paid to several Quebec advertising firms (Gomery, 2005). By 2000, 
rumours had emerged of irregularities with the Sponsorship Program. In 2002, the 
Auditor General reported irregularities to the police. In response to increasing 
public pressure, the then Prime Minister Paul Martin appointed Justice John 
Gornery to conduct an investigation. When Justice Gornery's investigation 
revealed excessive commissions were paid to Quebec advertising firms, there 
were demands for the minority Liberal government to call an election. In January, 
2006 the Conservative party won a minority government under Stephen Harper. 
One of Prime Minister Harper's key election promises was to introduce 
accountability legislation. 
The sponsorship scandal, a source of sustained media coverage, had a profound 
impact on Canadians* trust in the federal government and its elected officials. An 
article in a national newspaper highlights the immediate impact on public opinion: 
In 
II 
'The popularity of Paul Martin's Liberals has plunged dramatically in the wake of this 
week's indictment of the federal sponsorship program ... A poll, conducted immediately 
after the release of Auditor General Sheila Fraser's report, shows the government dropped 
nine percentage points this month [February], down from 48 per cent in January. "Outside 
of an election period, I've never seen numbers move like this, " said Darrell Bricker, 
president of the polling firm. Mr. Bricker said Mr. Martin's assertion that he wasn't aware 
of the breadth of the scandal is being doubted by rank-and-file Canadians, who think he 
either knew about it or should have. ' (Laghi, 2004) 
Another newspaper coluninist noted that public anger over the sponsorship 
scandal adds to an already cynical view of govermnent: 
'The snowballing response to Auditor General Sheila Fraser's report indicates she has 
tapped into a wave of profound cynicisms and anger toward the federal Liberals that goes 
far beyond a particular scam involving a handful of advertising and communications 
firms in Quebec. That wave has so much fury ... the sponsorship scandal may just have become the tipping point, that coalescence in the collective Canadian consciousness of the 
notion that it is time to throw the rascals out'. (Winsor, 2004). 
Furthermore, the government's own internally commissioned survey confirms the 
declining public trust in government: 
'The percentage of people who said they had 'high trust' in the federal government 
dropped to 25 per cent in the autumn of 2004 from 32 per cent before the release of the 
Auditor-General's report. ' (Bronskill, 2004). 
Public sector accountability has also taken on heightened focus in the Province of 
Newfoundland as a result of its Auditor General's identification of inappropriate 
spending related to constituency allowances paid to provincial politicians. In late 
2005, the Newfoundland government introduced its Transparency and 
Accountability legislation. This legislation extends beyond line government 
departments to include all government agencies. In Canada in general and 
Newfoundland in particular, the public is demanding and setting high expectations 
for governments and their agencies to be accountable to their stakeholders. 
Public expectations for government at the national and provincial levels to 
demonstrate accountability permeates through to public sector agencies. 
No 
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Govemments in recent years have devolved various key services to agencies. This 
trend largely stems from the perception that services can be provided more 
efficiently and effectively by the private sector. Throughout the past two decades, 
there has been increased pressure on public sector managers to demonstrate the 
efficiency and responsiveness of public services. Western European and North 
American governments have responded to this public demand through a variety of 
improvement initiatives. According to Humphrey et al (1993) the U. K. 
government response, which was largely led through the market-oriented policies 
of Margaret Thatcher, introduced greater accountability in goverranent through 
such initiatives as performance indicators, budgets, value-for-money audits, and 
internal markets to evaluate public sector service delivery. Increased demand for 
public sector accountability in the United States and Canada has also taken place 
(Werher-Seebach, 1996). 
While most government services in Canada have not been privatized, the 
devolution to agencies represents an attempt to attain the efficiency of the private 
sector while at the same time ensure that essential services are provided to all 
citizens. The semi-autonomous nature of certain government agencies leads to 
difficulties in holding these agencies sufficiently accountable, since they often 
operate in an arm's length manner from goverm-nent. Authority for operations of 
such semi-autonomous agencies is delegated by the Minister to a CEO and Board 
of Directors. Compounding the accountability issue is the fact that some of these 
agencies are self-funding and thus do not require govermnent funding. It can be 
argued that public sector agencies ought to be held to a higher standard of 
accountability than government departments or agencies which receive direct 
lw 
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government funding since they are not subject to the same level of budgetary 
scrutiny, government control and monitoring as a funded agency. Consequently, it 
is imperative that government ensure agencies are held accountable to 
stakeholders in fulfilling their mandate. 
The objective of this research study is to identify the elements that a stakeholder 
reporting model for public sector agency could encompass. This includes 
financial reporting, performance outcome reporting and stakeholder consultation. 
The model includes an underlying definition of accountability along with a 
determination of the stakeholders to whom public sector agencies should be held 
accountable. While the thesis is important to public sector agencies in general, it is 
particularly relevant for self-funded govermnent agencies. The intent of this 
research is the development of a stakeholder reporting model which can be used 
by public sector agencies to demonstrate accountability to their multiple 
stakeholders. 
This research will use the case of the workers' compensation agency in the 
Province of Newfoundland and Labrador, Canada, as an example of how public 
sector semi-autonomous agencies may demonstrate accountability to their 
stakeholders. The workers' compensation agency has been selected for this case 
study since it is an example of a government agency that has existed in Canada 
since 1915 and in the province of Newfoundland since 195 1. (A history of 
workers' compensation is provided in Appendix 1). It is a well -established public 
sector agency, and it operates at arm's length from government. It is more 
autonomous than most other agencies owing to its funding arrangements. It levies 
Mm 
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its own revenue; it is not dependent on government for ftinding and is 
consequently not subject to the same level of government scrutiny and monitoring 
as line government departments. 
Workers' Compensation Boards (WCBs) are public sector agencies established by 
provincial government legislation to provide wage loss, health care, rehabilitation 
and long-term disability benefits to workers who are injured during the course of 
their employment. It is a mandatory, collective liability system that is compulsory 
for employers and workers. WCB agencies are funded solely through employer 
premiums based on the risk level of their industry and do not receive any 
government funding. WCBs are operated by a govermnent-appointed Board of 
Directors and Board Chairperson. The Board is comprised of three union 
representatives, three employer representatives, three public members and the 
Assistant Deputy Minister of Labour. The Board is responsible for the hiring of 
the CEO. While Canada's workers' compensation schemes are a totally public 
system, the United Kingdom has a dual system comprised of Industrial Injuries 
Disablement Benefits administered by the Department of Work and Pensions and 
privately though employers' liability insurance. 
Stakeholder accountability is important for the workers' compensation agency 
since government has given the agency broad legislative authority to levy 
sufficient revenue from employers to provide benefits to injured workers through 
a mandatory, no fault system, and workers have relinquished the right to sue their 
employers. This means neither employers nor workers can be found 'at fault' for a 
workplace injury. The WCB agency through its executives and Board of Directors 
Im 
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is held accountable by multiple stakeholders such as employers, injured workers, 
government, health care providers and its own staff who have multiple and often 
diverse and conflicting needs. 
In addition to demonstrating accountability to funder and beneficiary stakeholders, 
researchers like Jennissen et al (2000) stress the importance of the WCB agencies 
demonstrating accountability to government through formal reporting 
relationships, strategic planning and performance reporting processes. They also 
point out govermnent's legislative and governance role in ensuring accountability 
to the stakeholders. Jennissen et al specifically recommend that the following 
mechanisms be implemented to improve accountability: 
Table 1.2 WCB and Government Accountability 
Accountability Mechanism Responsibility Characteristic 
1. Legislation should specify the reporting Government Legislation 
relationship between the WCBs and the Governance 
responsible minister; 
2. Annual reports and five-year strategic plans WCB Agency Reporting 
with specific goals be developed and submitted 
to the governinent 
3. Board structures should be changed to Government Legislation 
ensure meaningful public representation Governance 
4. Deputy Ministers or Assistant Deputy Government Legislation 
Ministers be appointed to the Board of Governance 
Directors 
5. Public involvement in policy development Government Legislation 
should be mandated Governance 
6. Formal performance reporting systems, WCB Agency Reporting 
which operate on a regular cycle and involve 
stakeholders, should be established. 
Source: Adapted from Jennissen et al (2000: p. 40) 
Clearly, government has a key role in ensuring that the WCB agency is 
accountable to its stakeholders from a governance perspective. However, the 
agency itself is responsible for the implementation of specific financial and 
Im 
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performance reporting mechanisms. It is important that the accountability needs of 
stakeholders be examined in order to provide relevant reports. 
The term 'agencyý is used throughout this study in an interchangeable manner 
with 'board' and 'commission'. According to Christensen and Laegreid (2006) the 
term 'agency' has been described in a number of different ways: non-departmental 
public bodies, quasi -autonomous public organization, and distributed public 
governance. In drawing on Pollitt (2004) and Pollitt et al, (2004), agency is further 
defined as a body that is formally separated from the ministry, which carries out 
public tasks on a permanent basis. Agencies are typically staffed by public 
servants and are generally financed by the state budget. According to Christensen 
and Laegreid, agencies have some autonomy from their respective ministry in 
policy decision-making and over personnel, finance and managerial matters, but 
they are not totally independent, because government has ultimate responsibility 
for their activities. 
The term 'semi-autonomous' adopted for this study, is differentiated from 
autonomous since the WCB is answerable to a Minister and is required to comply 
with legislation. Therefore, it is not totally autonomous. When agencies are 
created, they may take several forms in terms of their funding arrangements. For 
example, hospitals and school boards receive direct government funding whereas 
others such as hydroelectric corporations and workers' compensation agencies 
generate their own revenue. For the purpose of this research, this latter type of 
agency is described as a mandated or semi-autonomous agency. Compared to line 
government departments, semi-autonomous agencies generally have considerably 
more flexibility and freedom to carry out their mandate. They are not dependent 
, qm 
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on government to provide funding and are, consequently, not subject to the same 
degree of budgetary restrictions and monitoring. These semi-autonomous agencies 
are typically at arm's length from government, and are self-funded through 
legislative authority. Some agencies such as hydroelectric crown corporations 
provide services and generate revenue which is remitted to government. Workers' 
compensation agencies generate sufficient revenue to provide services and 
programs to citizens, but they do not generate revenue for government. 
Most provinces in Canada refer to their workers' compensation agencies as 
"Workers' Compensation Boards" (WCBs). Others such as New Brunswick and 
Newfoundland use the term "Commission". However, for simplicity, the term 
WCB will be used to refer to all workers' compensation agencies in Canada. The 
WCBs operate under provincial legislative authority. In addition, all WCBs in 
Canada are members of an industry organization known as the Association of 
Workers' Compensation Boards of Canada (AWCBC). This association facilitates 
networking, the exchange of information among the WCBs, along with national 
statistical and financial reporting. 
The motivation for this research stems from the researcher's employment with the 
Newfoundland WCB agency as its Director of Finance. Interest in this topic was 
further heightened through membership on the Association of Workers' 
Compensation Boards of Canada (AWCBC) Financial Comparability Committee. 
This Committee was formed to establish standardized financial reporting, develop 




1.1 Identification of Research Problem 
The research question investigated in this study is how public sector agencies can 
utilize a stakeholder reporting model to demonstrate accountability to diverse 
groups of stakeholders. The study uses the case of the workers' compensation 
agency in the province of Newfoundland and Labrador as an example of a serm- 
autonomous agency, with the aim of developing a stakeholder reporting 
framework to address the multi-dimensional accountability needs of its 
stakeholders. In developing the reporting framework, stakeholder groups are 
identified and their accountability needs and stakes are determined along with 
their respective accountability criteria. 
To develop the stakeholder reporting model, the research study examines how 
conceptual frameworks, convergence of accounting standards, designation of a 
government organization as a government business enterprise (GBE) and the 
introduction of transparency and accountability legislation impact the proposed 
model's underlying assumptions. 
To develop a reporting model which can be employed to demonstrate 
accountability, it is necessary to first ascertain what the term 'accountability' 
means to stakeholders. Accountability is defined in different ways by various 
authors. The commercial definition of accountability typically involves the 
accountor providing an account to the accountee (Ijiri, 1983). This view of 
accountability is traditionally thought of in a stewardship context, with the 
provision of financial statements to assess management's use of the resources 
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entrusted to them (Chen, 1975). This view of accountability has been expanded 
over recent decades to decision making with a focus on investor needs. This is 
sUPported by the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants (CICA) which 
considers the objectives of financial statements for profit-oriented enterprises to 
be meeting the informational needs of investors and creditors. The public sector 
view of accountability is much broader than the decision-making role of 
information provided to the commercial sector. Public sector accountability is 
often characterized as the obligation of those who have resources entrusted to 
them to answer publicly for the discharge of their responsibilities (Coy and Pratt, 
1998; Glynn and Murphy, 1996; McCandless, 1993). Accountability in the public 
sector encompasses the multi-dimensional needs of a broad spectrum of 
stakeholders. These needs range from financial results to efficiency and 
effectiveness of the organization's operations to how well it meets the service 
expectations of stakeholders. This research explores accountability in order to 
determine the various definitions employed by stakeholders of public sector 
agencies and to identify how such agencies should fulfil their accountability 
obligations. 
When developing a stakeholder reporting model, it is also essential to identify and 
classify the stakeholders to whom the agency is accountable. As with the term 
'accountability', the term 'stakeholder' can also be viewed from both broad and 
narrow perspectives. Freeman (1984: p. 46) broadly defines stakeholder as "any 
group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the 
organization's objectives". According to this definition, organizations can be 
affected by or they can affect almost anyone (Mitchell et al, 1997). Other scholars 
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define accountability in a much narrower sense. For example, Clarkson (1995) 
defines stakeholders as those who have something at risk, and as persons or 
groups that have, or claim, ownerships, rights or interests in a corporation and its 
activities. Clarkson also considers the various stakeholder classification 
typologies, such as primary and secondary and Mitchell et al. (1997) seek to 
identify stakeholder salience as reflected through their relative power, legitimacy 
and urgency. Various aspects of stakeholder theory, descriptive, instrumental and 
normative (Donaldson and Preston, 1995), are examined to broaden the 
understanding of how public sector agencies approach stakeholder management 
and demonstration of accountability. The stakeholder management ladder, as 
proposed by Friedman and Miles (2006), is explored to determine how it might be 
utilized to enhance accountability. 
This case study involves eight exploratory interviews and eighteen semi- 
structured interviews (consisting of a series of open-ended questions and a 
questionnaire component) with a stratified non-random sample which represents 
the key stakeholders (sub groups) in the population. In addition, three semi- 
structured interviews are held with senior executives of the WCB agency. The 
purpose of these interviews is to identify the issues of interest to stakeholders and 
to discern how the agency can discharge its accountability obligations. In addition 
to the semi-structured interviews, a documentary analysis is undertaken of the 
various reports issued by the workers' compensation agency to its stakeholders. 
This case study identifies and categorizes the various stakeholder groups, 
identifies their accountability needs and develops a stakeholder reporting model 
which is appropriate for public sector agencies. 
21 
The research approach adopted involves first conducting exploratory interviews 
with knowledgeable stakeholders. The purpose of these exploratory interviews is 
to identify the key issues of concern. The information derived from the 
exploratory interviews is utilized to develop the main research instrument: semi- 
structured interviews. These interviews are comprised of three elements: open- 
ended questions, checklist questions and Likert-scale questions. This research 
approach combines the advantages of using open-ended questions (to probe for 
additional detail and facilitate gathering additional pertinent information) with the 
quantitative benefits of using Likert-scale and checklist questions. The 
employment of qualitative and quantitative data collection methods contributes to 
the robustness of this case study and is suggested as an effective way to develop a 
user-needs stakeholder reporting model. 
There are advantages and disadvantages associated with conducting a case study 
on an organization in which the researcher is employed. While the researcher's 
role with the agency could potentially compromise independence, her extensive 
knowledge of the WCB aids in identifying the issues and in interpreting the 
research results. It must also be noted that the author's position with the agency 
contributes to the access and willingness of respondents to participate in this 
study. 
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1.2 Contribution of research to theory 
This research makes the following three significant contributions to the public 
sector stakeholder accountability literature: 
1. The major contribution of this research is to enhance the understanding 
and knowledge of the multi-dimensional accountability expectations of 
stakeholders of a semi-autonomous public sector agency. This research 
contributes to stakeholder literature through the identification and 
classification of key stakeholder groups, their stakes and the means 
through which their accountability needs are to be met. This research 
enhances the understanding of stakeholder accountability for public sector 
agencies through its two-level approach of classifying stakeholders. 
Firstly, Clarkson's primary/secondary typology is used to identify the 
primary stakeholder groups which are the focus of this study. Secondly, 
Mitchell et al's (1997) stakeholder salience framework informs further 
classification of the primary stakeholders into high, medium or low 
salience. This combined typology enables the agency to prioritize its focus 
on the highly salient stakeholders. 
2. This research culminates in the development of a comprehensive reporting 
model to aid the WCB and other public sector agencies demonstrate 
accountability to their stakeholders. It provides an integration of Stewart's 
(1984) Ladder of Accountability with Friedman and Miles' (2006) Ladder 
of Stakeholder Management and Engagement. This combined approach 
associates the high rung on Stewart's ladder, programme with the high 
rungs on Friedman and Miles' ladder, consultation, negotiation, 
involvement, collaboration, and partnership. 
Im 
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3. This research may also contribute to the reform of the accountability 
arrangements of the Newfoundland WCB agency. The author has been 
requested to present the research findings to the CEO and WCB senior 
executives. The model will also be presented to the AWCBC Financial 
Comparability Committee. This may lead to consideration of industry- 
specific accounting standards and changes to the calculation of certain key 
statistical measures. 
This research is topical within the Canadian context of increased concern over 
government accountability, particularly in light of govermnent's increased 
devolution of essential services to increasingly autonomous agencies. 
Governments at both national and provincial levels have recognized the need for 
accountability and transparency, as evidenced by their introduction of 
accountability legislation. While there has been considerable research in the area 
of public sector accountability, there is a paucity of research on accountability of 
public sector agencies to their stakeholders. Since public sector organizations 
place significant reliance on the provision of information to demonstrate 
accountability, it is important to examine the financial and non-financial reporting 
mechanisms used by the workers' compensation agency to evaluate effectiveness 
in meeting stakeholders' accountability needs. 
The proposed model is based on an underlying stakeholder management style 
which fosters stakeholder consultation and involvement whereby they play a vital 
role in setting organizational direction. Essentially, the model is comprised of 
stakeholder consultation combined with financial and non-financial performance 
outcome information. The proposed model is based on the adoption of commercial 
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accounting standards since WCB meets the criteria of a government business 
enterprise (GBE) and is thus governed by commercial accounting standards. In 
addition, it is suggested that the stakeholder reporting model incorporate the 
introduction of industry accounting standards where the existing standards are not 
appropriate for a semi-autonomous public sector agency in terms of meeting the 
stakeholders' needs. This will ensure that financial and performance reporting 
provides information that is relevant for stakeholders. Finally, this model calls for 
the provision of expanded explanatory information to accompany the financial 
statements and non-financial performance outcome measures as a method of 
ensuring that the agency is responding to stakeholder needs. Overall, this model 
provides a way to identify and classify stakeholders, analyze their accountability 
needs and demonstrate accountability. While the stakeholder accountability 
reporting model is developed for the Newfoundland WCB, it is transferable to 
other WCB's as well as to other public sector organizations. 
1.3 Thesis Structure 
This chapter has provided an overview of the research topic and how it contributes 
to the various theories surrounding stakeholder accountability for a public sector 
agency. The remainder of the thesis is organized in the following manner: 
Chapter 2 reviews the literature on stakeholder accountability theory; 
o Chapter 3 reviews the literature concerning stakeholder reporting 
frameworks and generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP); 
e Chapter 4 evaluates the possible research methods and outlines the 
research approach for this study; 
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e Chapter 5 consists of a documentary review of the Canadian WCBs' 
reporting; 
0 Chapter 6 discusses the results of the semi-structured interviews as it 
pertains to stakeholders' perceptions of accountability; 
e Chapter 7 examines mechanisms of stakeholder accountability as 
derived from the semi-structured interviews; 
e Chapter 8 introduces the stakeholder reporting model; and 
* Chapter 9 provides contributions, limitations and conclusions of this 
research study. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW - ACCOUNTABILITY 
2.0 Introduction 
This chapter provides a review of the relevant literature on accountability and 
stakeholders. To develop a stakeholder reporting model, is it necessary to define 
what the agency is accountable for and to whom it is held to account. The 
literature review starts with a critical examination of what is embodied in 
accountability and explores stakeholder accountability in a broad context, 
progressing from a private sector/commercial perspective toward an analysis from 
the public sector and a government agency's point of view. The literature review 
is undertaken to establish the context for accountability in general and to discuss 
public sector accountability in particular. The literature review examines various 
definitions of accountability to identify a definition suitable for government 
agencies. The specific concerns of stakeholders in terms of how agencies 
demonstrate accountability through adherence to perfon-nance reporting are also 
explored. 
The second major thrust of the literature review is a typology of stakeholder 
classification to identify those of interest for public sector agencies. The 
stakeholder literature is explored to identify a typology as an appropriate method 
of categorizing the public sector agency stakeholders. The literature is also 
examined to determine appropriate methods of stakeholder management. 
The third section of the literature review encompasses performance reporting. 
Presented in Chapter 3, it begins by examining financial reporting frameworks 
before concentrating on wider performance issues. The literature is explored to 
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provide a definition, to review the historical development performance reporting 
and to examine the various issues surrounding performance reporting as a method 
of meeting stakeholders' accountability expectations. 
2.1 Accountability - Private Sector/Commercial Perspective 
Accountability is defined by Rosenfield (1974: p. 125) as the "justifiable holding 
of one to account for personal actions where justifiability is conferred by an 
authority relationship between the persons involved". When defining 
accountability, it is important to distinguish between the tenns 'accountability' 
and 'responsibility'. Throughout the literature the term accountability is often 
used interchangeably with responsibility. However, these concepts do not 
necessarily have the same meaning. Hoskin (in Munro and Mouristsen, 1996) 
differentiates between accountability and responsibility. Under Hoskin's 
definition, responsibility is considered to be encompassed within accountability. 
Hoskin maintains that responsibility involves stewardship of goods/money and 
answers for past perfonnance whereas accountability involves connecting 
performance reports to plans and forecasts. 
The focus of this research is largely centred on issues concerning the broader 
concept of accountability. This concept originated with the separation of 
ownership and management as owners of companies delegated responsibility for 
the operation of their businesses to professional managers. This created a situation 
whereby managers were viewed as agents of the principals (owners/shareholders). 
Agency theory is used to explain the relationship between one party (the principal) 
who delegates work and the agency (who performs the work). One of the key 
assumptions of agency theory is that the agent's self interests conflict with the 
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objectives of the principal (Eisenhardt, 1988). Initially, the focus of accountability 
was on stewardship as managers provided an account to the principals of how they 
discharged their responsibilities for the resources entrusted to them. This was a 
fairly narrow view of accountability as it was based on the accountee (agent) 
providing an account to the accountor (principal). Although managers still have a 
stewardship responsibility as agents, the focus has now shifted to capital market 
relationships where information is required for decision-making purposes. This 
issue is discussed in more detail in Chapter 3. Furthermore, commercial entities 
are increasingly expected to be accountable to a broad group of stakeholders, not 
just shareholders. Stakeholder theory, with its broader perspective, subsumes 
agency theory (Shankman, 1999). 
The traditional view of accountability is based on the concept of management 
providing an account to the shareholders, owners and creditors on how the 
resources of the company have been managed. This form of accountability is 
typically based on financial accountability which is usually fulfilled through the 
provision of audited financial statements. Financial statements are needed to 
assess management's use of resources entrusted to them, and this is described as 
stewardship (social) responsibility (Chen, 1975). As well, financial statements are 
used by investors for economic decision-making (Gjesdal, 1981). The usefulness 
of accounting information is explored by Stanton (1997) who notes that the main 
justification of accounting historically was to achieve accountability under a 
stewardship definition whereas the current primary objective is decision 
usefulness. Stanton distinguishes between these two concepts by describing 
accountability as concern for individual interest, whereas decision useftilness is 
1ý 
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concerned with the efficient allocation of resources (investment decisions). 
Accountability may exist inside the firm with officers and employees held to 
account to their superiors and outside the firm with responsibility to shareholders, 
creditors, government, unions, consumers and the general public (Ijiri, 1983). Ijiri 
maintains that accounting information can ftiltil both functions of accountability 
and decision making. It can be decision-based (centred on providing information 
to make economic decisions), or it can be accountability-based with a focus on the 
relationship between the accountor (supplier of information) and the accountee 
(user of information). 
The principal accountability mechanism of most organizations is the annual 
report, comprised of financial statements and other key performance information. 
Annual reports use marketing, management and communication to present a 
picture of the organization. Corporate annual reports are generally divided into 
two sections: the financial statements (usually placed towards the end of the 
report) and the larger upfront section which is comprised of non-statutory 
information (Stanton and Stanton, 2002). While the informational component of 
accountability can be provided through a variety of mechanisms including formal 
and informal, routine and ad hoc, written, spoken, electronic and other media, Coy 
et al (2001) contend that annual reports provide a wide range of summarized 
information in a single concise document, thereby enabling stakeholders to gain a 
comprehensive understanding of an organization's objectives and performance in 
both financial and non-financial terms. Although the annual report is a 
comprehensive source of information, it represents a form of one-way 
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communication with stakeholders and may therefore play a limited role in 
demonstrating accountability. 
In the wake of the recent Enron and WorldCom scandals, the serious problems in 
accounting and auditing have undermined the perceived quality and integrity of 
financial reporting (Imhoff, 2003). Imhoff contends that accounting and auditing 
are only components of the broader system of corporate governance and cannot be 
corrected without substantive changes in the overall governance process. He 
argues that in order to address the problems blamed on accounting quality and 
auditing, it is first necessary to address the weaknesses of corporate governance. 
This suggests that total reliance on financial reporting without due consideration 
to an organization's governance model may be misguided. 
In addition to the provision of financial and other performance information to 
support decision making as it pertains to capital markets, commercial reporting 
has become much broader. Business enterprises are expected to provide an 
account to a wider range of stakeholders, not just to shareholders. This account 
now extends beyond the financial report to include the environmental and social 
dimensions of their activities. Many commercial enterprises are adopting various 
reporting tools to aid them in providing broader social accounts to their 
stakeholders. These tools include the Global Reporting Initiative, Accountability 
1000 and the Balanced Scorecard (BSC). 
The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) is a framework which can be used by 
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organizations to guide the preparation of their sustainability reports (GRI, 2000). 
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Accountability 1000 is another reporting framework which may be utilized by 
businesses for their social and ethical accounting and reporting. It encompasses 
standards for accounting, auditing, reporting and stakeholder engagement. 
Stakeholder consultation is central under the AAlOOO framework. Until the 
introduction of AAlOOO, there were few common principles surrounding 
stakeholder consultation (Beckett and Jonker, 2002). AA1000 provides a tool to 
guide dialogue, question assumptions and identify areas of interest regarding 
measurement and performance. Both GRI and AAIOOO have become important 
tools in assisting businesses with the narrative aspect of their accountability 
reporting to a broad range of stakeholders. 
In addition to the financial statements, Management Discussion and Analysis 
(MDA) and other information contained within the annual report, many 
commercial organizations are also utilizing the BSC as a reporting tool. Although 
the BSC was originally intended to be used as an internal management tool by 
commercial enterprises, it is now also employed as a method of external reporting 
to stakeholders. The BSC framework introduced in 1992 by Kaplan and Norton 
has gained widespread acceptance in both the private and public sectors. It 
organizes strategic objectives into the following four perspectives: 
1) Financial - growth, profitability and risk 
2) Customers - strategy to create value to customers 
3) Internal Business Processes - create customer and shareholder satisfaction 
4) Learning and Growth - climate that supports organizational change, 
innovation and growth 
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Since its introduction, Kaplan and Norton (2001 a) have expanded on the 
application of the original BSC concept by adding a strategy map that specifies 
how critical elements of these perspectives are linked to organizational strategy, 
According to Kaplan and Norton (2001b), the BSC has evolved from a 
performance measurement system to an organizing framework for strategy 
implementation. Although the BSC is intended to reflect more balance between 
financial and non-financial measures, Kaplan and Norton (1996a) also emphasize 
the importance of having financial measures for each stage of the product life 
cycle. 
An example of BSC implementation in Canada's banking industry has been 
examined by Atkinson and Epstein (2000) and Atkinson, Waterhouse and Wells 
(1997). The Bank of Montreal in Canada employed the BSC to manage its 
relationships with shareholders (return on investment), customers (good service 
and competitive rates), employees (working environment and pay), and 
communities (social leadership) (Atkinson and Epstein, 2000). According to 
Atkinson et al (1997), the bank's BSC helped integrate the components of its 
performance management system, improved decision making by providing people 
the necessary information, encouraged organizational focus on results and 
redirected attention to its main goals. 
Various researchers have emphasized the BSC's role as an extemal 
communication tool. Forgione, (1997) points out that in the insurance and financial 
services industry, one Swedish company, Skandia, uses the BSC to communicate 
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information to external market participants. Similarly, Aidemark's (2001) study 
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also found that the BSC was regarded as a communications tool since it clarified 
goals, fostered dialogue and articulated the complex work of health care 
professionals to management and politicians. 
In spite of the purported benefits of including non-financial indicators in the BSC, 
some measures such as employee and customer satisfaction are lagging (outcome) 
measures and consequently exhibit some of the same limitations as financial 
measures (Kaplan and Norton, 1996b). Other concerns related to non-financial 
measures include the fact that they often are generic, they are not always tied to 
specific objectives, and they tend to focus on how well the organizational strategy 
worked in the past. Scorecards built on lagging and non-strategic indicators do not 
take advantage of the full power of the BSC. Rather, the financial and non- 
financial measures should be derived from the organizational strategy. Another 
area of concern with the BSC is the tendency of some organizations not to include 
a balance of lagging measures and leading indicators (performance drivers). 
Performance drivers communicate how the outcomes are to be achieved, and 
outcome measures reveal how well the organization is performing. The authors 
contend that although corporations may have hundreds of measures to monitor 
performance to identify when corrective action is needed, these are actually 
diagnostic measures and are not reflective of the drivers of organizational success. 
They maintain that the BSC is not intended to replace an organization's day-to- 
day measurement systems. Instead, BSC measures are chosen to direct the 
organization toward achievement of its strategic objectives. According to Kaplan 
and Norton (1996a), the BSC is most effective when it is used to drive 
organizational change. They suggest the BSC include short-tenn targets to enable 
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managers to monitor how well the strategy is working. They also maintain that 
strategic planning and operational budgeting should not be treated as separate, 
distinct activities; rather, they need to be linked to the strategic plan. 
Despite the widespread use of the BSC, it is not without critics. Norreklit (2000) 
argues that the BSC does not include all stakeholders, particularly suppliers and 
institutional stakeholders, and that its top-down nature may also inhibit its 
acceptance by staff and management. Norreklit contends that an effective BSC 
includes a combination of outcome (lag) indicators and performance drivers (lead 
indicators) since non-financial measures are often used to predict financial 
performance. Norreklit questions the BSC's assumptions regarding the causal 
relationship among the four perspectives. While agreeing that customers who are 
not satisfied will not lead to financial success, the author asserts that it cannot be 
assumed that satisfied customers will result in financial success. The BSC is a 
useful tool to aid management in reporting not just to shareholders, but to 
stakeholders on a broad range of issues. Its extensive use by commercial 
enterprises marks a departure from the traditional focus on financial results as a 
consequence of the changing environment of performance reporting and the 
multidimensional needs of stakeholders. As commercial enterprises are 
increasingly expected to broaden their reporting to include stakeholders, they may 
rely on tools such as AAlOOO and the BSC to expand their reporting beyond 
financial statements. 
2.2 Accountability - Public Sector Perspective 
Typically, accountability in the public sector is significantly broader in scope than 
that associated with the private sector. While the private sector focuses on 
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financial results and the creation of shareholder value, the public sector 
encompasses a diverse group of stakeholders, which often includes most citizens, 
taxpayers, funders, consumers, elected officials, professional groups and public 
sector managers, along with myriad of accountability expectations (Brignall and 
Modell, 2000, Kloot and Martin, 2000, Mayston, 1985). 
As in the private sector use, the BSC has been employed increasingly in the public 
sector. Indeed, Wisniewski and Olafsson (2004) and McAdam and Walker (2003) 
have analyzed its role in assisting with the implementation of the UK 
government's Best Value initiative introduced in 1997 as part of the government's 
modernization program. Modell (2004) sees multidimensional models such as the 
BSC as counteracting the emphasis on financial measures. When adapting the 
BSC for the public sector, Johnsen (2001) concurs with Kaplan (2001) that the 
focus on shareholders, employees, customers and financial results must be 
replaced with public management concerns with other stakeholders such as clients 
and citizens. Indeed, Kaplan (2001) acknowledge the difficulty in implementing a 
BSC in non-profit government organizations (NPGO's) and recommend that the 
agency's mission (as the overarching objective) be featured with 
customers/constituents placed at the highest level on the BSC. Further studies 
examine public sector use of performance measurement and the BSC. ' 
' Chan (1984) focused on the BSC in municipalities in Canada and the US. Chow et al (1998) 
studied the BSC in the healthcare sector. Kaplan and Norton (1996 and 1993) advocate employing 
the BSC to implement strate , gic planning while 
Likierman (1993) explored the role of performance 
indicators as managerial tools in the public sector. Johnsen (2005), Propper and Wilson (2003) and 
Freer (2002) examined how performance measurement has impacted the public sector. 
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In addition to the BSC, another way of addressing public sector reporting has been 
advanced by Van Peursem (1999) in her skeletal model as depicted in Figure 2.1. 
Van Peursem's model is beneficial in explaining how an organization utilizes its 
resources to ensure citizens receive essential goods and services. 
Figure 2.1: Skeletal Model 
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As depicted in the Figure 2.1, Van Peursem's model is based on five fundamental 
concepts: net resources, conversions, structure, expectations and processes. The 
author defines fundamental concepts as a universal opinion regarding what aspects 
of an entity should be disclosed in a report. These fundamental concepts are linked 
through ten bridging concepts (illustrated in Figure 2.1 through the two-way 
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arrows) and represented through four properties of distributional equity, authority, 
intensity and consensus. 
These five fundamental concepts are beneficial in explaining how the organization 
utilizes its financial, human and physical resources and structure to carry out 
processes to meet performance expectations. Van Peursem contends that the 
model forms a foundation to structure and analyze discourse on social preferences 
for the report. Overall, Van Peursem's model Provides a useful framework to gain 
a comprehensive understanding of how organizational resources and activities 
interact during the course of delivering a public service. 
The contrast between the public and private sector definitions of accountability is 
explored by Stewart (1984) who maintains that the range of public accountability 
is much broader and extends higher up the Ladder of Accountability than 
managerial accountability, which involves primarily program and performance 
accountability rather than policy, and commercial accountability, which is 
expected to compare to market standards. Conversely, for public accountability, 
there are generally no predetermined standards at the high levels on the Ladder of 
Accountability. Stewart acknowledges that while public accountability may 
appear simple, its application, particularly to the various forms of government 
organizations, is challenging. 
In its narrowest terms, accountability is viewed as the provision of an account or 
information (Stewart, 1984). His definition is based not only on the provision of 
information, but also on the judgment of that information - the "holding to 
account involves both evaluation and consequence" (Stewart, 1984: p. 15). The 
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author argues that information forms the elements of the account. In order for the 
account to be beneficial, Stewart contends that the account must be given in a 
manner that is easy to understand and reflects several languages other than 
financial, such as a legal account and a policy account. He maintains that 
accountability is contingent on the existence of a capacity for action by those who 
hold others to account. The whole process of providing the account and the 
holding others to account can be described as a relationship or a bond since "only 
the person to whom the account is given has the power to hold to account the 
person who gives the account" (Stewart, 1984: p. 16). To summarize, Stewart's 
(1984: p. 18) framework includes the following components: 
a) the account 
b) the holding to account 
c) the bond of accountability (which is the relationship of power between the 
accountor and the accountee) 
d) the link of account (where there is no bond of accountability; rather, there 
is an obligation or custom to account) 
e) the field of accountability (activities for which the account is given) 
f) the ladder of accountability (sets out the bases of accountability) 
In the public sector, accountability is broader than Rosenfeld's (1974) definition 
for the private sector as simply holding to account and providing the account. The 
relationship or bond of accountability is comprised of several steps which Stewart 
describes as a Ladder of Accountability. As illustrated in the following table, this 
ladder has significant application for public sector agencies. 
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Table 2.1: Ladder of Accountahilit-v 
Bases of Description Accountability 
Accountability Of Public Sector 
Agencies 
1. Probity and Probity - ensures that the funds are used - Audited financial 
legality properly and in the manner authorized; statements and 
fiscal accountability is concerned with Legislative compliance 
whether the funds were expended 
appropriately. Legality - ensures that the 
powers given by the law are not 
exceeded. 
2. Process Encompasses whether the procedures Audited financial 
used were adequate in terms of time and statements 
effort; considers efficiency to ensure Systems reviews 
there is no waste in the use of resources Ombudsman 
and administration to ensure that there is 
no maladministration 
3. Performance Considers whether the performance Audited financial 
achieved meets required standards - statements 
output data must be added to financial Strategic plan 
data Balanced Scorecard 
4. Programme Concerns whether the work carried out Audited financial 
met the goals; is the agency achieving its statements 
objectives. Strategic plan 
Balanced Scorecard 
Board of Directors 
5. Policy There are no set standards used in the Transparency and 
formulation of policy; government is Accountability 
ultimately accountable to the electorate legislation 
for its policies 
Source: Adapted from Stewart (1984: pp. 17 - 18) 
The preceding table identifies potential mechanisms which public sector agencies 
may use for each type of accountability. For example, it is expected that probity 
would be satisfied through audited financial statements, while legality would be 
addressed through a legislative compliance audit by the Auditor General. Wider 
performance outcome information in the form of systems reviews, appeals, 
ombudsman, a strategic plan and BSC are employed to demonstrate accountability 
for the process, performance and programme steps on Stewart's ladder. Although 
the BSC is identified as a mechanism to demonstrate accountability. it is 
recognized that other tools such as AAlOOO may also be employed. The main 
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point is that agencies need to supplement their financial reporting with 
performance outcome information. 
While the role of information is critical in forming the raw material for the 
account, it does not constitute the whole of accountability (Stewart, 1984). 
However, infonnation in the account enables stakeholders to evaluate and to 
identify appropriate action or response. According to Stewart, the infonnation 
required for the higher levels on the Ladder of Accountability are more difficult to 
define as there are fewer standards. Consequently, there is greater reliance on 
judgment. For example, the informational requirements for financial and legal 
accountability can be defined with a high degree of precision while it is more 
difficult to define standards for policy accountability. 
At the performance step, outcome data must be added to the financial data and at 
the programme level, the account must provide information on objectives and how 
well they are met. Stewart contends that performance and programme information 
should relate financial inputs to the outputs (goods or services provided). Overall, 
to be meaningful, the account must be relevant to stakeholders and recognize their 
values, beliefs and perceptions. The provision of relevant accountability 
information is contingent on the organization compiling the necessary data. 
Clarkson (1995) contends that availability of data is critical in evaluating 
performance. He argues that if data about an issue are not available, then the issue 
is not being managed. Furthermore, Clarkson maintains that an organization will 
compile data when a stakeholder issue is considered to be important enough to be 
managed. 
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In addition to Stewart's Ladder of Accountability, other scholars such as Goddard 
and Powell (1994) contend that the concept of accountability should be broadened 
to include interest groups who would like to have access to decision making and 
performance monitoring information. Goddard and Powell suggest that 
infonnation be provided to address the following accountability relationships: 
a. Administrative/bureaucratic: requires information of an accounting 
or performance indicator nature 
b. Professional/client: needs service efficiency information 
c. Social/communal: requires qualitative information 
The concept of accountability has expanded well beyond its core sense of being 
called to account for one's actions. It has been extended to include internal 
responsibility of public servants to professional standards and external 
responsiveness to the needs of clients and public dialogue (Mulgan, 2000). This 
broadening of accountability leads to various complexities due to the multi- 
dimensional nature of the public sector environment. For example, Mulgan notes 
that the accountability of professionals such as doctors could potentially lead to a 
conflict between practitioner accountability to professional bodies and to the 
public. 
Communication is one of the main mechanisms though which accountability is 
achieved. The demonstration of accountability is very dependent on dialogue, as 
evidenced by the expectations for officials to answer, explain and justify their 
action (Mulgan, 2000). Effective public dialogue requires the flow of information 
and effective forums for discussion and cross-examination, analogous to round 
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table meetings. Another key component of accountability relates to the importance 
of various mechanisms to ensure that an organization meets its accountability 
obligations. According to Mulgan, these include audit offices, ombudsmen, 
administrative tribunals, legislatures and courts. Special interest groups hold 
governments accountable by lobbying for their members' interests. Accountability 
is viewed by other researchers as a mechanism to improve communication among 
stakeholders, which necessitates solicitation of input from citizens, customers, 
stakeholders, and constituents regarding their desired performance measurement 
information (Shelton and Albee, 2000). 
When considering accountability in the public sector, various authors maintain 
that accountability lies between the organization and govenunent. Coy and Pratt 
(1998) contend that it is the responsibility of government, through politicians, to 
ensure that those entrusted with public assets are held accountable. In the case of 
public sector agencies, govenunent has the power to hold these agencies to 
account. Other stakeholder groups also expect an account but often lack the 
power. Ultimately, the power rests with government to ensure that agencies 
provide an account to stakeholders. Another aspect of accountability relates to the 
obligation of public sector agencies to government. The relationship between 
public sector agencies and govermnent reflects the 'bond of accountability' as 
advanced by Stewart (1984). 
The relationship aspect of accountability also extends to the relationship between 
the agency's Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and goverm-nent. Through her 
research with 15 CEO's of Australian public sector organizations, Sinclair (1995) 
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argues that accountability can be improved by understanding the ways in which 
managers perceive and portray a sense of being accountable. Sinclair maintains 
that accountability can be understood as something a person feels, something that 
a person has been granted (an obligation or part of a job contract) or something a 
person exchanges for authority. Furthermore, she contends that accountability is 
viewed differently by various actors. For example, auditors view accountability as 
a financial matter, while political scientists view it from a political perspective and 
the legal community approaches it from a constitutional stance. 
Sinclair's (1995) research reveals that five forms of accountability are evident in 
the CEO's understanding: political, public, managerial, professional and personal. 
It can be argued three of these forms (political, public and managerial) are 
included in Stewart's (1984) ladder of accountability under his respective bases of 
policy, performance and programme. To a degree, it can also be argued that 
professional accountability is encompassed under Stewart's process category since 
professional accountability includes not just one's duty as a member of a 
professional group, but also extends to upholding public service ethics and 
introducing business-like professional management. The main form of 
accountability advanced by Sinclair that was not explicitly examined by Stewart 
relates to personal accountability which focuses on personal conscience regarding 
moral and ethical values. This is an extremely important form of accountability, as 
noted by Sinclair, since it is driven by psychological rather than external controls 
and is more powerful. Sinclair asserts that accountability is not independent of the 
person occupying a position of responsibility. It is internalized and defined in 
terms of the incumbent views as proper. Therefore, when analyzing how an 
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organization demonstrates accountability, one must be cognizant of the personal 
accountability views of CEO's and how this impacts their approach to managing 
stakeholders. 
Clearly, the term 'accountability' holds a wide variety of meanings for various 
scholars. For example, it may guide management in the public sector where there 
is no profit motive or market mechanism (Pallot, 1992). Furthermore, 
accountability is often associated with acceptable performance, as demonstrated 
through the three E's - efficiency, effectiveness and economy (Pollitt, 1986). 
However, other scholars (Clarke, 1984; Hopwood, 1984) have argued that other 
performance criteria such as availability (amount and type of service), awareness 
(users' knowledge of the service), extensiveness (quantity of service) and 
acceptability (user satisfaction) are also extremely important in evaluating 
efficiency and effectiveness. The concept of the three E's, along with availability, 
awareness, extensiveness and acceptability, are embodied in the process and 
performance categories of Stewart's Ladder of Accountability. Ultimately, 
Stewart's (1984) broad based definition is best suited for this research study into 
accountability to stakeholders for multiple performance dimensions of public 
sector agencies since it is comprehensive. 
Although accountability is much broader in the public sector than in the 
commercial sector, the lines between commercial and public sector accounting 
standards are becoming more blurred as standard-setting bodies move toward 
common accounting standards. In particular, the Canadian Institute of Chartered 
Accountants (CICA) is moving toward the adoption of International Financial 
45 
Reporting Standards (IFRSs). Although the public sector is accountable to a wider 
group of stakeholders than the private sector, they are expected to adopt many of 
the commercial accounting standards. 
While public sector accounting standards have moved closer to commercial 
standards, at the same time, the private sector has increasingly broadened its non- 
financial performance reporting to include stakeholders, not just shareholders. 
Although non-financial reporting in the commercial sector is still much narrower 
than the public sector, it has broadened over time. Overall, there appears to be a 
convergence of reporting approaches in the private and public sectors. 
2.3 Evolution of Public Sector Accountability 
The concept of public sector accountability has grown over the past four decades. 
The United Kingdom and Canada have experienced growing public expectations 
for government to demonstrate accountability to their respective stakeholders. The 
increased demand for accountability can be attributed to the growth, complexity 
and impact of government coupled with an underlying dissatisfaction due to 
declining trust in professionals and politicians (Coy and Pratt, 1998; Stewart, 
1984). 
According to Humphrey et al (1993), the concept of accountable management in 
the public sector was popularized in the United Kingdom during Prime Minister 
Margaret Thatcher's administration. Her government's desire to demonstrate 
efficiency and cost accountability resulted in a focus on accountable management. 
For example, various instruments or mechanisms such as performance indicators, 
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budgets, value-for-money audits, and internal markets have been used to evaluate 
public sector service delivery. 
Canadian Federal and provincial govermnents have recognized the need to 
improve accountability and to focus on results management (Werhar-Seebach, 
1996). The provision of performance information to governing bodies may lead to 
improved management and enhanced performance. For example, in the mid- 
1990's, Ontario's Financial Review Commission recommended more timely and 
relevant information to improve decision-making and public accountability. They 
also recommended that each ministry prepare three-year business plans that would 
identify performance measures and targets, explain the delivery structure and 
accountability, and provide semi-annual progress summaries to monitor 
perfonnance (Werhar-Seebach, 1996). 
The prominence of accountability was further heightened in western Canada when 
British Columbia issued a report in 1995 entitled "Enhancing Accountability for 
Performance in the British Columbia Public Sector". Meanwhile, Alberta was the 
first province to pass legislation regarding the implementation of an accountability 
regime for its public sector. This legislation required all public sector agencies to 
prepare three-year business plans setting out their goals and performance 
measures. The Auditors General of Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Prince Edward 
Island, and Newfoundland have all identified the need for improved governance 
and accountability. 
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The increased public demand for government organizations to be operated in an 
efficient and effective manner, has led to an increased emphasis on 
managerialism. This is defined by Guthrie and English (1997) as a public sector 
management philosophy that involves performance measurement, clear objectives, 
corporate plans, managerial autonomy, performance evaluation, rewards and 
sanctions for senior public servants and competitive neutrality for commercial 
authorities. Indeed, Guthrie (1993) argues that govermnents are starting to rely on 
managerialism as a way to administer the public sector, and this has resulted in 
more segments of the public sector developing performance indicators, 
particularly those that encompass outputs and outcomes in both financial and non- 
financial terms. The continued public perception that markets are better than 
government at delivering economic outcomes has been largely responsible for the 
increased emphasis on managerialism (Broadbent and Guthrie, 1992). 
Consequently, managerialism has evolved in a manner similar to the private sector 
with its focus on reducing staff along with improving efficiency, outputs and 
accountability. 
New Public Management (NPM) 
The increased emphasis on managerialism as the public sector continues to 
introduce private sector management practices can be described as New Public 
Management (NPM). Essentially, NPM is the culmination of various government 
responses to the demands for improved public sector efficiency and reduced costs 
by introducing private sector processes to the public sector. Hyndman and Eden 
(2000) define NPM as the collective changes that have occurred in public sector 
agencies in many western countries during the past 20 years. It is a reform process 
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which started in the 1980's and 1990's in an effort to restrict the size of 
government, reduce spending and introduce private sector management models 
(Glynn and Murphy, 1996). Hood (1995) notes that the growth of NPM can be 
attributed primarily to efforts of Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher who both 
sought to reduce big government by introducing private sector management 
principles to the public sector. Hood maintains that the term NPM was used in 
order to be more generic than individual initiatives such as the United Kingdom's 
'Next Steps' and Canada's 'Public Service 2000'. NPM is based on the premise 
that the public and private sectors should be managed on the same basis. It focuses 
more on management than policy making, on accountability for results rather than 
process, decentralization, modernization, increased client focus, changes from 
providers to enablers of services, increased contracting out and increased attention 
on efficiency and effectiveness (Hoque and Moll, 2001; Hyndman and Eden, 
2000; Mwita, 2000). One of the main goals of NPM is to reduce the differences 
between public and private sectors by focusing on greater accountability for the 
attaimnent of results. 
NPM, with its emphasis on private sector management approaches combined with 
a focus on efficiency, effectiveness and economy, is believed to increase public 
sector accountability. Conversely, some scholars contend that although NPM is 
touted as the best way to govern organizations and enhance accountability, it is 
unclear as to whether it will actually improve accountability (Gendron et al, 
2000). In spite of the widely held notion that the public sector is less efficient 
than the private sector, Gagne (1996) contends that public agencies operate in a 
political not a market environment. Therefore, public institutions cannot select 
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their customers as would be the case for the private sector. Consequently, this may 
limit the efforts of the public sector in its quest to adopt private sector 
management practices. As NPM has evolved, governments have introduced 
mechanisms such as Value-for-Money and Best Value to demonstrate they are 
operating efficiently. 
Value-for-money can be best characterized as a concept rather than a reporting 
framework. It is an approach that some public sector organizations are 
implementing in order to demonstrate that they are operating in an economical, 
efficient and effective manner to achieve their mandate. Economy is defined as 
the organization's ability to acquire resources in the appropriate quantity and 
quality at minimal cost. Efficiency refers to maximum output with minimum input 
to produce a given quality and quantity of outputs. Effectiveness is the extent to 
which program objectives are met (Palmer, 1993). In addition to the three E's 
(economy, efficiency and effectiveness), Bovaird et al (1995) suggest that an 
additional 'E' be added for equity, since this is a crucial issue for public service 
organizations. The concept of Value for Money is key in meeting stakeholders' 
demands for government to be more accountable for how their taxpayer dollars 
are spent. 
Best Value is an example of a government's response to public demand for 
increased accountability. It was introduced by the British government and has 
been in place since early 2000 (Boyne et al, 2002). Best Value is defined as the 
duty to deliver services to clear standards, including cost and quality, by the most 
effective, economic and efficient means. Essentially, it is an extension of Value- 
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for-Money (Keenan, 2000). It involves a rolling programme of performance 
reviews and accountability through performance plans. Best Value is intended to 
facilitate fast reaction to poor performance and complaints from users. It involves 
measuring intangible benefits through reliance on performance indicators, 
standards and benchmarking against other service providers. This includes 
comparisons between providers and the competitiveness of the service. Keenan 
asserts that Best Value is not a budgeting technique; rather, it is a performance 
reporting framework which includes planning and programming. 
Boyne et al (2002) disagrees with Keenan and argues that Best Value is neither an 
extension of Value-for-Money, nor is it a reinvention of previous management 
reforms; rather, it is a major innovation. They maintain that Best Value is a public 
sector form of Total Quality Management (TQM) since it conforms to the 
principles of TQM. Regardless of whether Best Value is an entirely new 
management tool or is an extension of another, it is a particularly relevant 
mechanism for public sector agencies since it encompasses quality, performance 
level and benchmarking, and may consequently assist in demonstrating 
accountability to stakeholders. 
The concept of NPM and the various tools, such as Value-For-Money and Best 
Value, are examples of how governments have responded to calls for increased 
accountability. These concepts are particularly relevant for public sector agencies 
which are typically established by govenunent to deliver goods and services in a 
cost efficient and effective manner. Overall, the characteristics embodied in NPM 
are reflected in Stewart's Ladder of Accountability. In particular, the process, 
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performance and programme rungs encompass principles of Value-For-Money, 
Best Value as well as managerialism. 
Although there are many benefits emanating from the increased public focus on 
accountability, there are concerns with the ability of government to respond to 
multiple stakeholder needs. This has added to the complexity of fulfilling 
accountability expectations. Brignall and Modell (2000) contend that when there 
is significant pressure on public sector organizations to meet the needs of a large 
number of stakeholders, the beneficiaries of public sector agencies are unlikely to 
have sufficient power to influence the compiling and reporting of performance 
information. As well, the existence of multiple stakeholders tends to place greater 
demand on public sector agencies to make trade offs in order to balance 
inconsistent and conflicting demands. The devolution of essential services from 
government to public sector agencies has an inherent assumption that such 
agencies operate like commercial enterprises and may therefore achieve a greater 
level of efficiency and effectiveness than a government department. As pointed 
out by Brignall and Modell, this assumption does not always hold true. 
2.4 Stakeholder Identification and Classification 
Although the focus of this study is on stakeholder accountability the narrower 
concept of shareholder accountability provided the initial focus before the wider 
needs of stakeholders became prominent. Moore (1999) points out that it is 
difficult to reconcile the differences between stakeholder and shareholder theories 
in terms of whether directors owe a fiduciary duty to shareholders alone or multi- 
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fiduciary duty to stakeholders. Moore offers a compromise approach which he 
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calls "Tinged Stakeholder Theory'. Tinged stakeholder theory takes an 
instrumental approach, but allows for moral and social obligations. That is, firms 
can take their responsibilities to stakeholders seriously, while retaining the 
fiduciary duties of directors and accountability to shareholders. Under pure 
shareholder theory, the ends are set by the shareholders and management contracts 
with other stakeholders to satisfy these ends. Under pure stakeholder theory the 
same argument is made, but it involves many fiduciary relationships rather than 
one. According to Moore (1999), under tinged stakeholder theory, management is 
accountable to shareholders alone, but also responsible for balancing the interests 
of all stakeholders (including shareholders). Accountability to shareholders 
(financiers) is tinged with responsibility to balance the needs of other 
stakeholders. 
Prerequisite to embarking on a process to demonstrate accountability, it is 
necessary to identify those stakeholders to whom the agency should provide an 
account. The term stakeholder has been defined in a number of different ways by 
various scholars. There are at least 55 definitions, starting with the Stanford 
Research Institute (Friedman and Miles, 2006). However, Friedman and Miles 
credit the seminal work of Freeman (1984) in his book Strategic Management: A 
Stakeholder Approach, with popularizing the stakeholder approach. One of the 
broadest definitions was advanced by Freeman (1984: p. 46) as "any group or 
individual who affect or is affected by the achievement of the organization's 
objectives". According to Mitchell et al (1997), this definition is so broad that it 
encompasses virtually anyone as a stakeholder. Such a broad definition challenges 
management in terms of identifying all the stakeholders and their stakes (needs). 
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Instead, it is beneficial to narrow stakeholders to a more manageable size. It is 
noteworthy that Freeman (1994) eventually refines his original definition of 
stakeholders as groups who are vital to the survival of the corporation. 
Clarkson (1994) proposes two definitions to illustrate his narrow view of 
stakeholders. He distinguishes between voluntary stakeholders who bear some risk 
as a result of having invested some form of human or financial capital in a firm 
from involuntary stakeholders who are placed at risk as a result of a firm's 
activities. This definition is based on the concept that without the element of risk 
there is no stake. Clarkson (1995) provides a clearer definition in a further attempt 
to narrow the view of stakeholders by describing them as: 
'Persons or groups that have, or claim, ownership, rights, or interests in a 
corporation and its activities, past, present, or future. Such claimed rights or 
interests are the result of transactions with, or actions taken by, the corporation, 
and may be legal or moral, individual or collective'. 
(Clarkson, 1995: p. 106) 
This definition, as proposed by Clarkson (1995), is a practical and workable 
definition of stakeholders. Its view of stakeholders as having a claim, ownership, 
rights or interests in the corporation's activities assists in identifying the 
stakeholders and its inclusion of legal or moral rights or claims is sufficiently 
broad to be meaningful. Ultimately, Clarkson's finite view of stakeholders is the 
definition which is best suited for this research study since public sector agencies 
are established by govermnent to serve selected constituents. Mitchell et al (1997) 
contend that those scholars who prefer a narrow definition of stakeholders are 
those who are searching for a normative core of legitimacy which would enable 
managers to focus on the claims of a few legitimate stakeholders. 
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As a result of a 10-year study on corporate social responsibility of 70 large 
Canadian corporations, Clarkson (1995) concluded that corporations manage 
relationships with groups rather than with society as a whole. According to 
Clarkson (1995: p. 106) "stakeholders with similar interests, claims, or rights can 
be classified as belonging to the same group: employees, shareholders, customers, 
and so on". To further refine the stakeholder groups of interest for public sector 
agencies, the literature was reviewed to identify potential classification typologies. 
The primary/secondary model advanced by Clarkson (1995) is particularly 
relevant for such agencies. He defines a primary stakeholder groups as: 
'One without whose continuing participation the corporation cannot survive as a 
going concern. Primary stakeholder groups typically are comprised of 
shareholders and investors, employees, customers, and suppliers together with 
what is defined as the public stakeholder group: the governments and 
communities that provide infrastructures and markets... ' 
(Clarkson, 1995: p. 106) 
This definition is based on the notion that if any primary stakeholder group, such 
as customers or suppliers, becomes dissatisfied and withdraws from the 
organization, it will be seriously damaged or unable to continue. Clarkson (1995) 
defines secondary stakeholder groups as those who influence or affect, or are 
influenced or affected by, the organization. They are not engaged in transactions 
with the organization and they are not essential for its continued operation. 
Examples of secondary stakeholders include the media and special interest groups. 
Since there are typically multiple stakeholders who have an interest in the 
outcomes of a public sector agency, the primary/second typology is useful in 
identifying those whose continued support and involvement is crucial for its 
success. Miller and Wilson (1998) contend that in order to effectively manage an 
organization, it is beneficial to identify and prioritize stakeholders. Their research 
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revealed that while there is consensus about the stakeholders' identity, there are 
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considerable differences in perceptions of their relative power, dynamism and 
interest. Consequently, this results in difficulties in prioritizing and meeting 
stakeholders' needs. 
Categorizing individual stakeholders into primary and secondary groups is the 
first step of the narrowing process. The next step involves examining various 
approaches to ftu-ther delineate the primary stakeholder groups. Two potential 
methods to narrow the primary stakeholders are resource dependency theory and 
stakeholder salience theory. Resource dependency theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 
1978) addresses the extent to which an organization is dependent upon external 
organizations and stakeholders in tenns of the importance of a particular resource 
to the organization. The premise is that organizations will be concerned with and 
pay more attention to sources of critical resources in order to ensure survival. 
Therefore, resource dependency can be employed to identify the relative 
importance of stakeholders. 
Not only can stakeholders be classified as primary or secondary, they can be 
further categorized according to their salience level. Such detailed classification 
may assist management of an agency in the stakeholder management process. 
Stakeholder salience describes the degree to which managers give priority to 
multiple stakeholders. It is a theory that is used to explain to whom and to what 
managers pay attention. The concept of relative importance of one stakeholder 
group over another is supported by Mitchell et al (1997) who propose a theory of 
stakeholder salience. This theory suggests that stakeholders can be identified by 
their possession of one, two or three of the following attributes: 
I" 
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1) Power to influence the firm; 
2) Legitimacy of their relationship with the firm-, and 
3) Urgency of their claim on the firm. 
Mitchell et al stress that although groups can be identified as stakeholders based 
on their possession of power, legitimacy and urgency; it is the firm's managers 
who determine which stakeholders are salient. The authors maintain that the 
classes of stakeholders are based on possession of one, two or all three of the 
attributes - power, legitimacy and urgency. Stakeholder salience is related to the 
cumulative number of attributes as illustrated in the following table. 
Table 2.2: Stakeholder Salience 
Attribute Stakeholder classirication 
No power, legitimacy Not stakeholders 
or urgency 
One attribute Low salience (latent stakeholders) 
" Dormant - possess power to impose will, but does not 
have legitimacy or urgency (fired employees who shoot 
supervisors, file lawsuits or speak to the media) 
" Discretionary - legitimacy, but no power or urgency 
(charities which accept donations or voluntary labour) 
" Demanding - urgency, but no power or legitimacy 
(picketers outside a corporation) 
Two attributes Moderate salience (expectant stakeholders) 
Dominant - power and legitimacy (investors) 
Dependent - legitimacy and power, no urgency 
(citizens) 
Dangerous - urgency and power, no legitimacy (strike, 
sabotage) 
Three attributes Highly salient 
e Definitive 
Source: Mitchell et al (1997) p. 872 
When examining the role of power, Mitchell et al point out that in addition to a 
firm's dependence on stakeholders, there may be situations where the stakeholders 
are dependent on the firm and where the firm and the stakeholders are mutually 
dependent. In describing the bases of power, Mitchell et al propose Etzioni's 
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(1964) categorization of power as coercive, based on force or threat or other 
physical means; utilitarian, based on material rewards consisting of goods and 
services; and normative, based on symbolic resources such as prestige and esteem. 
According to Mitchell et al, a party has power when it has the means (coercive, 
utilitarian or non-native) to impose its will on others. Power does not automatically 
translate into high salience; rather, it gains authority through legitimacy. 
Mitchell et al. posit that legitimacy is contingent on a contract, claim, legal or 
moral right and the stakeholder having something at risk. The authors contend that 
power and legitimacy are different. For example, some influencers may have 
power over the firm regardless of whether they have valid claims, while there may 
be claimants who have legitimate claims but may not have the power to influence 
the firm. Mitchell et al argue that scholars who advocate a broad definition of 
stakeholders emphasize the stakeholders' power to influence the firm, while 
supporters of a narrow definition focus on legitimacy. Mitchell et al (1997) adopt 
Suchman's (1995: p. 574) definition of legitimacy as: "a generalized perception 
that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some 
socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions". 
The final component of Mitchell et al's (1997) approach to stakeholder salience 
theory is urgency which they define as the degree to which stakeholder claims 
require immediate action. They argue that urgency is based on time sensitivity, the 
degree to which delay in responding to a claim is unacceptable and criticality, the 
importance of the claim. Mitchell et al contend that those stakeholders with power 
are not necessarily considered salient, but when power is combined with 
, qm 
58 
legitimacy, these stakeholders gain authority. When power and legitimacy are 
combined with urgency, this results in a high level of salience. 
The stakeholder salience framework is based on the assumption that managers pay 
attention to certain classes of stakeholders; that managers' perceptions determine 
stakeholder salience; and that salience is based on possession of the attributes of 
power, legitimacy and urgency. The primary stakeholder groups exhibit varying 
degrees of power, legitimacy and urgency. Mitchell at al's (1997) salience 
classification scheme contends that those exhibiting all three characteristics are 
highly salient while those groups with two characteristics are moderately salient. 
Although Mitchell et al do not advocate addressing the needs of highly salient 
groups over moderately salient stakeholders; this classification typology may be 
of assistance to an agency in prioritizing and managing the accountability needs of 
multiple stakeholders. 
Jawahar and McLaughlin (2001) contend that this model does not address how 
management deals with stakeholders who vary in terms of salience. Jawahar and 
McLaughlin assert that their comprehensive stakeholder theory describes which 
stakeholders will be salient, when they will be important or salient and how firms 
will deal with stakeholders who vary in terms of importance. In addition to 
prioritizing stakeholders based on salience level, Jawahar and McLaughlin note 
that several scholars suggest that an organization can also adopt different 
approaches to deal with each primary group: reaction, defence, accommodation 
and proaction. For example, when interacting with a highly salient group, 
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depending on the issue, the agency can take a proactive approach if the concerns 
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are identified in advance. Jawahar and McLaughlin's theory contends that 
different strategies are used to deal with different stakeholders, but also different 
strategies will be used with the same stakeholders over time, depending on the 
organization's life cycle. 
To enhance the understanding of stakeholders, it is important to examine the 
underlying stakeholder theory. Donaldson and Preston (1995) contend that 
stakeholder theory is comprised of three different aspects: descriptive, 
instrumental and normative. They argue that the three approaches are mutually 
supportive, but that the normative serves as the underpinning for the theory. They 
define descriptive as a mode which explains the past, present and future of the 
corporation and its stakeholders. Instrumental theory examines the linkage of 
stakeholder management with the achievement of various goals. Normative theory 
involves the identification of moral or philosophical guidelines for the operation 
and management of a corporation and is based on two premises: stakeholders are 
persons/groups with legitimate interests in the corporation; and the interests of all 
stakeholders have intrinsic value in that each stakeholder group warrants 
consideration for its own sake (Donaldson and Preston, 1995). 
Donaldson and Preston argue that stakeholder theory, from a normative 
perspective, can be based on the theory of property. Property is viewed as a 
'bundle' of many rights which are embedded in human rights and encompass the 
interests of others such as non-owner stakeholders. They contend that if a 
pluralistic theory of property rights is accepted, then the connection between the 
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theory of property and the stakeholder theory becomes explicit. Furthermore, 
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stakeholder theory is managerial since the combination of attitudes, structures and 
practices constitute a stakeholder management philosophy. They maintain that the 
ultimate justification for stakeholder theory is found in its normative base and that 
the theory of property rights lends further support. Indeed, the central core of the 
theory is normative since it presumes that managers act as if all stakeholder 
interests have intrinsic value. Recognition of these ultimate moral values and 
obligations gives stakeholder management its fundamental normative base. 
Donaldson and Preston (1995) contend that the three types of stakeholder theory 
are mutually supportive. Jones and Wicks (1999), on the other hand, argue that 
there is a much closer connection, a hybrid form that they call convergent 
stakeholder theory that is superior to the existing fonns. Convergent theory 
involves applying instrumental theory (what happens if) to normative cores to see 
if they result in personally and organizationally viable outcomes, while 
instrumental theory helps evaluate the practicability of the behavioural 
contingency (normative core) of the convergent theory. Jones and Wicks present 
the argument that instrumental theory, without a morally sound normative 
foundation, violates the premise of stakeholder theory and is incomplete as a 
social science theory. Furthermore, instrumental stakeholder theory based on 
values inherent in a morally based normative core, gains credibility. According to 
Jones and Wicks, stakeholder theory is simultaneously normative and instrumental 
since it implies that adherence to normative standards of behaviour results in 
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outcomes that are normatively and practically acceptable. 
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Convergent theory has been challenged by other scholars. For example, Friedman 
and Miles (2002) argue that such integration is premature since not enough work 
has been done on the organization/stakeholder relationship to combine the 
different strands of stakeholder theory into a single meaningful framework. 
Secondly, they contend that a convergent theory based on normative cores could 
subject stakeholder theory to Gioia's (1999) criticism of naivety (as cited by 
Friedman and Miles, 2002). Thirdly, Friedman and Miles maintain that this 
approach is somewhat limited since it analyzes stakeholders from the limited 
perspective of the organization rather than in their own right. Friedman and Miles 
point out that other scholars also reject Jones and Wicks' convergent theory. For 
example, Freeman (1999, p. 233) argues that more narratives of better ways to 
understand organizations in stakeholders' terms are needed rather than more 
theory that converges. 
Friedman and Miles (2006) contend that Donaldson and Preston (1995) and Jones 
and Wicks (1999) view stakeholder theory as focused on management. However, 
Friedman and Miles advocate a broader view that encompasses the values of 
stakeholders and intermediaries: it is a more embracive normative stakeholder 
theory. This view of stakeholder theory is more compatible with public sector 
agencies than convergent theory. While elements of convergent theory apply to 
agencies, the adoption of normative values is thought to help the organization 
demonstrate accountability to its stakeholders. Convergent theory does not 
entirely address the need to incorporate the views and values of the stakeholders 
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themselves, rather than just the views of management. Consequently, the 
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normative stakeholder theory as advanced by Friedman and Miles (2006) is 
adopted as the underlying theoretical basis for this research study. 
2.5 Stakeholder Management 
Ultimately, accountability requires the identification of stakeholders and their 
stakes. Stakeholder consultation is a critical component in the accountability 
relationship. One school of thought argues that consultation not only improves the 
relationship of an organization with its stakeholders, it also contributes to more 
meaningful public accounts. The importance of facilitating stakeholder 
involvement in the accountability process cannot be overstated. The importance of 
soliciting stakeholder input is recognized by Van Peursem (1999) and Sanderson 
(200 1). Van Peursem's study on New Zealand's public health sector concludes 
that accountee preferences should drive the report content. Sanderson contends 
that the viewpoints of all major stakeholders should be considered in the selection 
of key measures and targets and that a more participative approach to performance 
measurement and evaluation is needed. 
Daake and Anthony (2000) argue that much of the stakeholder literature focuses 
on managing stakeholder groups, rather than seeking their input. They contend 
that most stakeholder analysis is based on subjective managerial perceptions of 
what they believe stakeholders want. On balance, stakeholder management and 
stakeholder consultation do not have to be regarded as mutually exclusive. Rather, 
consultation can be viewed as a component of the overall stakeholder 
management process as illustrated by Friedman and Miles (2006). 
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In their 12-Step Ladder of Stakeholder Management and Engagement, Friedman 
and Miles use a variety of management tools. The ladder is displayed by 
presenting the tools that range from the highest level of stakeholder control (step 
12) to the lowest levels of manipulation and therapy (steps I and 2). 
lw 
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Table 2.3: Ladder of Stakeholder ManaLyement and Fnvnfyt-. m,, nt 
Management Tool Description 
12. Stakeholder Stakeholder control occurs if they obtain the majority of 
control decision-making seats or full managerial power in an 
organization - this is extremely rare. 
11. Delegated In this situation stakeholders are empowered by recourse of 
power law 
10. Partnership Organizations engage in joint ventures and joint 
committees with a range of stakeholders. The difference 
between partnerships and collaborations is a matter of 
degree with partnerships being more substantial joint 
activities. Collaborations are focused on joint outcomes 
while partnerships also involve joint processes leading up 
to joint outcomes. 
9. Collaboration Strategic alliances are collaborations between organization 
and stakeholders 
8. Involvement Stakeholder involvement is positioned above negotiation 
because the balance of power is less extreme. 
Stakeholder roundtables are resource-intensive and tend 
only to be used for major policy matters. 
A degree of decision-making power is afforded to the 
roundtable since participants are expected to draft 
proposals, rather than just provide advice or 
recommendations as is the case with a focus group or 
advisory panel. 
7. Negotiation Negotiations may be direct or indirect (through an 
intermediary such as a trade union, industry association, 
professional association). 
6. Consultation Corporations historically have used stakeholder surveys 
5. Placation Advisory panels, task forces and focus groups involve two- 
way dialogue prior to a decision being made. Such methods 
of stakeholder management can be used for political 
purposes such as tasks forces or advisory panels - this 
offers a degree of legitimacy. For acceptance all groups 
should be represented and participants should be authorized 
to speak on behalf of the stakeholder groups they represent. 
4. Explaining Holding workshops would be an example of explaining - 
the lowest level of tokenism. 
3. Informing Viewed to be genuine transparency when reports include 
both good news and negative information. Still considered 
to be one-way communication. 
2. Therapy The most basic form of stakeholder management; involves 
information releases via the web, briefing sessions, leaflets, 
newsletters, etc. 
There is no dialogue - only one-way communication, 
1. Manipulation usually self-laudatory information. An example of this is 
CESAR - corporate environment, social, and ethical 
reporting. 
Source: Friedman and Miles (2006) p. 162 
65 
In this classification, the lower levels (manipulation, therapy and informing) 
include situations where the organization is merely informing stakeholders about 
decisions that have already taken place. This style of stakeholder management is 
autocratic and does not involve participation between the organization and its 
stakeholders. Friedman and Miles note that the lower two rungs are distinguished 
from the third in that they are contrived attempts to indicate true participation. 
At the middle levels (Steps 4 to 7) are token gestures of participation - 
stakeholders have opportunities to voice their concerns prior to decisions, but no 
guarantee that their concerns will have an impact. Mitchell et al describe Step 4, 
explaining, as giving the powerless a voice, but they still lack the power to ensure 
their concerns are heard. Although this level involves holding workshops, there is 
minimal opportunity for stakeholders to have any degree of influence. The fifth 
level, placation, is a direct response to stakeholder unrest requiring some form of 
appeasement. Placation is also regarded as tokenism since some organizations do 
not respond to input from task forces and advisory panels. Also at issue, is how 
the stakeholders are selected to represent underlying groups and whether they are 
authorized to speak on behalf of the groups they represent. Friedman and Miles 
explain that consultation is rated only at the sixth level because consultation 
through a survey involves soliciting opinions on issues which have been 
determined by the organization, and consequently the concerns of stakeholders 
may be ignored in the survey. Furthermore, the survey results may not necessarily 
influence decisions. Negotiation (Step 7) is described as a way of attaining 
stakeholder appeasement. In certain cases, stakeholders have some power through 
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their control of resources such as human capital. In other instances, stakeholders 
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may be disadvantaged if the organization is not truthful during negotiations about 
its intentions. Steps 8 and 9 provide an opportunity to involve stakeholders in a 
two-way consultative process and to facilitate their participation in a collaborative 
manner to jointly help the organization achieve its goals and object'ves. At the 
involvement level (Step 8), it is critical that stakeholder representation be 
unbiased and comprehensive. Otherwise, the process would lose credibility. 
Collaboration (Step 9) occurs when organizations and stakeholders pursue 
mutually beneficial objectives. Benefits associated with collaboration include 
access to expert opinion, improved markets and improved public image. To ensure 
success, it is important to ensure that the partners' objectives are compatible. 
The highest levels of engagement involve empowering stakeholders in corporate 
decision making. Partnerships (Step 10) imply joint decision-making. According 
to Friedman and Miles, partnerships are similar to collaboration, but imply more 
substantial joint activities. For example, collaboration encompasses endorsements 
and sponsorships while partnerships involve joint processes. Delegated power and 
stakeholder control (Steps 11 and 12) are managerial tools within the domain of 
the govemment rather than the agency. It is govemment's decision as to the level 
of power and control delegated to stakeholders. Since the focus of this research is 
on the accountability of the agency, these managerial tools are outside the scope 
of this study. Consequently, only the first 10 steps of this ladder inform the 






The literature presented in this chapter provides a conceptual foundation for the 
empirical processes used in this research. This study is informed by a broad-based 
definition of accountability which includes financial and non-financial 
performance reporting. The main theoretical underpinning of accountability 
adopted for this research is based on Stewart's Ladder of Accountability in that it 
encompasses the various elements of accountability which are taken into 
consideration. Public sector agencies are expected to fulfil accountability 
obligations related to the first four steps on the ladder: probity/legality, process, 
performance and programme, while government is responsible for the fifth step, 
policy. 
The relationship aspect of accountability is central to the theoretical underpinnings 
as advanced by Stewart (1984). Stewart presents the concept of the bond or 
relationship between the accountor and the accountee. Therefore, when 
developing a reporting model, the relationship between the agency and its 
stakeholders and between government and the agency are important factors aiding 
the organization in fulfilling its accountability obligations. 
Clarkson's primary/secondary typology may be useful in classifying the numerous 
stakeholders of public sector agencies. This primary/secondary typology is 
beneficial in identifying individual stakeholders and classifying them into groups. 
It is much more feasible to manage relationships with groups rather than with 
many individual stakeholders. Furthermore, Mitchell et al's (1997) stakeholder 
salience framework is helpful in assisting organizations further delineate and 
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prioritize their stakeholders in order of importance or salience. Stakeholder 
salience is determined by each group's relative legitimacy, power and urgency. 
Consequently, if an accountability model is to be effective in helping manage 
stakeholders, the relative salience of each of the primary stakeholder groups plays 
a key role. The salience framework is useful in assisting an organization more 
effectively manage its stakeholders. It aids managers in prioritizing the 
accountability expectations of multiple stakeholders. 
While there is merit in Jones and Wicks (1999) convergent theory, combining 
instrumental and normative theory, overall, Friedman and Miles' (2006) 
nonnative stakeholder theory is best suited as the theoretical underpinning for the 
stakeholder aspect of this research. Friedman and Miles' (2006) Ladder of 
Stakeholder Management and Engagement is used to help inform how agencies 
manage their stakeholders. It identifies the various tools used by organizations in 
managing their relationships with their stakeholders. By engaging stakeholders 
and involving them in the accountability process, agencies are in a better position 
to develop a meaningful and relevant stakeholder reporting model. Stewart's 
Ladder of Accountability is employed to identify the various elements of 
accountability. The next chapter reviews the implications of accounting 




CHAPTER 3: ACCOUNTING FRAMEWORKS AND GAAP 
3.0 Introduction 
This chapter commences with a review of the academic and professional 
literature, accounting standards and performance reporting for the commercial 
sector in Canada. It examines the importance of conceptual frameworks in 
providing guidance on the application of accounting standards and for 
professional judgment when suitable standards are not available. The continued 
development and convergence of Canada's conceptual framework with the 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs) is also examined. 
The second section of this chapter reviews the literature, accounting standards and 
performance reporting for the public sector in Canada in general and in 
Newfoundland in particular. The differences between commercial and public 
sector reporting are identified and analyzed. The chapter concludes with an 
analysis of the reporting implications for this research study into a stakeholder 
reporting model for public sector agencies. 
3.1 Private Sector/Commercial Reporting 
The following sections outline the accounting standards which govern financial 
reporting in Canada. The commercial accounting standards are examined since 
some of the public sector agencies may be classified as a government business 
enterprise (GBE) and must adhere to commercial rather than public sector 
accounting guidelines. 
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Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants (CICA) 
Conceptual Framework 
The importance of a conceptual framework cannot be overstated in its 
contribution to standard setting. It assists standard setting bodies to develop 
accounting standards and recommendations for financial reporting. Before 
discussing Canada's conceptual framework, it is helpftil to examine conceptual 
framework issues in other countries. The accounting standard setting bodies in the 
United States, United Kingdom and Australia have all developed conceptual 
frameworks. According to Dopuch and Sunder (1980), the repeated efforts of 
authoritative bodies to define the conceptual framework of accounting and the 
elements of financial statements results from a genuine belief that precise 
definitions help resolve accounting controversies. Dopuch and Sunder note that 
the American Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) has claimed that the 
benefits of a conceptual framework include guidance for establishing standards; a 
frame of reference to resolve accounting questions in the absence of a specific 
standard; bounds for judgment in preparing financial statements; improvement in 
users' understanding of financial statements; and enhanced comparability. Dopuch 
and Sunder contend that the presence of diverse accounting practices hurts the 
credibility of the standard-setting bodies firstly, since the existence of alternative 
accounting methods could be taken as evidence that the accounting standard- 
setting body is not doing its work properly; and secondly, whenever the standard- 
setting body prescribes one accounting method, the advocates of the methods no 
longer permitted tend to criticize the agency for not protecting their interests. 
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In addition to the debate concerning the usefulness of conceptual frameworks, 
other scholars concentrate on the argument for two conceptual frameworks: one 
for the commercial sector and one for the public sector. Ellwood (2003) notes that 
the objectives of financial reporting in the private sector are centred on wealth 
creation, whereas in the public sector, the accountable use of public funds is 
paramount. Ellwood argues that since the focus of the public sector is 
accountability not wealth creation, the informational needs of both sets of users 
differs. Thus, financial statements that focus on the interests of investors do not 
address the accountability needs of the public sector where the emphasis is on 
fiscal control, compliance and accountability. 
Although proponents such as Ellwood and Newbury (2006) and Barton (1999) 
argue for two separate conceptual frameworks, McGregor (1999) in discussing the 
Australian Accounting Standards Board (PSASB) reports that PSASB recognizes 
that while the decision-making needs may vary from one entity to another, the 
focus of financial reporting is to provide financial information on which to base 
resource allocation decisions. For example, investors decide whether to invest, 
creditors decide whether to lend and goverrunents decide whether to fand 
programmes delivered by the entity. The PSASBs concepts statements argue that 
resource allocation decisions require conu-non types of information, regardless of 
the nature of the entity. The elements of the financial statements (assets, liabilities, 
revenues, expenses and equity) are defined from an economic/resource 
perspective rather than from the perspective of the reporting entity. Although there 
are two sets of accounting standards in Australia, they are developed using a 
common conceptual framework and they contain virtually the same requirements. 
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According to McGregor (1999), one argument in favour of a separate approach for 
public sector entities is based on the broader notion of public sector 
accountability. However, the PSASB concluded that this broad concept of 
accountability is compatible with the private sector objective of financial reporting 
which focuses on decision-making regarding the allocation of scarce resources. 
Canada's conceptual framework, accounting standards and generally accepted 
accounting principles are established by the Canadian Institute of Chartered 
Accountants (CICAa). The CICA is a self-regulated and self-supported 
professional association responsible for setting accounting and auditing standards 
for business, government and not-for-profit organizations (CICAa). The standard 
setting structure of the CICA is depicted in the following figure: 
Figure 3.1: Accounting Standard Setting in Canada 
Lezend 
CICA - Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants 
AcSOC - Accounting Standards Oversight Council 
PSAB - Public Sector Accounting Board 
AcSB - Accounting Standards Board 
AASOC - Auditing and Assurance Oversight Council 
AASB - Auditing and Assurance Standards Board 
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As illustrated in Figure 3.1, the CICA has established two oversight bodies, the 
Accounting Standards Oversight Council (AcSOC) and the Auditing and 
Assurance Oversight Council (AASOC). They are charged with the responsibility 
for developing accounting and auditing standards respectively. The Accounting 
Standards Oversight Council has assigned responsibility for accounting standards 
to two bodies: the Public Sector Accounting Board and the Accounting Standards 
Board. Meanwhile, the Auditing and Assurance Oversight Council has delegated 
responsibility for auditing and assurance standards to the Auditing and Assurance 
Standards Board. There are two CICA handbooks which contain Canadian 
accounting principles and guidelines: one for the commercial sector and one for 
the public sector. These handbooks are numbered by section and paragraph. For 
example, Section 1000, Financial Statements and Concepts, is comprised of 58 
paragraphs (1000.01-1000.58). The public sector handbook numbering sequences 
are similar to the commercial handbook with the exception that they are preceded 
by 'PS', for example: PSI 000, Financial Statement Concepts - Federal, Provincial 
and Territorial Govennnents. 
Although Canada sets its ovm accounting standards, the influence of the United 
States Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) is evident. The FASB, as 
well as the Accounting Standards Board (ASB) and the International Accounting 
Standards Board (IASB) define a conceptual framework: 
A coherent system of interrelated objectives andfundamentals that can 
lead to consistent standards and that prescribes the nature, function, and 
limits offinancial accounting andfinancial statements. (CICAd, 2: 2-10) 
The most important similarities between the Canadian and American conceptual 
frameworks relate to a similar user focus and a primary objective of economic 
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decision making. Both the CICA and the FASB give most of their attention to 
investors and creditors with virtually no attention to other user groups. Despite 
these commonalities, Canada includes stewardship as well as decision usefulness 
while FASB emphasises cash flows. Moreover, the American FASB Concepts 
Statement No. I focuses on the broader concept of financial reporting, whereas the 
CICA concentrates on financial statements (CICAd, 2-57). In contrast to the 
United States and the United Kingdom, where the emphasis is on decision 
usefulness, Canada's inclusion of stewardship is due to the fact that the CICA 
Handbook applies to both commercial and not-for-profit (NFP) organizations: 
'The objective of financial statements is to communicate information that is useful to 
investors, members, contributors, creditors and other users in making their resource 
allocation decisions and/or assessing management stewardship' (CICAb 1000.14). 
Canada's conceptual framework is comprised of five components: accounting 
postulates, objectives of financial reporting, qualitative characteristics, recognition 
and measurement and elements of financial statements. Each of these components 
closely resembles the American conceptual framework (CICAd, 2-13). The 
components of Canada's conceptual framework for commercial enterprises and its 
implications for financial reporting for public sector agencies required to adopt 
commercial accounting standards are discussed in more detail in the subsequent 
sections. The sections in italics denote the description of the CICA conceptual 
framework. This is followed by a discussion of the implications of the framework 
for GBEs that are subject to commercial accounting standards. 
1. Accounting postulates 
a. Quantification and exchange postulate is based on the assumption that 
goods and services are distributed through exchange and that the 
exchanges are quantified through market prices. It may be difficult to 
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quantify values in the public sector where there are no markets for many of 
the goods and services provided. 
b. Entity postulate is based on the premise that accounting is concerned with 
specific and separate economic entities. This concept applies to public 
sector agencies since they are typically established as separate entities. 
c. Going concern postulate assumes that economic entities are organizedfor 
indefinite periods of operation. This assumption can be applied to most 
public sector agencies. 
d. Time period postulate assumes that the business community and society in 
general have a need for short-term (less than twelve months) periodic 
financial statements which involves accruals and allocations. It may be 
difficult for many public sector organizations to issue short-term financial 
statements. For example, the valuation of pension liabilities on a quarterly 
basis could be costly. In this instance, it is advisable to weigh the cost of 
providing frequent or periodic financial statements against the benefits 
derived from this information. 
e. Unit of measure postulate refers to money as the common denominator in 
the exchange of goods and services. It may be difficult to establish a unit 
of measure for some publicly provided goods and services. 
2. Objectives offinancial reporting 
The objective of profit-oriented financial statements is to communicate 
information that is useful to investors, members, contributors, creditors and other 
users in making resource allocation decisions or assessment of management 
stewardship (CICAb, 1000.15). The framework underlying the CICA's accounting 
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standards is based on the concept that in the Canadian economic environment, 
goods and services are produced primarily by investor-owned business 
enterprises that obtain investment resources ftom debt and equity markets along 
withfinancial institutions (CICAb, 1000.07). 
Since the ownership of such business enterprises is generally separated from 
management, this has created a need to communicate economic information about 
the entity to investors (CICAb 1000-09). The CICA has adopted the stance that 
since it is not practical to satisfy the needs of all users, the objective of financial 
statements is to concentrate on the needs of investors and creditors (CICAb 
1000.11). Under Canada's accounting standards, public sector organizations 
classified as GBEs adhere to commercial accounting standards. The application of 
commercial accounting standards to public sector agencies is questionable due to 
the significant differences in their mandates. 
The CICA accounting standards have evolved from a stewardship function, with 
the agent providing an account to the principal, to a focus on decision usefulness 
for investors and creditors. The CICA has adopted a narrow view of users of 
commercial financial statements and concentrates on meeting the needs of only 
the most important (or salient) users. This narrow view of the users of financial 
statements as investors and creditors does not appear to sufficiently address the 
needs of other stakeholders such as employees and those concerned with the social 
responsibility of businesses. Their wider informational needs could not be met 
through the financial statements. 
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3. Qualitative characteristics 
The third component of' the Canadian conceptual ftamework embodies the 
qualitative characteristics offinancial statements that enhance their usefulness to 
readers: understandability, relevance, reliability and comparability. The financial 
statements must be comprehensible by users who have limited knowledge of 
business and accounting and who are prepared to study the information with 
reasonable diligence. The extent of reader knowledge may be challenging where 
public sector agencies have unique accounting practices or when the agency falls 
under commercial rather than public sector standards. In this situation, the 
organization may need to consider providing additional supplementary narrative 
information to enhance readers' understanding of the financial statements in order 
to achieve accountability. Ultimately, financial reporting must be relevant for 
stakeholders. 
Financial statement information is relevant when it has predictive value, feedback 
value and is timely. Certain government agencies may have difficulty in fully 
satisfying the reliability characteristic. For example, they typically provide only 
annual rather than quarterly financial statements, usually not available until six 
months after year-end. There are generally no particular concerns with agencies 
meeting the predictive value characteristic, but in cases where the agency does not 
provide comparative budget and actual results, this may limit the feedback value. 
To be reliable, financial statement information must achieve representational 
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faithfulness, verifiability, neutrality and conservatism. For the most part, public 
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sector agencies are not likely to experience difficulty in meeting the reliability 
criteria. 
Finally, comparability is important when comparing two different entities and 
when comparing the same entity over two time periods (CICAb 1000.18 - 
1000.22). The issue of comparability to other entities is a particularly contentious 
issue for public sector agencies as their stakeholders typically wish to compare 
perfon-nance with their respective counterparts. In demonstrating accountability, 
public sector agencies need their financial statements to reflect these qualitative 
characteristics. 
4. Recognition and Measurement 
The Canadian conceptual framework encompasses the following recognition and 
measurement concepts: 
a) Accruals - revenues and expenses are recognized in the period in which 
they are earned or incurred Accruals are helpful in ensuring 
intergenerational equity, particularly in GBEs where fees or premiums are 
charged to provide benefits over a future time period. Canadian 
govermnent agencies are expected to adhere to accrual accounting. 
b) Matching - revenues and expenses are linked in a cause and effect 
relationship. This issue is important for a public sector agency because 
revenue is levied to meet the expenses of the current year which may be 
paid in future periods, as is the case with pensions. 
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c) Going concern -financial statements are prepared on the assumption that 
the enterprise will continue for the foreseeable future. This characteristic 
does not present a challenge for government agencies. 
d) Substance over form - transactions accounted for to reflect economic 
substance rather than the legal form. This is an important issue in the 
public sector because there may be a tendency to account for transactions 
on a legal, rather than a substance basis. For example, governments tend to 
spend remaining budget funds toward the end of the fiscal year. This may 
lead to situations where an expense is recorded because the purchase order 
is issued, but if the goods or services have not been received, the substance 
of this transaction has not been achieved and should, therefore, not be 
recorded. 
e) Historical cost - transactions recorded at the value ascribed to them when 
they tookplace. Most government transactions are recorded at cost. 
f) Nominal dollar financial capital - no adjustment is made for changes in 
purchasing power. Governments generally record assets at nominal dollar 
value and do not adjust for purchasing power changes. 
5. Elements offinancial statements 
The final component of the Canadian conceptual framework is comprised of the 
elements of financial statements. Elements are defined as the basic categories 
needed to meet the objectives of financial statements and they include assets, 
liabilities, equity/net assets, revenue, expenses, gains and losses (CICAb 1000.25- 
40). 
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a) Assets are defined as economic resources controlled by an entity as a 
result of past transactions and are expected to provide future benefits. 
Capital assets include both tangible and intangible assets. Intangible 
assets lack physical substance and are not a financial asset. When future 
benefits of intangible assets are reasonably assured, the asset may be 
capitalized The cost of an intangible asset includes direct development 
costs and overhead related to the development. Development of 
information technology systems is an example of an intangible asset. 
Those agencies that meet the criteria of a GBE, for the most part, adhere to 
the definitions of the various asset categories. Unlike government 
departments, government agencies do not have the same challenges in 
accounting for assets such as natural resources. Most agencies have been 
established to provide goods and services to citizens and, therefore, have 
acquired tangible assets such as buildings, equipment and technology to 
deliver these services. 
b) Liabilities are described as obligations on a determinable date, 
occurrence of event or on demand Transactions creating the liability 
occur in the past and the entity cannot avoid the liability. The actuarial 
basis of liability calculation may present challenges for certain 
organizations such as workers' compensation agencies where accounting 
guidance is not particularly clear. For example, these GBEs need to 
determine if they should follow the main standards, life insurance 
standards or develop their own industry specific standards. 
c) Equitylnet assets include the ownership interests in assets after deducting 
liabilities. In a commercial enterprise, equity includes share capital, 
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contributed surplus and retained earnings. In GBEs the 'equity/net assets' 
tenninology is not considered appropriate. Rather, the term ýaccumulated 
surplus/deficit' is preferable, owing to the public sector nature of such 
agencies. 
d) Revenues are comprised of increases in assets or decreases in liabilities 
resultingftom the sale of goods or services or rent, interest, royalties and 
dividends. 
e) Expenses are reductions in assets or increases in liabilities resultingftom 
ordinary business activities. 
f) Gains are differentiated ftom revenues in that they are derived ftom 
peripheral and incidental transactions rather than regular business 
activities. 
g) Losses are defined as decreases in equity which resultfrom peripheral or 
incidental transactions outside of normal business activities. The 
commercial application of revenue, gains, losses and expenses is 
appropriate for most public sector agencies that are classified as GBEs. 
The conceptual framework serves as a source of guidance to accountants when 
specific accounting standards do not exist to address circumstances they may 
encounter. Although it is expected that financial statements will be prepared in 
accordance with GAAP as set out by the CICA, it is recognized that accounting 
pronouncements are not likely to address all issues that may arise. Consequently, 
accountants often exercise their professional judgment and, in effect, become ad 
hoc standard setters. Indeed, due to the slowness of accounting pronouncements, 
accountants are more apt in Canada than in other countries to be placed in 
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situations where they have to use their professional judgment (CICAd, 2-4). This 
is particularly relevant for accountants of public sector agencies who may need to 
utilize this provision to set standards for specific situations where there are no 
clear guidelines. Some public sector agencies may fit the criteria as a GBE within 
the commercial accounting standards, but may also display characteristics of a 
public sector agency as defined by the Public Sector Accounting (PSA) 
guidelines. Where the standards do not adequately address their needs, arguably 
they have to rely on their professional judgment in setting standards. Industry 
specific standards would improve the relevance of the financial report for 
stakeholders. 
The Canadian Accounting Standards Board (AcSB) is in the process of adopting 
the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs). Over the five-year period 
(2006-2011), public companies in Canada will move to the IFRSs. By 2008, the 
definitive changeover timetable will be announced, but it is assumed that reporting 
under IFRSs will be effective January 1,2011 (AcSB, 2006b). Initially, the focus 
is on publicly accountable companies. The adoption of lFRSs for public 
companies will affect other publicly accountable enterprises such as crown 
corporations, credit unions and cooperatives (AcSB, 2006a). The AcSB 
recognizes that the convergence of commercial standards may present challenges 
for not-for-profit (NFP) and GBEs which are governed by commercial accounting 
standards. Consequently, the AcSB notes that 'one size does not necessarily fit all' 
and indicates that they are assessing the extent to which lFRSs may be useful for 
private sector and NFP organizations. 
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When the CICA issued new accounting standards in April, 2005 dealing with the 
recognition, measurement and disclosure of financial instruments, hedges and 
comprehensive income, they reflected, to the extent possible, international 
accounting standards (Hague, 2005). These changes are effective for the fiscal 
years beginning on or after October 1,2006, with early adoption permitted 
(CICAb, 3855). The CICA defines financial instruments as any "contract that 
gives rise to a financial asset of one party and a financial liability or equity 
instrument of another party" (CICAb, 3855). The Canadian guidelines on financial 
instruments do not apply to employee future benefits, life insurance companies, 
subsidiaries or joint ventures. Financial assets may be designated as held to 
maturity, held for trading or available for sale. Held to maturity assets are 
financial assets with fixed or determinable payments and fixed maturity rather 
than an entity that has a positive intention and ability to hold to maturity. No 
WCB jurisdiction has designated their investments as held to maturity since there 
is no intention to hold to maturity, as securities are periodically sold for funding or 
portfolio management purposes. Held for trading means that the asset is acquired 
for selling in the near term or there is evidence of a recent pattern of short-term 
profit taking. The available for sale assets are held for longer terins. Gains and 
losses resulting from a change in fair value are recognized in net income for assets 
designated as held for trading, while such gains and losses are recognized in 
Accumulated Other Comprehensive Income (AOCI) for available for sale 
financial assets. Consequently, the designation of an organization's financial 
assets as held for trading, versus available for sale has a significant impact on its 
financial position and operating results. Therefore, it would be expected that 
accounting guidelines would be issued regarding the designation of assets as held 
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for trading or available for sale. Such guidelines would reduce the potential for 
organizations to manipulate their income. 
Comprehensive income is defined by the CICA as the residual amount after 
expenses and losses are deducted from revenues and gains. The introduction of 
fair value accounting for financial instruments impacts comprehensive income as 
it adds another component. Barker (2004) maintains there is a loss of information 
when comprehensive income is reported without separate disclosure of its 
components, such as operating and non-operating income. Further complicating 
matters are situations where a transaction that is non-operating for one company 
can be operating for another. For example, disposal gains and losses and fair value 
changes in financial instruments might be classified as non-operating, unless 
reported by a real estate company or a financial institution. Therefore, this 
presents a problem for those who prefer 'one-size-fits-all'. 
The gains and losses on financial instruments and actuarial gains and losses may 
have a significant impact on financial statements. Barker (2004) asserts that 
revaluation, gains or losses on financial instruments and actuarial gains/losses are 
best described as remeasurements. The remeasurements distinction is important in 
reporting financial performance because the income statement commingles 
income streams with capital gains and losses. Therefore, remeasurements are 
considered to be 'one-off. Barker maintains that if the income statement makes a 
distinction between remeasurements and all other income and expenses, then there 
is greater clarity in presenting the income statement effects of different underlying 
valuation models. To facilitate this differentiation, he proposes an alternative 
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matrix presentation, where a total column includes all items of income and 
expense while additional columns allow a line-by-line desegregation between 
remeasurements and other income. This presentation is thought to enhance 
readers' understanding of the financial statements. 
The change in accounting practice for financial instruments raises the issue of 
reliability versus relevance. Eunsup and Larkin (1998) contend that market value 
accounting presents the economic reality of transactions and, therefore, provides 
more meaningful and relevant information than historical cost reporting. 
However, Eunsup and Larkin point out that not all the literature supports mark-to- 
market accounting as it is less reliable due to subjectivity in arriving at fair market 
value and it leads to increased volatility in income. 
3.2 Public Sector Reporting 
This section examines the reporting standards governing public sector 
organizations from both a national perspective and a provincial viewpoint using 
the province of Newfoundland as an example. This examination includes the 
accounting and actuarial standards which influence financial reporting as well as 
industry guidelines and provincial reporting requirements which impact both 
financial and non-financial reporting. 
3.2.1 Canadian reporting environment 
CICA Public Sector Accounting Handbook 
The CICA recognizes the unique reporting requirements for government as 
outlined in the CICA Public Sector Accounting Handbook. Although the 
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Canadian public sector has a separate conceptual framework, it is virtually 
identical to that of the commercial conceptual framework. The Public Sector 
Accounting (PSA) Handbook acknowledges the challenges faced by government 
in meeting the accountability expectations of many stakeholders. Consequently, 
government reporting envisions a multidimensional accountability report 
comprised of a financial report, other information about a government's financial 
condition, supplementary financial performance information and non-financial 
information (CICAc, PS 1000.10). While the financial statements provide evidence 
of accountability, the information needed to understand and evaluate government 
financial operations and to promote accountability extends beyond reporting 
surpluses and deficits (CICAc, PS1000.21 and 1000.24). According to the PSA 
handbook (CICAc, PS05-06), the financial statements are only one indication of 
financial condition. Additional information such as narrative explanations., along 
with financial and non-financial indicators, is needed to supplement the financial 
statements in order to improve accountability for and understandability of 
financial condition and non-financial performance. Government financial 
statements should provide information that describes the purpose and nature of 
government spending as well as the sources of its revenues (CICAc, PSI 100.12). 
Clearly, the PSA standards encompass a much wider accountability perspective 
than commercial standards and are a better fit than the CICA commercial 
accounting standards for many public sector agencies whose stakeholders have 
broad accountability needs. Those agencies that are subject to commercial 
accounting standards owing to the classification as a GBE will likely benefit from 
the wider performance reporting associated with the PSA standards. 
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Despite the commonalities of the public and commercial frameworks, there are 
distinct differences between the financial reporting and accounting standards 
required for commercial enterprises and those required for government since 
business exists to generate profits while goverm-nents exist to provide services to 
their constituents. Consequently, the business measure of net income is not 
necessarily appropriate to measure government's service output. Moreover, 
outcomes of government services are best measured using both financial and non- 
financial information including program cost/benefit analysis (CICAc, 
PS1100.41). Another key reporting difference is that government financial 
statements generally provide a comparison of actual to budgeted results (CICAc, 
PS1100.125) whereas commercial financial statements provide year-over-year 
comparisons. This is an area where agencies may differ from government, since 
those which are deemed to be GBEs may adopt commercial standards and report 
year-over-year actual results rather than budgets or targets. That is not to say that 
it would not be appropriate to provide both (prior year's actual and budget) 
comparative referents. 
When comparing the public sector conceptual framework to that of the 
commercial sector, it appears that the public sector framework includes most or all 
of the commercial characteristics as well as a number of additional requirements. 
With the exception of the three characteristics noted in Table 3.1, both conceptual 
frameworks include the same qualitative characteristics. The following table 
provides a summary of the additional qualitative characteristics of public sector 
financial statements. 
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Table 3.1: Additional Public Sector Charsirti-Actioc 
Characteristic Additional Public Sector Characteristics 
Relevance In addition to predictive value, feedback value and 
timeliness, the PSA includes 'Accountability Value' which 
is comprised of information that helps users assess 
government's stewardship of resources. Accountability is 
enhanced when financial statements include targets and 
objectives and when the annual report includes financial 
and non-financial information. 
Reliability Both commercial and public sector accounting standards 
include representational faithfulness, verifiability, 
neutrality and conservatism. However, PSA elaborates on 
neutrality by stating that it should not colour or bias the 
image it communicates. Also, PSA includes the category 
of 'Completeness' which requires that none of the data 
necessary to achieve representational faithfulness is 
lacking. 
Understandability The PSA standards include the additional category of 
and Clear 'Understandability and Clear Presentation'. The PSA 
Presentation standards note that information should be presented clearly 
and simply without excessive detail or overly technical 
descriptions. 
As illustrated in the preceding table, the PSA qualitative characteristics include 
more categories than commercial standards. The inclusion of accountability value, 
completeness and understandability reflects the wider, multidimensional nature of 
public sector financial reporting. 
The relevance of the financial report for stakeholders of public sector 
organizations is improved when the report has accountability value. The public 
sector conceptual framework defines this accountability value as the provision of 
targets and objectives as well as non-financial information in the annual report. 
The PSA conceptual framework implicitly acknowledges that additional data, over 
that required by the commercial conceptual framework is necessary to achieve 
representational faithfulness. The importance of providing financial information is 
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recognized by the public sector's conceptual framework in the requirement to 
avoid complex presentation and technical descriptions. 
When comparing the elements of financial statements, both commercial and 
public sector standards include assets, liabilities, revenues, gains, expenses, losses 
and operating results (surplus or deficit). The main differences are equity versus 
surplus/deficit and the PSA's supplementary information on the types of assets, 
particularly government assets such as natural resources. Recognition and 
measurement criteria are largely the same for both commercial and public sectors. 
The main difference relates to the description of public sector natural resources 
and crown lands as assets. 
It should be noted that all government organizations are not required to comply 
with the PSA guidelines. According to the Public Sector Accounting Board 
(PSAB), certain types of govermnent organizations, such as government business 
enterprises, govermnent business-type organizations and government not-for- 
profit organizations may adhere to the commercial standards. 
According to CICAc, (PSI 300.28), a govermnent business enterprise has all of the 
following characteristics: 
a) It is a separate legal entity with the power to contract in its own name; 
b) It has the financial and operational authority to carry on a business; 
c) It sells goods and services to individuals and organizations; and 
d) It can maintain its operations and meet its liabilities from revenues 
received from sources outside of the government reporting entity. 
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Many public sector agencies meet these criteria. For example, hydroelectric crown 
corporations, governrnent-owned liquor stores, public insurance agencies and 
workers' compensation agencies all meet these four criteria. This classification 
appears to place these agencies in a position whereby they must comply with 
commercial accounting standards, while at the same time provide wider financial 
and non-financial performance reporting expected for a public sector entity. 
Not only are there differences between the private and public sectors, but there are 
also significant variations amongst public sector organizations delivering various 
types of goods and services. Barton (1999) delineated three categories of 
government goods and services, as outlined in Table 3.2. 
Table 3.2: Cateizories of Government Goods and Services 
Description - Service Type Attributes 
1. General government goods and 9 Public goods provided for little or no charge - 
services defence, law, education, health care. 
0 Public goods provided for significant charge - 
tertiary education and some health services. 
2. Community facilities open to 0 Natural capital assets - parks, beaches, water 
public use 0 Man-made heritage assets - art galleries, botanical 
gardens, museums, etc. 
3. Private goods and services 0 GBEs with significant externalities or natural 
provided by government - monopoly powers - water, postal, rail, power, 
operating activities primarily or telecommunications. 
wholly funded from revenue 0 GBEs without significant externalities or monopoly 
receipts and capital needs supplied power; operate in commercial markets and compete 
by government against private firms - airlines, insurance companies 
Source: Barton (1999), p. 27 
Generally, public sector agencies would largely fit Category 3 and would, 
therefore, be classified as a GBE subject to commercial accounting standards. 
However, other government organizations may be classified as Category I and 
Category 2 and be subject to public sector accounting standards. This creates a 
situation whereby some government organizations are expected to comply with 
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commercial accounting standards, while others follow public sector accounting 
standards. This approach means there is no single system by which 
citizens/stakeholders can evaluate or assess government services. 
Some scholars argue that the application of commercial accounting standards is 
not appropriate for the public sector since they are not 'identical twins' (Barton, 
1999). Barton contends that the objectives of the public and private sectors are 
significantly different and, therefore, require different accounting standards to 
meet users' informational needs. This viewpoint is shared by Ellwood and 
Newbury (2006) who argue that public sector organizations are different from 
commercial enterprises since they acquire resources for public benefit, not to 
increase capital. Ellwood and Newbury maintain that the public sector's capacity 
to levy taxes, provide public goods and redistribute wealth has no parallels in 
commercial accounting. While Ellwood and Newbury acknowledge that many 
accounting rules for recognizing, quantifying, valuing and recording transactions 
are the same for government as for commercial enterprises, they contend that 
there are many unique issues in the public sector which justify the creation of its 
own framework. Ultimately, they argue that one underpinning conceptual 
framework cannot fit both the private and public sectors since the objectives and 
users of public sector accounting statements are much wider than those presumed 
for profit oriented businesses. 
The challenges associated with applying private sector accounting to the public 
sector is examined by Hodges and Mellett (2003). They assert that accounting 
rules in the private sector need to be modified before they are applied to the public 
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sector. Through their examination of accruals based accounting in the National 
Health Service (NHS), they highlight examples where such a system may not be 
appropriate. Hodges and Mellett suggest there are risks in assuming that private 
sector methods are superior to those of the public sector. 
Further support for separate, unique accounting standards for the public sector is 
provided by the American Government Accounting Standards Board (GASB, 
2006) which argues that since public sector organizations have different purposes, 
processes of generating revenue, stakeholders, budgetary obligations and 
propensity for longevity, there should be separate accounting and financial 
reporting standards. 
While the drive toward adoption of commercial accounting standards in the public 
sector can be partially attributed to compliance with international accounting 
standards, it has been argued that the move toward commercial standards was also 
influenced by managerial reform, a focus on efficiency and a belief in commercial 
approaches that has led to a revolution in public sector accounting (Ellwood, 
2002). For example, Ellwood contends that the United Kingdom public sector 
management reforms provided the impetus for more commercial style accounting 
in government. Indeed, these changes in public sector accounting are a logical 
response to changes in the British contextual setting, a setting that has been 
mirrored intemationally. 
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Canadian Institute ofActuaries (CIA) 
In addition to complying with the accounting standards, certain public sector 
agencies are also subject to the actuarial guidelines of the Canadian Institute of 
Actuaries (CIA). The CIA is a self-regulated and self-supported professional body 
established by an Act of Parliament. In the commercial sector they govern the 
valuation of pension plans and the liabilities of life insurance companies. In the 
public sector, the CIA governs the valuation of government employees' pension 
plan liabilities and workers' compensation liabilities for injured workers. The CIA 
regulations and approach to the valuation of liabilities is influenced by the CICA. 
For example, the recent adoption by the CICA of fair value accounting for 
financial instruments had an impact on the CIA's methodology for the valuation 
of certain liabilities, as discussed further in Chapter 5. 
3.2.2 Newfoundland's Reporting Environment 
In addition to the Canadian accounting and actuarial standards, various public 
sector agencies in each of the Canadian jurisdictions have their own legislation 
and provincial reporting standards. These additional reporting standards are wider 
than the financial reporting standards since they are intended to address the public 
sector accountability requirements of government agencies. The following table 
depicts the standards which govern reporting for Newfoundland's public sector 
agencies: 
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Table 3.3: Newfoundland's Standard Settinfy Radio.. -. 
Standard Setting Body Standards Mandatory or 
Voluntary 
Provincial legislation 0 Submit annual report to Minister Mandatory 
governing various 0 Audited financial statements Mandatory 
agencies 
Auditor General Submit annual report Mandatory 
Submit strategic plan Mandatory 
Office of the Comptroller Transparency and Accountability Mandatory 
General (Treasury Board) Act 
Auditor General 
The Auditor General is governed by the Auditor General Act and is responsible 
for the audit of the Government's accounts including its departments as well as 
some of the small agencies. Large agencies generally appoint their own external 
auditors. As well, each year the Auditor General performs additional examinations 
of certain government agencies whose financial statement audits are performed by 
private sector auditors. These examinations are designed to review compliance 
with various legislations and to ensure that the entities have adequate systems of 
management control in place. The results of these examinations are disclosed in 
the Auditor General's annual report to the House of Assembly, which is the 
provincial legislature of Newfoundland (Auditor General, 2005). Agencies using 
external auditors submit their annual report and management letter to the Auditor 
General for review. The Auditor General notes any concerns regarding agencies in 
his main report to government. 
Traditionally, audited financial statements have been the primary tool used by 
government and its agencies to demonstrate credibility. Many public sector 
organizations have now extended their audit function to include value-for-money 
and performance audits. Heaton et al (1993) maintain that public demand for 
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greater government accountability has led to public sector performance initiatives 
and a performance audit function. However, it can be argued that most 
performance audits have limited utility since they do not generally include service 
effort and accomplishment reporting. Overall, the major benefit of the information 
generated from the performance audit is increased credibility for use of public 
funds. By identifying gaps between the object audited and the criteria, the state 
auditor motivates government entity executives to adopt 'best practices'. 
Currently, Newfoundland's Auditor General does not conduct value-for-money or 
performance audits. Rather, the focus is on attest auditing and legislative 
compliance. 
Transparency and Accountability Act 
Undoubtedly, the single greatest provincial influence on stakeholder reporting in 
Newfoundland is the Transparency and Accountability Act. This legislation was 
introduced in December 2005, as part of the government's ongoing efforts to 
ensure greater public accountability for all aspects of govermnent operations. The 
stated purpose of this legislation is 'to enhance the transparency and 
accountability of the govenunent and government entities to the people of the 
province' (Transparency and Accountability Act). 
This legislation mandates that all government entities be classified as Category 1, 
2 or 3. Category I entities are comprised of large agencies such as school boards 
and hospitals, Category 2 entities are often research bodies such as the 
Newfoundland and Labrador Centre for Health Information and the Provincial 
Advisory Council on the Status of Women. Category 3 entities are typically 
specifically mandated organizations including certification panels, advisory 
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boards and appeal boards such as the Teacher Certification Panel. Category I 
entities are required to prepare three-year strategic plans; Category 2 governrnent 
entities must prepare business plans while Category 3 organizations are required 
to prepare activity plans. This legislation is very detailed and specific with respect 
to the development, monitoring and reporting on an organization's strategic plan. 
The Act specifies the minimum required elements of a reporting model, but does 
not preclude the agency from publishing additional information. The government 
provides the following description of these three categories: 
Table 3.4: Criteria to Identifv Public Bodies for Each of the Three Cateeories 
Criteria Category I Category 2 Category 3 
Established organizational 
structures 
Yes Varies No 
Distinct administrative 
supports 
Yes Varies No 
Operating budgets Yes Yes Varies 
Going concerns/legal entities Yes Yes Varies 











Source: Treasury Board (2000), p. 13 
Government has designated the WCB as a Category 1, and the agency clearly 
meets this criteria. It is a separate legal entity, it has its own administrative 
structure and it determines its operating budgets. The 'moderate to high' public 
interest in its activities fits with the current enviromnent where trade unions and 
employer associations represent the interests of their stakeholder groups. 
Therefore, there is moderate general public interest, but high interest in the WCB 
by the employers and (potential) injured workers. 
To provide direction to the public bodies in implementing requirements of the 
Transparency and Accountability Act, the Treasury Board released a number of 
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detailed publications. The Transparency and Accountability guidelines advise 
public organizations to move beyond providing information on resources, 
activities and outputs, but to also capture information on effectiveness in 
achieving goals and objectives. In particular, the guidelines state that reporting 
must relate to broader public accountability and transparency. The guidelines 
stress the importance of the strategic plan including: 
1) Vision, mission and values 
2) Review of environmental factors 
3) Identification of strategic issues facing the organization 
4) Goals and objectives 
5) Description of priorities and strategies 
6) Performance measures to evaluate progress in achieving goals and 
objectives (Transparency and Accountability Office, 2005) 
The WCB's compliance with the Transparency and Accountability Act is 
discussed in detail in Chapter 5 (Section 5.2.1). Newfoundland's Transparency 
and Accountability Act complements the CICA's public sector financial reporting 
standards. This Act widens public sector performance reporting by all government 
organizations. 
3.3 Conclusions 
This chapter has presented and analyzed the commercial and public sector 
conceptual frameworks along with the financial and non-financial reporting 
regulations and guidelines that govern public sector agencies. These financial, 
actuarial, and government accountability standards and guidelines form the 
foundation of a stakeholder reporting model. This chapter has highlighted the role 
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of conceptual frameworks in the development of accounting standards and the 
provision of guidance to accountants in situations where standards do not exist or 
where they are not deemed adequate to meet the reporting needs of stakeholders. 
It illustrates how accountants may rely on conceptual frameworks to introduce 
accounting standards for sPecific situations where the relevance of the financial 
report could be enhanced. This may prove advantageous for public sector entities 
that are classified as GBEs, particularly when there is a need to address 
accounting issues not identified in the accounting standards. Consequently, this 
may provide GBEs with an opportunity to develop industry- specific accounting 
standards. A stakeholder reporting model for public sector agencies needs to 
consider a provision for the development of industry- specific accounting 
standards. 
Throughout the chapter the issues surrounding the potential classification of many 
public sector agencies as GBEs, required to adhere to commercial accounting 
standards, has been discussed. The objectives of commercial enterprises are 
significantly different than those of public sector agencies. Consequently, the 
application of commercial standards for public sector agencies may not 
necessarily provide stakeholders with sufficient and relevant information to assess 
performance. Since these agencies are established to provide a public good or 
service, it can be argued that the wider reporting standards associated with public 
sector accounting would be more appropriate. 
The development of a stakeholder reporting model would also need to consider 
the impact of other government reporting guidelines. In the case of 
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Newfoundland, the Transparency and Accountability Act specifies several 
reporting requirements, including a three-year strategic plan. Evidently, an 
accountability model needs to incorporate a broad range of factors: CICA 
accounting standards for both commercial and public sector organizations, CIA 
standards where applicable and specific government accountability standards as 
reflected in the Transparency and Accountability legislation. The following 
chapter presents the research methodology for this study into the development of a 
stakeholder reporting model for the WCB agency. 
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CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
4.0 Introduction 
This chapter presents the methodology selected to address this study's research 
questions, to develop a stakeholder accountability reporting model for public 
sector agencies. This research examines how the application of commercial and 
public sector accounting standards, combined with prominent goverment 
reporting requirements influence the WCB's discharge of its stakeholders' 
accountability expectations. The Newfoundland WCB is used for this case study 
since it is a long-standing public sector agency in Newfoundland as are WCBs in 
all other jurisdictions in Canada. It is among the most autonomous of public sector 
agencies owing to its funding arrangements and governance structure. 
Consequently, an accountability reporting model for this agency must address a 
broad array of multi-dimensional issues for many stakeholders. The WCB 
stakeholder reporting model is expected to be comprehensive and thus 
transferable, with modification, to other public sector agencies. The research 
includes a documentary analysis to evaluate the impact of regulatory and 
voluntary reporting on WCBs. The wider issues pertaining to performance 
reporting to stakeholders are explored through semi-structured interviews with 
selected stakeholder groups. 
The chapter begins by providing a discussion of the role of workers' 
compensation agencies along with an analysis of the accountability issues facing 
these public sector agencies. The chapter outlines the approach taken for data 
collection and analysis and examines the advantages and disadvantages associated 
with qualitative research methodologies. In particular, this research aims to 
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develop a stakeholder accountability reporting model by identifying how the 
WCBs' primary stakeholders view accountability and by discerning the reporting 
mechanisms and consultation approaches which would meet their accountability 
needs. 
4.1 Role and Structure of Workers' Compensation Boards 
As noted in Chapter 1, the main role of each WCB in Canada is to provide 
medical benefits, wage loss replacement and rehabilitation to injured workers and 
to provide insurance for the employer community. There are twelve WCBs in 
Canada, one for each Province and Territory. Each WCB is governed by its 
respective provincial/territorial legislation, and all WCBs report their activities 
and financial results to their provincial/territorial legislature. Each WCB is 
administered by an independent Board of Directors. The composition of these 
Boards varies somewhat by jurisdiction, but they usually include representatives 
for workers, employers and the general public. 
As explained in Chapter 1, in Newfoundland, the CEO and Board of Directors 
administer the WCB agency. The organizational structure is depicted in Appendix 
2. The authority to discharge all the responsibilities prescribed by legislation 
regarding the operation of the agency rests with the Board of Directors. The 
fonnal reporting relationship of the Board of Directors to the Minister of Labour 
complements an informal administrative arrangement whereby the CEO of the 
WCB reports to the CEO of the Labour Relations Agency. In effect, the CEO of 
the Labour Relations Agency is the intermediary between the CEO and the 
Minister. The roles of the Board of Directors and CEO are outlined in Appendix 3. 
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WCB programs are independent of other social programs and are governed by the 
provincial rather than by the federal government. WCB benefits are employer 
funded and are provided to individuals who are injured during the course of their 
employment. A comparison of Canada's social programs is depicted in the 
following table: 
Table 4.1: Canada's Social ProLrams 
Program Description Funding Responsibility 
Source 
Social Income assistance for Taxation Provincial 
Assistance individuals with no Government 
other source of income 
Health Care Services of hospitals and Taxation Federal and 
physicians at no charge Provincial 
to all citizens Governments 
Canada Pension Pension benefits for all Jointly by Federal 
Plan citizens upon retirement employers and Government 
from the workforce employees 
Old Age Pension benefits for all Taxation Federal 
Pension citizens at the age of 65 Government 
Employment Benefits for individuals Jointly by Federal 
Insurance who have been employers and Government 
displaced from employees 
employment 
Workers' Benefits for individuals Employer Provincial 
Compensation who are injured during funded Government 
the course of their 
employment 
A Statutory Review of the WCB is required by legislation every five years, and it 
is conducted by a committee appointed by government. This Committee 
represents all stakeholders of the system: employers, workers, government and the 
general public. Its mandate is to review the WCB's legislation, policies and 
operations and make recommendations for changes. However, the government is 
not obligated to implement the recommendations of the Statutory Review 
Committee. The Committee conducts an independent review and serves as a 
means to involve all stakeholders, thereby giving them more ownership of the 
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system. It also acts as a public forum since its report is made available to the 
public. It is noteworthy that the WCB is the only Newfoundland government 
agency which is subject to a Statutory Review process. This arrangement is 
thought to indicate a higher standard of accountability than that expected of other 
public sector organizations. 
All the Canadian WCBs provide the same basic services to injured workers and 
their survivors: health care, rehabilitation, short term disability benefits, long term 
disability benefits and survivor benefits. The health care benefits include a full 
range of medical, surgical, nursing and hospital services. Short term disability 
benefits include all income benefits paid to the injured worker during the initial 
period after the injury, before the injury has stabilized or plateaued. Depending on 
the jurisdiction, the benefits provided range from 75% of gross wages to 90% of 
net wages. Long term disability benefits include all income benefits paid to an 
injured worker after the short term disability benefits have ceased and after the 
injury is deemed to be sufficiently stabilized. Generally, long term disability 
benefits are indexed to the Consumer Price Index. Survivor benefits are paid to the 
surviving spouse and children in situations where a worker is fatally injured 
(Doane Wyatt, 1992). 
In addition to providing health care and wage loss benefits to injured workers, 
some jurisdictions in Canada also have responsibility for the administration of all 
or a portion of Occupational Health and Safety (OHS). In Newfoundland, OHS is 
administered jointly by the Department of Government Services and the WCB. 
The WCB is responsible for the prevention and training aspects while the 
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Department of Goverm-nent Services is responsible for the enforcement of 
compliance with the OHS legislation which is achieved through inspections, 
audits and the levying of fines. 
The WCB funds these programs by levying and collecting assessment premium 
revenues from employers. These premiums are determined by a number of factors 
including injury risk level of the employer, type of industry, claims history, 
legislation, and economic conditions. The WCBs levy annual premiums that are 
sufficient to cover the current and expected future lifetime costs of claims incurred 
in the current fiscal year as well as related administration costs. Premiums 
collected from employers are invested until needed to pay compensation and other 
costs associated with that year's injuries. 
While there have been demands for improved government accountability, there 
have also been calls for improvements in accountability of specific public 
services. For example, Jennissen et al (2000) claim workers' compensation is one 
of the oldest social programs in Canada and it is one of the least publicly 
accountable. Jennissen et al maintain that workers' compensation should be made 
more accountable in line with other government services. Their view that 
accountability expectations for WCBs are weaker than line goverment 
departments can likely be attributed to the absence of WCB's results in 
government reports and, in many cases these results do not appear to be subject to 
the accountability standards imposed on government departments and agencies 
which are dependent on government funding. 
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Jennissen et al (2000) contend that the challenge facing WCBs is extending 
beyond traditional accountability to business and labour. to include accountability 
to elected officials for policy results and administrative processes. They call for 
increased WCB accountability to government through outcome-based reporting 
and increased government participation in the direction of programs. They assert 
that responsibility rests with government to ensure workers' compensation 
agencies are held to account. 
4.2 Stakeholder Classification and Their Stakes 
This study into the development of a stakeholder accountability reporting model is 
based on the premise that individual stakeholders can be classified into groups. 
Using Clarkson's (1995) primary/secondary typology as a method to classify the 
stakeholder groups, WCB stakeholders are classified into the following primary 
and secondary groups. 
Table 4.2: WCB Stakeholder Classification 
Primary Stakeholders Secondary Stakeholders 
(Potential) Injured workers_ General public 
Employers Envirorunental groups 
Govemment 
Health care providers 
Employees 
The focus of this study is on the accountability of the WCB agencies to their 
primary stakeholder groups defined are those whose continued involvement is 
considered essential in order for the organization to survive. The general public 
classification refers to citizens who are not directly involved in the WCB system 
through a workplace injury or as an assessment paying employer. Their interest in 
the organization is simply knowing that the system exists in the event of a 
workplace injury. Consequently, the general public is considered to be secondary 
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stakeholders. Enviromnental groups are also classified as secondary stakeholders 
since they are not essential for the WCB's survival. The secondary stakeholders, 
defined as those whose participation is not essential for the organization's 
survival, are outside the scope of this research. 
This research is based on the premise of an accountability relationship or bond 
(Stewart, 1984) among the primary stakeholders as illustrated in the Figure 4.1 
below. The two-way arrows in this Figure indicate that the relationship among 
stakeholders is a two-way reciprocal process. The WCB agency is placed in the 
centre since it is charged with demonstrating accountability to its primary 
stakeholder groups. This schematic depicts the WCB's relationship with 
govemment and its other stakeholders. 





Injured Workers Associations 
WCB 
Board of Directors 









Health Care Providers 
Doctors 
Hospitals 
Service Providers (1) 
Vendors (2) 
Notes: 
1. Service providers include doctors, physiotherapists, chiropractors, etc. 
2. Vendors refer to suppliers of health care products, such as wheelchairs, etc. 
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In addition to classifying the WCB stakeholders as either primary or secondary, it 
is beneficial to consider the relative importance or salience of the various primary 
stakeholders. While five groups (injured workers, employers, government, health 
care providers and WCB staff) are classified as primary stakeholders, there are 
differences in their perceived relative salience. The issue of stakeholder salience is 
central to this research, since the WCB system was established to address the 
needs of two groups: injured workers and employers. Consequently, it could be 
argued that these two primary stakeholder groups are more important than the 
other primary stakeholders groups (goverriment, health care providers and WCB 
staff). The salience level of the primary stakeholders is examined through the 
research. Stakeholder salience is dependent on the cumulative number of 
attributes. The following table reflects the hypothesized salience of WCB primary 
stakeholders: 
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Table 4.3: Hvnothesized WCB Primarv StakeholdiprSalit-mvi- 
Attribute Stakeholder classirication WCB Primary Stakeholders 
No power, Not stakeholders Not applicable 
legitimacy or 
urgency 
One attribute Latent stakeholders Not applicable for primary 
" Dormant - possess power to stakeholders, but could be 
impose will, but do not have relevant for secondary 
legitimacy or urgency stakeholder groups - for 
" Discretionary - legitimacy, but no example, the general public 
power or urgency would fit the dormant 
Demanding - urgency, but no attribute. 
power or legitimacy 
Two attributes Moderately salient - expecting Government, WCB staff, 
something health care providers - 
" Dominant - power and legitimacy dominant since they have 
" Dependent - legitimacy and power and legitimacy, but no 
urgency, no power urgency 
" Dangerous - urgency and power, 
no legitimacy 
Three Highly salient (Potential) Injured workers 
attributes Definitive (trade unions) and employers 
(associations) since they have 
power, legitimacy and urgency 
Source: Adapted from Mitchell et al (1997) p. 872 
As depicted in the preceding table, goverm-nent, WCB staff and health care 
providers are considered to be moderately salient since they possess the two 
attributes of power and legitimacy, while employers and unions display the three 
attributes of power, legitimacy and urgency, and are therefore highly salient. The 
urgency aspect of power attributed to employers and injured workers is based on 
the premise that the WCB is expected to address their concerns as beneficiaries 
and funders as expeditiously as possible. Issues related to payment of benefits to 
injured workers are critical since they likely have no or very limited other sources 
of income. For example, delays in processing claims can result in serious negative 
impacts on the livelihood of those who are injured. Although employer issues are 
not so immediate, their interest in balancing the high cost of WCB premiums with 
their profitability goals also requires the timely attention of the WCB managers. 
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Friedman and Miles (2006: p. 95) note that attributes to the model of stakeholder 
salience are transitory. Time sensitivity and criticality on which urgency is based 
are dynamic. For example, while employers and trade unions' salience level is 
predominantly static, there may be occasions when it could temporarily change. 
Indicators of change include labour disputes within the WCB or service providers. 
During a labour dispute, WCB staff would move from moderately salient to 
highly salient as their needs become urgent to the organization. Similarly, the 
withdrawal of services by health care providers would escalate their salience level 
from moderate to high. Once the disputes are resolved and services reinstated, 
WCB staff and health care providers would revert back to a moderate salience 
level. Consequently, when circumstances change, even temporarily, the 
stakeholder salience model is dynamic and can be modified to reflect various 
situations. 
Following from the classification of WCB stakeholders, this research examines 
the stakes or issues of concern for the Agency's primary stakeholders. The 
following table, adapted from Carnaghan. et al (1996) illustrates the multiple WCB 
stakeholders along with their hypothesized stakes and accountability criteria. 
These hypotheses are explored and confirmed through the semi-structured 
stakeholder interviews as outlined in Chapters 6 and 7. 
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Table 4.4: WCB Stakeholders and Their Hvpothesized Stakes 
Stakeholders Hypothesized Stakes Hypothesized 
Accountability Criteria 
Employers (Funders) Minimize premiums Funding position 
0 Average premium rate 
Reduce injuries 0 Injury frequency 
Prompt return to work 0 RTW success rate 
0 ESRTW outcomes 
Operate efficiently and 0 Reduce administration 
effectively costs 
0 Total costs 
Cost per claim 
Number claims denied 
Percentage claims 
appealed 
(Injured) Employees Rehabilitation and return to 0 RTW success rate 
(Beneficiaries) work 0 ESRTW outcome 
0 Duty to accommodate 
0 Injury frequency 
Improved safety 
0 Reduce time to first 
Operated efficiently and payment 
effectively 0 Number of claims denied 
0 Number of claims 
accepted 
0 Percentage of claims 
appealed 
0 Funding position 
0 Administration costs 
Government 0 Adherence to legislation 0 Audit opinion (Auditor 
General) 
0 Financially viable insurance 0 Funding position 
coverage for employees and 0 Average premium rate 
employers 0 Wage replacement rate 
0 Reduce administration 
costs 
Minimize financial impact on 
other government social 0 Number of claims 
programs accepted 
0 Number of claims denied 
WCB Staff Recruitment and retention 0 Employee turnover rate 
Training and development 0 Number of training days : 
Employee morale 0 Staff satisfaction 
Health Care Providers _ 0 WCB as a revenue source 0 Funds available for health 
" Maintain professional care providers 
standards 
" Assist injured workers 
medically recover and return 
to work 
Source: Adapted from Carnaghan et al (1996), p. 167 
Legend: RTW - return-to-work; ESRTW - Early and Safe Return to Work 
III 
4.3 Methodology 
The research question addressed by this study is the development of a multi- 
dimensional stakeholder accountability reporting model. To develop this model, it 
is necessary to identify and classify stakeholder groups, their stakes and desired 
accountability framework. It has been determined from the literature review in 
Chapter 2 that Clarkson's (1995) primary/secondary typology best reflects the 
nature of WCB stakeholders' interests. Moreover, this research seeks to identify 
stakeholders' views on their relative importance or salience (Mitchell et al, 1997). 
Through the case study, stakeholders' views regarding their stakes (Camaghan et 
al, 1996) will be explored and their preferred accountability approaches will be 
examined. 
The case study methodology is ideally suited to the stated objectives of this study. 
Yin (1994) defines case studies as a multi-faceted research strategy which 
typically involves an in-depth examination of one organization, situation or 
community. Case studies can be described as holistic investigations which 
generate both quantitative and qualitative data from archival material, interviews, 
surveys and observations (Hill, 1993). Hyde (2000) suggests that a case study is 
not simply a single qualitative method; rather, it is an approach to research. Face- 
to-face interviews, associated with case studies, provide an opportunity to probe 
stakeholders for additional information and result in richer and more in-depth 
information than could be derived solely from a survey of a statistical sample of 
the population at large. The case study approach facilitates in-depth interviews 
with the stakeholder groups representing the underlying individual stakeholders. 
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A case study is beneficial for the development of a stakeholder accountability 
reporting model which best meets the multidimensional needs of a public sector 
agency. It is an appropriate technique for this research problem given the paucity 
of research investigating users' needs related to how government agencies can 
demonstrate accountability to their stakeholders. This research approach provides 
a mechanism to understand the meaning which stakeholders attribute to various 
situations. Furthermore, it enables the exploration of new ideas by developing and 
testing hypothesis of the stakes and accountability criteria, thereby contributing to 
the evolution of new theories (Easterby-Smith et al, 1991; Miles and Huberman, 
1994; McCracken, 1988). It provides the researcher with the flexibility to adjust 
the data collection methods as the study proceeds, and it yields comprehensive 
results and rich data (Miles and Huberman, 1994). The face-to-face interview 
process enables the researcher to control the line of questioning, particularly in 
situations where it may become apparent that some of the questions need to be 
amended to ensure clarity or when the responses may generate additional 
questions. This flexibility contributes to the level of understanding of the issues. 
Although case studies are time consuming and costly, their findings cannot be 
generalized and they lack rigorous control which can compromise validity 
(Bennett, 1991; Hill, 1993), these disadvantages can be minimized and mitigated. 
While it provides rich information, enabling respondents to provide general 
feedback, it risks increasing the narrative to be analyzed, thereby increasing the 
amount of time required to analyze and code the responses. This disadvantage is 
largely mitigated in this research by taping the interviews and having them 
transcribed by a typist, along with using NVivo software for coding. The 
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researcher's ease of access to respondents (no refusals) reduced the time and costs 
usually associated with securing access to interviewees. The only cash outlay 
related to transcribing services. The researcher had previously acquired NVivo 
software and tapes and had access to a tape recorder through her employer. 
Finally, there were minimal travel costs since the respondents resided in the 
researcher's home city. 
As the methods of analyzing qualitative data have not been well formulated, this 
approach has limitations in terms of replicating the study (Creswell, 1994). 
Moreover, the typically small sample size does not lend itself to generalizability 
(McCracken, 1988). Although this case study cannot be generalized in the same 
manner as that achieved through a statistical sample, as discussed in Chapter 9, 
the methodology and resulting reporting model are transferable to other public 
sector agencies such as health care boards, school boards and hydroelectric crown 
corporations. 
The lack of rigorous controls typically associated with case studies as well as the 
possible reflexivity of the researcher, potential influence of active listening, and 
the impact of the relationship between the interviewer and the respondent 
(McCracken, 1988) were partially mitigated through taping the interviews and 
through the researcher not attending round table meetings. Taping the interviews 
ensured that all responses were captured accurately and coding using NVivo 
software improved control through the production of reports showing the 
comments of all respondents by topic. This reduced the possibility of 
inadvertently omitting key responses. The CEO invited the researcher to attend 
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the round table meetings, but this opportunity was declined to maintain a degree 
ofindependence. 
While all the disadvantages cannot be mitigated, a case study would be the most 
appropriate approach due to the complex nature of the research questions and the 
need to solicit feedback from a number of stakeholder groups representing a broad 
spectrum of society. 
This research has two components: (1) a documentary review of the reporting 
environment and (2) a series of semi-structured interviews with a questionnaire 
component. The documentary review examines the reporting environment of the 
WCBs. The semi-structured interviews are comprised of open-ended questions 
along with a questionnaire component of checklist and Likert-scale questions 
(administered in a face-to-face format) to deepen and test the findings (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994). The multiple data collection approach aids in obtaining 
comprehensive information from stakeholder input and facilitates a degree of 
quantitative analysis. 
Some researchers use multiple methods since the strengths of one method offset 
the weaknesses of the other methods (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998) while 
achieving triangulation. Triangulation refers to the extent to which research 
findings can be confirmed by the simultaneous application of multiple methods, 
multiple investigators, multiple data sets or multiple theories. Increased 
triangulation provides more robust results and improves the ability of researchers 
to draw conclusions and generalize findings (Scandura and Williams, 2000). This 
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study's literature review, documentary review, semi-structured interviews with 
open-ended questions, checklist questions and Likert-scale questions ensure that 
data and method triangulation is achieved. 
4.4 Documentary Reviews 
The first main thrust of this research is an extensive archival review of the 
Canadian WCB reporting environment. At a national level, the documentary 
review comprises the Canadian accounting guidelines for commercial enterprises 
and the public sector, the standards of the Canadian Institute of Actuaries (CIA) 
and the industry practices of the Association of Workers' Compensation Boards of 
Canada (AWCBC) concerning financial reporting and Key Statistical Measures 
(KSMs). From a provincial perspective, the documentary review includes the 
WCB Annual Report, strategic plan, WCB Act, the Auditor General Act and the 
Transparency and Accountability Act. 
The findings of the documentary review are analyzed regarding the implications 
of commercial versus public sector accounting standards as well as the impact of 
actuarial standards on stakeholder accountability reporting. The voluntary 
standards of the AWCBC are also analyzed to determine the impact of industry- 
specific standards on reporting. Finally, the reporting requirements specific to 
Newfoundland are examined along with the agency's level of compliance. 
4.5 Exploratory Interviews 
Prior to the development of the main data collection technique (semi- structured 
interviews) eight exploratory interviews were held with primary stakeholders 
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(three employer groups, three unions and one government official) and with a 
senior executive of the WCB agency. These exploratory interviews help refine the 
research instrument by gaining in-depth information, ascertaining how WCBs 
currently demonstrate accountability to their stakeholders and eliciting more 
detailed and comprehensive information regarding the key performance indicators 
which the stakeholders would like to evaluate performance. The exploratory 
interviews enable the researcher to test the issues and develop the main research 
instrument (semi- structured interviews), thereby gaining an in-depth 
understanding of the issues. The interviews were very flexible in order to facilitate 
additional topics raised by the interviewees. The insight gained from the 
exploratory interviews added to the breadth and scope of the semi-structured 
interview questionnaire component. 
Face-to-face exploratory interviews (using open-ended questions) were conducted 
with one or two experts in each of the three key stakeholder groups as well as with 
a WCB executive. This approach provided a comprehensive understanding of 
stakeholders' concerns, their views towards accountability and the performance 
reporting approach of interest to them. Experts were selected for exploratory 
interviews based on their expected knowledge level of the workers' compensation 
system. This research approach is based on the premise that various stakeholder 
groups represent individual stakeholders and have expert knowledge of the 
workers' compensation system. The concept is supported by Creswell (1994) who 
suggests that qualitative researchers should purposefully select those infonnants 
who will best answer the research questions. The following table depicts the 
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individuals who are represented by the primary stakeholder groups and the 
corresponding interview participants. 
Table 4.5: Stakeholder GrouD ReDresentation for EXDloratorv Interviews 
Stakeholder Group Individuals Represented Interview Participants 
Employer Employers Health Care Association 
Associations Canadian Federation of 
Independent Business 
Chamber of Commerce 
Trade Unions and (Injured) Workers Nurses Union 
Worker Carpenters Union 
Representative Workers' Representative 
Government Employees, employers, Treasury Board 
citizens, injured workers 
In addition to the interviews with the above-noted stakeholder groups, an 
interview was conducted with a senior WCB executive. 
The one to two hour exploratory interviews were conducted by the researcher 
through field site visits to the offices of the interviewees. As new issues emerged 
throughout the interviews, topics were added to subsequent exploratory 
interviews. Consequently, the exploratory interviews were fluid and responsive, 
enabling the researcher to explore new issues as they were raised by respondents. 
The researcher took notes and also tape recorded the interviews. Once the 
interviews were transcribed, the researcher re-played the tapes to verify the 
accuracy of the transcripts. The transcripts were read for a second time to identify 
any pertinent issues to the list of exploratory questions for subsequent interviews. 
Finally, after all interviews had been completed, the transcripts were analyzed 
using NVivo software. This software is used to code transcript passages to various 
key topics. The information derived from these exploratory interviews informed 
the questions for the main data collection tool: the semi-structured interviews used 
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in the main study with a larger number of stakeholder groups and WCB 
executives. 
The exploratory interview questions were based on stakeholder accountability 
issues derived from the literature review and the documentary review. The 
questions were designed to elicit stakeholders' views on identification of 
stakeholder groups, salience level, and the WCBs current methods of 
demonstrating accountability through the various types of information provided, 
appropriate comparative referents, and stakeholder participation in selecting 
applicable performance measures. The research seeks to identify additional 
information not currently provided that would aid stakeholders in their evaluation 
of the WCB. The initial set of questions encompassed the following topics: 
1. Accountability 
a. Do you believe WCB is demonstrating accountability? 
b. Is there anything else we can do to improve accountability? 
2. Types of information provided 
a. Are there other Key Statistical Measures (KSMs) and financial 
reports that are not provided which you would like to have 
compiled? 
3. Stakeholder participation in selection KSMs and report content 
a. What forums should be used to solicit feedback? 
b. What is the value of stakeholder surveys? 
4. Annual Report 
a. How useful do you find the annual report and the type of 
information it provides? 
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b. Is there anything that is particularly useful in the annual report? 
5. Comparative referents 
a. Other provinces, national statistics 
b. Atlantic provinces 
c. Targets 
d. Year-over-year 
e. Private insurance industry 
6. Other sources of information 
a. What other sources of information to you use? 
b. Are you familiar with the AWCBC? 





a. Do you use WCB website? 
b. What do you like about it? 
9. Medium to provide information 
a. Website 
b. Annual report 
c. Press release 
Throughout the course of these interviews, stakeholders raised the following 
issues which had not been included in the initial set of questions: 
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1. Round Table Stakeholder Meetings 
This refers to the semi-annual round table meetings which the WCB holds 
with its employer and injured worker stakeholder groups to solicit their 
feedback and to provide them with information on the organization's 
plans. These meetings were raised in the first interview as a very important 
means of soliciting stakeholder participation in a two-way communication 
process. The respondents indicated this topic was of high importance to 
them, but they expressed diverse views regarding the effectiveness of the 
round table meetings. Consequently, all subsequent exploratory interviews 
as well as the semi-structured interview questions encompass this topic. 
2. Strategic Planning 
The WCB's strategic plan was discussed by an employer stakeholder 
group. This stakeholder group identified a number of concerns with the 
strategic plan: it has too many objectives, it is too operational, it is not 
outcome-based and it is driven by the Balanced Scorecard (BSC) rather 
than using the BSC as a reporting tool. This topic was included in 
subsequent exploratory interviews as well as in the serni-structured 
interview questions. 
3. Administration Costs 
WCB's administration costs have been a concern of government and 
certain employer groups. However, historically, there has been little 
evidence of concern among the other stakeholder groups. Due to this 
apparent contradiction regarding the importance of administration costs, 
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this question was added to the list in order to ascertain stakeholders' level 
of concern. It is also explored in the semi-structured questions. 
4. Accountability 
The questions initially focused on determining if stakeholders believe the 
WCB is demonstrating accountability and if there is more that the 
organization could do to improve accountability. However, the exploratory 
interviews demonstrated that since this is a crucial aspect of the research, 
the following additional topics should be queried: 
a) What does the concept of accountability mean to you? 
b) Who is accountable for the WCB system? 
c) Do you consider the WCB to be a social program? 
d) Is the WCB in compliance with govenunent's accountability 
guidelines? 
5. Stakeholder Identification 
The questions were devised and interviewees were selected based on the 
researcher's identification of the primary stakeholder groups. During the 
course of the interviews, the researcher gradually became aware of her 
potential bias as a WCB Finance Director. Consequently, the researcher 
concluded that it would be prudent to ask the interviewees who they 
considered to be the main stakeholders of the WCB system. Therefore, the 
exploratory interviews expanded to include this topic and it is included in 
the semi-structured interview questions. 
122 
6. Revenue Generation 
The initial set of questions did not include a question particularly focused 
on revenue. Rather, it was assumed that revenue would be discussed in 
terms of KSMs. However, one of the employer groups raised the issue of 
monthly premium billing and Canadian Revenue Agency (CRA) matching. 
Monthly billing is desired by employers since they currently have only two 
options: (1) pay the entire annual premium in April or (2) request quarterly 
payment arrangements (which include interest). 
The CRA is Canada's national taxation agency. CRA matching refers to 
the process whereby the WCB and CRA match their respective registration 
listings in order to identifý employers who are not registered with one of 
these organizations. Since both topics have been discussed extensively, 
internally and externally, the researcher concluded that it would be prudent 
to further explore stakeholders' views on these topics. 
The exploratory interviews proved to be extremely valuable. As each interview 
was conducted and new issues emerged, subsequent interviews were enriched. 
Since exploratory interviews were held with representatives of the three key 
stakeholder groups as well as with a WCB executive, this process led to a deeper 
and richer understanding of WCB stakeholder issues and allowed the researcher to 
develop a comprehensive set of semi-structured interview questions. The 
information gathered from the exploratory interviews was used, along with 
information derived from the literature review and from the documentary review 
to design the semi-structured interviews. 
123 
4.6 Semi-structured Interviews 
After the documentary review and exploratory interviews, the third phase of this 
research study entailed the main data collection mechanism, semi-structured 
interviews in a face-to-face format with selected sample from each of the major 
stakeholder groups, employers, workers, govermnent, health care providers and 
WCB staff as well as with WCB executives. A stratified non-random sample of 
representatives from each stakeholder group is appropriate since the groups are 
considered to be representatives of the population. 
The groups were selected based on the hypothesized primary stakeholder groups 
as identified in Section 4.2. Clarkson's (1995) typology is used to classify 
stakeholders as primary or secondary. Five groups were determined to be primary 
stakeholders: employers, (injured) workers, WCB staff, health care providers and 
government. Moreover, the primary stakeholder groups are further delineated 
according to level of salience. Employers and (injured) workers are hypothesized 
to be highly salient; this is consistent with Mitchell et al's (1997) criteria of 
power, legitimacy and urgency. The remaining primary stakeholders (government, 
WCB staff and health care providers) are considered to be moderately salient. One 
of the objectives of the research is to confirm the primary stakeholder groups and 
their salience level. In addition to the stakeholder groups, executives of the WCB 
agency were interviewed. WCB executives are not considered stakeholders; rather 
they are assumed to be contained within the firm (Friedman and Miles, 2006). 
In spite of the disadvantages of face-to-face interviews, this technique has been 
chosen. Since the sample size is relatively small, a high response rate is required 
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to give credible results. According to Singleton and Straits (2002), face-to-face 
surveys are useful to examine complex issues, allow for maximum degree of 
probing, yield a better response rate, provide flexibility over question content and 
facilitate clarification of questions and terminology. This methodology is 
appropriate to this study's focus on the development of a stakeholder 
accountability model for public sector agencies. 
The open-ended questions were conducted before the respondents were asked to 
self-complete the Likert-scale and checklist questions. The rationale for this order 
was to ensure that responses to open-ended questions were not influenced or 
limited by the choices provided in the Likert-scale and checklist questions. Also, 
if a portion of the time had been spent at the beginning of the interview on the 
questionnaire component, the interviewees may also have been somewhat rushed 
in their responses to the open-ended questions, thus not providing the depth and 
breadth of information needed for this study. 
In addition to the options provided, space is provided for respondents to add 
information not included in the checklists. This ensures that more complete 
information is obtained from respondents. Likert-scale questions enable the 
researcher to assess the relative degree of importance of various issues to the 
respondents. The checklists and Likert-scale questions facilitate data coding and a 
degree of quantitative analysis. The interview instruments are provided in 
Appendices 4-8. The following issues were examined through the three 
components of the semi-structured interviews: 
125 
a) Accountability: what does the concept mean, to whom should the WCB be 
held accountable 
b) Stakeholder identification 
c) Financial reporting: purpose served, sufficiency of information 
d) Annual Report 
e) Role of the Auditor 
f) Stakeholder consultation 
g) Strategic plan: is the plan appropriate, are the targets realistic 
h) Non-financial perforniance reporting 
i) Reporting forum and frequency 
Types of performance information desired by stakeholders 
k) Comparative referents 
1) Website: usefulness as a source of information 
m) Administration costs 
n) Round table meetings: are they effective, should all stakeholders be invited 
to attend, regional representation 
o) Communication with stakeholders 
Role and mission of WCB 
q) Premium billing cycle 
4.6.1 Selection of interview participants 
The interview participants were selected not only for their knowledge of the 
workers' compensation system, but also to confirm the hypothesized 
primary/secondary classification and perceived salience levels. Since this subject 
is somewhat technical, it is expected that the unions and employer associations are 
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in a better position to provide meaningful information since they are likely to have 
a more comprehensive knowledge of the workers' compensation system than 
individual employees and individual employers. Therefore, a large random sample 
of employees and employers would not be appropriate since it would not likely 
yield the best possible information. 
This view of stakeholders as experts is supported by the fact that these groups 
regularly lobby govermuent and the WCB Board of Directors regarding various 
issues on behalf of their constituents. Given the nature of the research design and 
the limitations in terms of generalizability and transferability, a purposive non- 
random sample, which represents the key stakeholders (subgroups) in the 
population, is appropriate. In addition, representatives of health care providers, 
government and WCB staff were interviewed to obtain their perspectives on the 
agency's accountability to its stakeholders. Secondary stakeholders (envirorunent 
and public) were not interviewed since they are outside the scope of this study. 
Table 4.6 depicts the specific stakeholder groups that participated in the 
interviews. 
It should be noted that the respondents are generally union presidents or high level 
union officials, while the employer interviewees are the chief executives or high 
level representatives of the employer associations. The union and employer 
respondents also participate in the WCB's round table stakeholder meetings. The 
union and employer groups do not have accountants or analysts available within 
their organizations to undertake an interpretation or analysis of the WCB financial 
statements and other financial reporting. 
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Table 4.6: Semi-structured Interviow PartivimantQ 
Stakeholder Group Type Group Name 
Employer Associations 0 Employers Council of Newfoundland 
0 Canadian Federation of Independent Business 
0 Hospitality Newfoundland and Labrador 
0 Newfoundland and Labrador Construction Safety 
Association 
0 Association of Seafood Producers 
0 Newfoundland and Labrador Construction 
Association 
Employee Associations 0 Newfoundland Association of Public and Private 
(Trade Unions) Employees 
0 United Food and Commercial Workers Union 
0 International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers 
0 Fish, Food and Allied Workers Union 
0 Newfoundland and Labrador Teachers' 
Association 
0 Royal Newfoundland Constabulary 
Health Care Providers 0 Occupational Therapists Association 
0 Physiotherapists Association 
Government 0 Auditor General's Office 
0 Chief Executive Officer, Labour Relations 
Agency 
WCB staff 0 Director, Human Resources 
0 President, Union Local 
In addition to the five primary stakeholder groups, the following representatives of 
the WCB agency were interviewed: 
1) Chief Executive Officer 
2) Chair, Board of Directors 
3) Chief Financial and Information Officer 
The trade unions and employer association respondents for the exploratory and 
semi-structured interviews were selected from the round table participants. In 
addition to the eight exploratory interviews, twenty-one respondents were selected 
for the semi-structured interviews comprised of six trade unions, six employer 
associations, two health care providers, two government representatives, two 
WCB staff representatives and three WCB executives. This combined sample, for 
exploratory and semi-structured interviews, includes nine of seventeen employer 
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associations and nine of fifteen trade unions representing 53% and 60% 
respectively of the round table participants. The union and employer interviewees 
were selected to reflect a cross-section of industries as well as small and large 
stakeholder groups. All respondents contacted agreed to be interviewed. This high 
level of participation (no refusals) may be attributed to the researcher's position as 
Finance Director with the WCB agency. 
4.6.2 Survey Instruments 
Five different surveys were employed in this research study (refer to Appendices 
4-8). The same survey was administered to employer associations and trade 
unions (Appendix 4). Both of these groups were asked the same open-ended 
questions, checklist questions and Likert-scale questions since they have many of 
the same issues. A comparison of their responses provides additional validation of 
the research findings. 
Although there are many common concerns for all stakeholders, there are a 
sufficient number of different issues pertaining to health care providers, 
government, WCB staff and managers to warrant separate surveys. As a result of 
using different survey instruments, the results contained in the charts and tables in 
Chapters 6 and 7 reflect comparative responses mostly from employers and trade 
unions and where applicable, WCB executives' responses. For the most part, 
govermnent, WCB staff and health care provider responses are reflected in a 
narrative format. 
129 
4.6.3 Data Analysis 
The open-ended question portions of the interviews were tape recorded and notes 
were also taken. The tapes were transcribed and their accuracy verified by 
replaying the tapes and by comparing to the notes. Prior to reading the interview 
transcripts, an initial list of key topics was compiled based on the questions posed. 
The transcripts were read for a second time and additional topics were included. 
The transcripts were exported from Microsoft Word into NVivo software and 
coded to nineteen topics as outlined in Appendix 11. These coding topics may 
prove beneficial, as coding structures, for future researchers examining 
stakeholder accountability reporting models. 
NVivo enabled the researcher to code passages under key headings/titles. This 
coding software facilitated grouping and sorting of responses and production of 
reports by topic. These reports contain all passages coded to each topic for all 
respondents thus ensuring that all respondents' views on each topic were 
considered in the analysis. The checklist and Likert-scale questions were 
summarized and tabulated using Excel spreadsheets. The cumulative responses 
were exported from Excel into graphs and tables in Chapters 6 and 7. 
4.7 Stakeholder Reporting Model 
Based on the results of the semi-structured interviews, documentary review and 
literature review, a stakeholder reporting model is developed. Clarkson's (1995) 
primary/secondary typology is used in conjunction with Mitchell et al's (1997) 
salience classification scheme. This model is comprised of the accountability 
stakes and key criteria identified by primary stakeholders as necessary to evaluate 
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the perfon-nance of the WCB agency. A fundamental objective of the model is the 
identification of the financial and performance reporting forms preferred by 
stakeholders as well as their desired consultation approach. The model links 
Stewart's (1984) Ladder of Accountability and Friedman and Miles' (2006) 
Ladder of Stakeholder Management and Engagement to illustrate a way for public 
sector agencies to demonstrate accountability to their stakeholders. Stewart's 
Ladder of Accountability is used to identify the many different aspects of 
accountability (probity/legality, process, performance, program and policy) which 
a stakeholder reporting model is expected to address. Friedman and Miles' (2006) 
Ladder of Stakeholder Management and Engagement is employed since effective 
management of stakeholders is a critical component of meeting their 
accountability expectations. Semi-structured interviews, in conjunction with the 
documentary review and the literature review, inform a reporting model that meets 
the needs of stakeholders. 
4.8 Limitations 
While this case study approach is based on the assumption that the researcher is 
independent and value-free, it is recognized that the researcher's extensive 
involvement with developing performance metrics in her capacity as a member of 
the Financial Reporting and Comparability Committee of the Association of 
Workers' Compensation Boards of Canada may limit her independence and 
contribute to bias. The researcher's extensive experience as an administrator in 
this industry could create a barrier with the respondents, compromising 
independence and influencing the responses. Also, the interviewer's attitudes and 
perceptions may influence her opinion about the respondents (Jobber. 1991). In 
spite of these drawbacks, verification of interview transcripts and the researcher's 
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increased awareness of the need for independence largely mitigate any potential 
bias created by her involvement in the workers' compensation system. 
Counteracting these potential limitations is the possibility that a novice would be 
less inclined to have hardened assumptions but would have more difficulty in 
seeing nuances and layered meanings (Johnson, 2002). In addition, the 
researcher's role as an administrator provided ease of access to the interviewees. 
Overall, the benefits derived from the researcher's role and knowledge of the 
WCB system outweighs any potential disadvantages. 
4.9 Conclusions 
The approach used in this case study utilized the information derived from the 
literature review, documentary review and the exploratory interviews to design the 
questionnaire and open-ended questions for the semi-structured interviews. The 
exploratory interviews and the documentary review were used sequentially to 
inform and refine the main research instrument (semi-structured interviews with a 
questionnaire component), thereby adding scope and breadth to the research. 
This chapter has set out the research methodology employed in this study and 
explained how a model would be developed to address the research questions. The 
following chapter presents the findings from the documentary review of the 
national and provincial reporting environments of workers' compensation 
agencies from a mandatory and voluntary perspective. 
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CHAPTER 5: AGENCY REPORTING - DOCUMENTARY REVIEW 
5.0 Introduction 
This chapter presents the documentary review of the Newfoundland WCB's 
current reporting mechanisms along with an analysis of its level of compliance 
with the mandatory and voluntary reporting standards. As public sector agencies, 
the WCBs are expected to comply with accounting standards set out by the 
Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants (CICA) as well as the industry- 
specific actuarial standards established by the Canadian Institute of Actuaries 
(CIA). There are also several voluntary reporting guidelines that have been 
developed by the Association of Workers' Compensation Boards of Canada 
(AWCBC). Finally, the reporting standards as reflected in the Transparency and 
Accountability legislation, which apply to government organizations in 
Newfoundland, are explored. 
There are several reporting issues explored in this chapter: adoption of 
commercial accounting standards, adherence to fair value measurement for 
investment assets, determination of benefit liabilities and calculation of funding 
position. The funding position is calculated as assets divided by liabilities and 
reserves. 2 This ratio is used to indicate the sufficiency of assets to meet liabilities 
and is seen as an indicator of financial health of a WCB. These accounting issues 
may materially impact the WCB's financial position, thus influencing 
accountability to stakeholders. 
' The reason for including reserves is not stipulated. Reserves generally denote an excess of assets 
over liabilities. 
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The review encompasses the financial statements, annual report (including the 
strategic plan and BSC) and supplementary reports (AWCBC). The mandatory 
and voluntary reporting requirements and guidelines significantly impact this 
study's stakeholder accountability model as the agency endeavours to balance its 
regulatory and voluntary reporting requirements with the accountability reporting 
expectations of its primary stakeholders. This review commences with an analysis 
of the issues related to financial reporting, offers suggestions for improvements 
and then moves to a discussion of the wider performance reporting issues. 
5.1 Financial statements and related disclosures 
The financial statements of the WCB are influenced by the CICA commercial 
accounting standards. Since the financial statements represent the cornerstone of 
accountability, it is important to examine factors which influence financial 
reporting. As discussed in Chapter 2, some government organizations in Canada 
are considered to be business enterprises and thus subject to commercial 
accounting standards rather than public sector standards. 
The WCB meets the criteria of a GBE as it complies with the four required 
characteristics as outlined more ftilly in Chapter 3. Despite its designation as a 
GBE, the WCB is a non profit making public workplace insurance system. 
Accounting standards are an extremely important issue as the WCB appears to be 
a hybrid with respect to which guidelines it follows. Although the WCB is a 
public sector agency, it is subject to the commercial accounting guidelines; this is 
discussed in more detail in the subsequent sections. However, its actual reporting 
is more reflective of a public sector organization as it includes financial and non- 
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financial performance information, which given its non profit making status 
features prominently. The application of commercial rather than public sector 
accounting standards has an impact on the development of a stakeholder reporting 
model. 
Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants (C[C4) 
This section examines the impact of the CICA guidelines on its financial 
statements, using the Newfoundland WCB as an example. The purpose of this 
review is to identify the reporting issues unique to the WCB, along with the 
difficulties surrounding stakeholders' use of financial statements to satisfy their 
accountability needs. 
The WCB financial statements are prepared in accordance with generally accepted 
accounting principles (GAAP) for commercial enterprises. The basis of 
measurement is historical cost except for long-term investments which are stated 
at market value. While the following financial statements reflect those of 
Newfoundland's WCB, they are similar in presentation to the WCBs of other 
Canadian jurisdictions. The following section examines the balance sheet accounts 
of the Newfoundland WCB and highlights related reporting issues. (The complete 
WCB 2005 Annual Report accompanies this thesis). 
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Table 5.1: Statement of Financial Position as at December 31 
(dollars in thousands) 2005 2004 
Assets 
Cash and cash equivalents (Note 4) S 9,119 $ 5,774 
Receivables (Note 5) 13,649 15,662 
Investments (Note 6) 653,199 572,804 
Capital assets (Note 8) 10,267 9,599_ 
$ 686,234 $ 603,839 
Liabilities and Net Fund Deficiency 
Payables and accruals (Note 9) 
Benefit liabilities (Note 10) 
Total liabilities 
Reserves (Note 12) 
Accumulated other comprehensive income (Note 13) 
Unfunded liability 
Net fund deficiency 










$ 686,234 $603,839 
2005 Annual Report, p. 37 
Assets 
Cash and cash equivalents refer to funds in bank accounts and short-term 
investments with maturity of less than twelve months. Receivables are comprised 
primarily of assessment premiums due from employers, along with various 
miscellaneous accounts. Due to their low dollar value, prepaid expenses are 
grouped with receivables. Capital assets are comprised of land, building, furniture, 
computer equipment and systems development. In recent years, the WCB has 
made a significant investment to upgrade its legacy systems to improve 
automation, strengthen internal controls and provide stakeholders with web access 
to conduct their transactions. These initiatives are described internally as 'business 
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improvement projects'. The substantial costs associated with systems 
development consists of intemal staff time along with extemal consultants' 
professional fees, certain computer hardware, software and training. All capital 
assets including systems development are amortized over their useful life, and this 
complies with the CICA guidelines for intangible assets discussed in Chapter 3. 
Since some of these systems development projects may take up to five years to 
complete, amortization of staff time and consultant fees does not commence until 
the systems are substantially complete. Conversely, amortization of any hardware 
and software acquired for these projects commences in the year of acquisition. At 
issue here is the appropriate time to recognize the systems development costs as 
intangible assets. Critics could argue that this amortization practice raises the issue 
of intergenerational equity in terms of today's employers funding components of 
systems improvements which will largely benefit employers of the future. 
Consequently, one has to question whether appropriate WCB matching principles 
and intangible asset recognition have been applied, particularly in view of the 
organization's objective of levying sufficient revenue from today's employers to 
cover all future costs associated with injuries occurring in the current year. 
Most WCB assets are comprised of financial assets derived from assessment 
premium revenue. In each fiscal year, the WCB levies sufficient ftinds to cover all 
anticipated future costs associated with current year injuries. The funds levied in 
excess of those needed for the current year cash expenditures are invested with 
external fund managers appointed by the Investment Committee of the Board of 
Directors. Each investment manager is given a performance mandate to exceed the 
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applicable benchmark. For example, the managers of EAFE (Europe, Australia 
and Far East) equities are expected to exceed the performance of the Morgan 
Stanley Capital Index. The asset mix (comprised of equity and fixed income 
allocated in Canada, US and EAFE) is determined jointly by the actuary and 
investment consultant and is approved by the Investment Committee. The 
financial statement notes disclose the asset mix, but do not provide information 
regarding the managers' mandates and whether their performance targets are met. 
Given the enormous reliance placed on the investment assets to fund future benefit 
liabilities, critics might argue that greater disclosure of budgeted expectations 
would be expected. More stakeholder information and explanation could be 
provided in the CEO's commentary, for example. In this case, compliance with 
commercial accounting does not lend itself to the inclusion of typical public sector 
budgeting information. 
The reporting standards for investments have been somewhat complicated by the 
lack of guidelines governing investment accounting for this industry. Therefore, 
until 2004, the WCBs adopted the investment accounting standards for 
commercial life insurance companies. Life insurance accounting standards have a 
provision to value investment assets at a moving average market basis rather than 
the full market value. This valuation methodology reflects the long-term nature of 
investment assets for commercial insurance companies. Likewise, the intent of the 
WCBs is to retain these investments to meet their long-term liabilities. It made 
sense for the WCBs to adopt the life insurance investment accounting standards. 
Given the long-term nature of WCB liabilities, it is understandable that they had 
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originally adopted the life insurance standard of the moving average market 
(MAM). This accounting method smoothes the fluctuations in unrealized gains 
and losses and may be more suitable for the valuation of the WCB's financial 
assets. 
Unlike insurance companies, the WCBs used actuarial present value to calculate 
their liabilities rather than the life insurance actuarial methodology known as the 
Canadian Asset-Liability Method (CALM) (Parkinson, 2004). The actuarial 
present value results in lower liabilities than CALM since the latter includes a 
significant margin for adverse deviations. It appears illogical to assert that for 
asset accounting a WCB is similar to life insurers, but not for liability accounting 
(Parkinson, 2004). Arguably, this is an area where either an industry standard or 
stronger CICA guidance might be warranted to ensure the financial report is 
meaningful and relevant for stakeholders. 
According to Ian Hague, Principal with the Canadian Accounting Standards Board 
(AcSB) (Hague, 2005), Canada needed a new standard for financial instruments 
since the existing standards did not comprehensively address when a financial 
instrument should be recognized or how it should be measured. Canada could not 
wait for international consensus any longer and as discussed in Chapter 3, the 
CICA introduced a new standard in late 2004 requiring that all investments be 
recorded at market value. Despite the fact that all WCBs are in a homogeneous 
business risk class, some jurisdictions selected the 'available for sale' option while 
others viewed their investments as 'held for trading'. Given the long-term nature 
of WCBs' liabilities, it is difficult to understand how these assets could be viewed 
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as 'held for trading'. This might be an area where additional CICA guidance is 
warranted or where the WCBs might consider developing an industry standard. 
This new accounting standard has had a significant impact on the funding 
positions of the WCBs. In Newfoundland, for example, the funding position 
improved by 9% as a result of this change. The WCB does not provide a rationale 
for its choice of 'available for sale' in its financial statement notes. This is an area 
where stakeholder understanding could potentially be enhanced by providing an 
explanation in the annual report. As discussed in Chapter 3, the CICA public 
sector characteristics encourage financial reporting that is presented clearly and is 
easy to understand. 
The move to fair value accounting in 2004 may contribute to confusion amongst 
stakeholders as the value of financial instruments fluctuates thereby creating 
volatility in the WCB's financial position. For example, a decline in market 
conditions could cause significant erosion in the value of the investment portfolio, 
potentially resulting in an unfunded liability and reducing the funded ratio. 
Presently, the WCB does not include a provision for a rate stabilization reserve 
which could be used to smooth significant fluctuations in investment values. 
Critics may question the validity of an accounting standard which could result in 
wide fluctuations in the financial position based on unrealized revenue, thereby 
creating a creating confusion amongst stakeholders regarding its true financial 
condition. 
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The valuation of financial instruments at market value, with its resulting 
fluctuations, may not be the most relevant measure for public sector organizations. 
Public sector stakeholders are generally concerned with the continued ability of 
the organization to provide services rather than holding assets for gain. This is a 
situation where additional narrative explanations could potentially enhance 
stakeholders' understanding (PSA 1100.12). As discussed in Chapter 3, relevance 
is one of the qualitative characteristics encompassed in Canada's conceptual 
framework. In this situation, the adoption of market value for financial 
instruments may be less relevant to stakeholders of a non profit making agency 
than to shareholders of a commercial enterprise. Therefore, when adopting certain 
accounting standards, it is important to consider the needs of the users of financial 
statements. 
Stakeholders may not be fully aware of the impact of fair value accounting on the 
WCBs financial position and the potential for fluctuations. To address this, in the 
annual report statistical section, the WCB attempts to disclose the impact of this 
change in accounting policy on the unfunded liability and funded ratio. The 
statistical section depicts the unfunded liability and funded ratio on the 'new 
accounting basis' and on the 'traditional basis'. Unfortunately it does not include 
definitions of these terms, so users may not fully understand the implications. The 
CICA Handbook suggests the users of financial statements are expected to have a 
reasonable understanding of business and economic activities, accounting and a 
willingness to study the information with diligence (CICA 1000.13). However, 
achieving such understanding may be more feasible for investors who rely on the 
advice of advisors than it is for wider stakeholders. As explained in Chapter 4, the 
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main stakeholder groups, employers and trade unions, do not employ professional 
accountants or analysts who could undertake an examination of the WCB 
financial reports. 
Liabilities and Net Fund Deficiency 
The payables and accruals accounts are comparable with any other organization. 
They include such categories as trade payables and accruals for vacation and 
severance benefits. There is no liability for staff pensions and post employment 
benefits since these are the responsibility of the Government. 
This opens the question of the boundary between the WCB and government. 
Arguably, since government is liable for the WCB staff pensions, this creates a 
stronger linkage between government and the agency, thereby challenging the 
semi-autonomous nature of the WCB. It could be argued further that since 
government has assumed responsibility for WCB staff pensions, this may create 
an implied responsibility or precedent whereby at some future time, if the WCB 
could not meet its liability obligations for injured workers, the government would 
be obligated to provide funding. However, there is no legislative obligation or 
historical practice for the goverrunent to cover the liabilities of the WCB. 
Consequently, the agency is fully responsible for all future benefits liabilities 
related to its claimants - short-term disability, long-term disability, survivor 
benefits, health care and rehabilitation. The related financial statement note 
provides an additional breakdown of the liability amount for each benefit type - 
the opening balance, cash payments, claims costs incurred and actuarial 
adjustments. 
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The WCB's benefits liability is the most significant account on the balance sheet. 
Consequently, the identification, recognition and measurement of these future 
obligations have a significant impact on the agency's financial results. Estimated 
future costs are based on a number of factors: the propensity of claimants to 
receive LTD benefits, mortality rates, claimant wage levels, claimant age and the 
consumer price index. The benefits liability encompasses all WCB benefit 
programs: short-term disability, long-term disability, health care, rehabilitation 
and survivor payments (as a result of fatalities). Of these five programs, LTD 
accounts for 57% of the total liabilities. 
The LTD liabilities may be manipulated somewhat since the actuary has the 
option to choose from a range of assumptions. The discount rate is disclosed in the 
notes to the financial statements, but there is minimal explanation for changes in 
actuarial assumptions regarding the specific rate used. Similarly, changes in 
assumptions regarding the expected percentage of current year injuries to 
eventually receive LTD benefits could also have a major impact on the benefits 
liability. The average LTD reserve is currently valued at $110,000 and 
approximately 4% of all new claimants are estimated to eventually receive LTD 
benefits. Consequently, if the actuary concluded that historical trends indicate the 
percentage of claimants receiving LTD may decline to 3%; this would result in 50 
fewer reserves (assuming 5,000 new claims) and a liability reduction of $5.5 
million (50 x $110,000). 
A small change in any of the key assumptions can result in a material change in 
the total liability. Consequently, accountability would be enhanced by providing 
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detailed explanations for changes in actuarial assumptions. The risk of major 
manipulation is mitigated by the requirement to adhere to professional actuarial 
practices. Further, for fiscal years ending 2006, Canadian Audit Guideline 43 
requires auditors to engage an independent actuary to review the work of the 
client's actuary. This improves the validity and reliability of the benefits liability, 
thus ensuring increased accountability. 
The WCB liabilities include a provision for future administration costs. This is an 
actuarially calculated amount which is intended to encompass the future costs 
associated with administrating existing and prior years' claims. This liability is a 
CICA requirement for life insurance companies, but there is no requirement for 
the WCB to recognize such a liability. Despite the lack of an accounting standard 
requiring recognition of a liability for future administration costs, by 2004 all 
jurisdictions except Newfoundland had recorded this liability. Since the WCBs are 
not in the life insurance industry, on the surface, it may be difficult to rationalize 
for the adoption of this standard. One potential explanation could be that since the 
WCBs had adopted the MAM valuation method for financial assets, they may 
have considered it appropriate to also align themselves with the life insurance 
standards for certain other liabilities. 
The WCBs somewhat arbitrary recognition of this liability points to the lack of a 
clear consensus on what constitutes appropriate accounting practices for this 
industry. Despite the fact that until 2004 Newfoundland was the only jurisdiction 
that did not recognize its liability for future administration costs, neither the 
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actuary nor the auditor appeared to have an issue with this, since they both issued 
unqualified reports. 
Subsequently, when Newfoundland adopted this change in accounting practice, it 
had the effect of increasing benefit liabilities by 7%. If the WCB had not recorded 
its administration liability in 2005, it would have reached nearly a 100% funding 
level. Clearly, this issue has an impact on the ability of the organization to provide 
its stakeholders with meaningful and comparable financial reporting. This is a 
situation where the agency's reporting should clearly disclose the financial impact 
of this change in accounting policy. 
Although WCB executives may have been somewhat motivated to recognize the 
liability for future administration costs in an effort to comply with industry 
practices, it is likely that their decision may have been influenced by their desire 
not to reach a 100% funding position prematurely. While it is the WCB's stated 
goal to achieve a 100% funding position, agency executives may have been 
concerned that a fully funded position would lead to employer demands for 
reduced premiums as well as union expectations for increased benefits for 
claimants. This is a situation where it could be argued that the WCB may have 
manipulated its financial results by recognizing this liability. Conversely, the 
agency could contend that it was merely complying with the industry standard. 
The liability section of the financial statements includes a reserve of nearly $1 .0 
million to fund occupational health and safety (OHS) research. While this account 
is entitled a 'reserve', this is a misnomer; rather, it is more indicative of a 
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provision which is similar to a liability. Typically, reserves are created through an 
allocation of accumulated surplus, thus implying that assets exceed liabilities. 
Since the WCB has a net fund deficiency, this results in a situation whereby the 
creation of reserve is actually artificially increasing the unfunded liability and net 
fund deficiency. From an accounting perspective, there is no rationale for creating 
a reserve when the organization does not have an accumulated surplus. 
Ultimately, the creation of reserves is at the discretion of the WCB since it is not a 
legislative requirement. The legislation merely states that the WCB may fund 
OHS research up to a maximum of 2% of its annual revenue. 
Critics may claim that the WCB's practice of setting aside a reserve out of a net 
fund deficiency is questionable at best and does not appear to comply with GAAP 
as outlined by the CICA. The practice of recording reserves is possibly 
unnecessarily complicating the financial statements. In this instance greater clarity 
might be achieved by including a provision for OHS research within the benefits 
liability. The use of the tenn 'reserve' leaves doubt as to whether an obligation 
actually exists. Consequently, this practice may limit stakeholders' ease of 
understanding. 
The accumulated other comprehensive income (AOCI) account was created when 
the WCB adopted fair value accounting for its investments. Essentially, it is the 
difference between fair value and book value of its investment portfolio as 
reflected in unrealized gains and losses. This account is placed before the 
unfunded liability amount and it is excluded from the denominator in the 
calculation of the funded ratio. 
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The 'Unfunded Liability' account is not a typical balance sheet account. The 
WCB calculates unfunded liability as assets less liabilities, reserves and AOCI. 
The intent of this account is to reflect the shortfall in assets to meet liabilities. 
When analyzing the financial position of the WCB, it is not the actual unfunded 
liability dollar amount that is used. Rather, the financial health of the organization 
is measured in terms of the percentage funded, known as 'funded position' which 
is calculated at December, 2005 in the following manner: 
Funded Position - 2005 
Assets $686,234 92.6% 
Liabilities + Reserves $739,859 + 913 
Calculation based on the 2005 financial statements (Annual Report, p. 3 7) 
The funded ratio is useful since it enables stakeholders to more easily discern 
improvement or deterioration in the financial position, and it facilitates inter- 
jurisdictional comparison. The funded ratio is not provided in the financial 
statements, but it is included in the statistical section of the annual report. Clearly, 
the calculation of an unfunded liability amount and the funded position calls into 
question whether the financial statements meet the CICA recommended 
characteristic of being easy to understand. Perhaps, further explanation of this 
calculation in the annual report would prove beneficial in aiding stakeholders' 
understanding of the WCB's financial performance. 
Most WCBs, including Newfoundland, exclude AOCI when calculating their 
funded position. However, jurisdictions such as Manitoba include AOCI in the 
denominator, thereby offsetting the impact of marking to market. Consequently, 
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this methodology means that marking to market would not impact the financial 
position of the WCB. If the Newfoundland WCB had included AOCI in the 
calculation of is funded position, it would have resulted in the following funded 
position: 
Funding Position (including AOCD - 2005 
Assets $686,234 -83.1% 
Liabilities + Reserves + AOCI $739,859 + 913+84,702 
Calculation based on the 2005financial statements (Annual Report, p. 3 7) 
Alternatively, it could be argued that the more appropriate treatment would be 
(assets - AOCI)/ (liabilities + reserves). This approach would eliminate the impact 
of fair value accounting on the WCB's funded position. It should be noted that 
this calculation is not currently used by any of the WCB's, but it is a viable option 
which they should consider. The current practice of excluding AOCI in the 
calculation of funding position has had a material impact on the WCB's financial 
position. The calculation of funding position is a critical accountability issue since 
it is the key indicator of the agency's financial health and is the chief inter- 
jurisdictional comparative referent. 
The inclusion of reserves (which are optional) and AOCI (unrealized investment 
gains/loses) in the calculation of unfunded liability could potentially artificially 
increase or decrease the funding position and would be subject to wide 
fluctuations as reflected in the varying market value of investments. Further 
clarification on how the WCB should treat AOCI when calculating its funded 
position would be beneficial since this is the key indicator of the agency's 
financial health. In the absence of guidance from the standard setting body, this is 
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an area where WCB accountants could exercise their professional judgment and 
develop an industry standard. 
The net ftind deficiency is the amount by which the total liabilities exceed total 
assets, excluding reserves and AOCI. The net fund deficiency more accurately 
portrays the agency's financial health than the unfunded liability since unfunded 
liability reflects the impact of reserves and AOCI along with liabilities. 
Nevertheless, this account is rarely used by the WCB in explanations or narratives 
to stakeholders. The following section examines the accounts of the Statement of 
Operations (Table 5.2) and explores the various related accounting issues. 
Table 5.2: Statement Of ODerations Years ended December 31 
(dollars in thousands) 2005 2004 
Revenue 
Assessments $158,217 $ 166,965 
Investment income (Note 6) 37,091 17,733 
195,308 184,698_ 
Expenses 
Claims costs incurred (Note 10) 
Short-term disability 29,360 27,760 
Long-term disability 54,990 56,356 
Survivor benefits 6,013 5,121 
Health care 37,917 40,464 
Rehabilitation 1,489 1,329_ 
Future administration costs 3,234 3,246_ 
133,003 134,276_ 
Administration (Note 15) 21,016 21,383 
Legislated obligations (Note 16) 6,505 6,177 
Amortization 2,047 2,577_ 
Other (Note 17) 1,225 1,162_ 
163,796 165,575 
Surplus from operations 31,512 19,123 
Actuarial adjustments (Note 10) (10,609) 31,848 
Surplus for the year $ 20,903 $ 50,971 
2005 Annual Report, p. 38 
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Revenue 
WCB revenue is comprised of assessment premiums and investment income. 
Assessment revenue is derived from a self-reporting system whereby employers 
are required to report their estimated payroll for the upcoming calendar year by 
February 28. Subsequent payroll changes during the year must be reported to the 
WCB. When employers fail to update their payroll on a timely basis, they are 
charged interest and penalties. The assessment revenue account is stated on an 
accrual basis and reflects the assessment revenue levied in the year as well as an 
estimated amount to be levied in the subsequent year related to the current year's 
operations. This complies with GAAP since performance has been achieved and 
there is reasonable assurance regarding measurement and collectability (CICA 
1000.47). Assessment revenue is calculated based on the payroll reported by 
employers. It is expressed in terms of an amount per $100 of payroll. For 
example, a poultry operation with payroll of $1.0 million would be charged the 
following premium: 
Sample Assessment Premium Calculation 
Total PWoll x $19.26 = $1,000,000 x $19.26 = $192,600 
$100 $100 
This rate is determined by the level of injury risk and historical industry claims 
costs. All employers are assigned to one of 82 different industries. There is a wide 
variation in the rates charged. In 2006, for example, the lowest rate charged was 
$0.53 for the finance and insurance industry compared to the highest rate of 
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$19.26 for the poultry and meat processing industry. Investment revenue reflects 
the investment earnings realized in the current year. 
Expenses 
Claims costs incurred represent approximately 80% of the WCBs annual 
expenses. Claims costs are reported along five categories: short-term disability, 
long-term disability, survivor benefits, health care and rehabilitation. Each benefit 
type is comprised of three components: cash payments for current year injuries, 
estimated future costs of current year injuries and the growth in interest expense 
for prior years' liabilities. Growth in interest expense refers to the amount by 
which the benefit liabilities grow in the current year as a result of reflecting their 
net present value. The benefit liabilities are recorded at the actuarial net present 
value, based on an assumption that a certain investment rate of return will be 
achieved. Cash payments and estimated future costs of current year injuries 
comprise 62% of claims costs, while the growth in interest expense accounts for 
the remaining 38% of the expenses. Although all three components are included in 
the benefits liability note to the financial statements, the Statement of Operations 
does not provide the user with a note reference for the claims costs incurred. 
Furthermore, the benefit liabilities note does not identify the nature of the prior 
years' benefits costs incurred. Without an in-depth knowledge, it may be difficult 
for even an informed reader to discern that the prior years' benefits costs are 
actually comprised of interest. Indeed, it is more likely that some readers would 
incorrectly conclude that these expenses relate to additional claims costs not 
recorded in previous years. 
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The remaining expenses include the administrative operating expenses, costs 
associated with the legislated obligation to fund the Occupational Health and 
Safety Division of the Department of Government Services, amortization, external 
training for employers and workers and business improvement initiatives. WCB's 
administration costs have been subject to employer scrutiny and criticism. 
Consequently, these costs are reported in a manner which differentiates pure 
administration costs, comprised primarily of salaries and operating costs, from 
legislated obligations which are not under WCB control. However, the remaining 
two categories (amortization and other expenses) are actually under the control of 
the WCB. Consequently, other than reducing administration costs, there is no 
rationale for the separate line item reporting of these expenditures. Proponents 
could argue that separate line item reporting provides additional information 
regarding the costs associated with normal operations versus costs of legislated 
obligations and special initiatives. However, all four categories could easily be 
grouped as administration costs with the detailed breakdown provided through 
note disclosure. 
All actuarial adjustments relate to improvements or deteriorations in prior years' 
benefit liabilities are reported as a separate line item. Due to significant 
fluctuations in benefit liabilities, this adjustment may be material in nature. 
However, there is virtually no explanation provided regarding why actuarial 
adjustments are required. The Statement of Operations refers the reader to the 
benefits liabilities note, but this only shows the actuarial adjustment amount. 
Although this adjustment in 2004 more than doubled the surplus, the financial 
statements and their accompanying notes did not provide any explanation for such 
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a significant adjustment. Arguably, this is an area where additional explanation is 
warranted. As pointed out in Chapter 3, there is support of such separate 
disclosure of actuarial gains/losses; as Barker (2004) argues, they could be 
described as remeasurements. 
In addition to the components analyzed in the preceding section, the financial 
statements also include a Statement of Unfunded Liability, Statement of 
Comprehensive Income and Statement of Cash Flows. The Statements of 
Comprehensive Income and Cash Flows are in accordance with GAAP. However, 
the Statement of Unfunded Liability appears to be unique to the workers' 
compensation industry. According to Section 1000 of the CICA Handbook, the 
standard statement would be the Statement of Retained Earnings. In the case of 
WCB, the Statement of Unftinded Liability appears to be serving as a proxy for 
Statement of Retained Earnings. 
Table 5.3: Statement of Unfunded Liability Years Ended December 31 
(dollars in thousands) 2005 2004 
Unftinded liability, beginning of year (as 
previously stated) 
Changes in Accounting Policy 
Future administration costs (Note 2(a)) 




Unfunded liability, beginning of year (restated) (160,143) (211,114) 
Surplus for the year 20,903 50,971 
Unfunded liability, end of year $(139,240) $(160,143) 
2005 Annual Report, p. 39 
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Concluding comments on WCB financial statements 
This brings the discussion to the agency's responsibility to ensure that 
stakeholders are provided with information in a format that is easily understood 
versus stakeholder responsibility to develop the level of understanding necessary 
to comprehend the information provided. The onus is on the agency to ensure that 
stakeholders understand key elements of the WCB's financial operations; 
therefore, additional information over and above the financial statements is 
needed. Clearly, even informed users of financial statements must have 
knowledge of the accounting issues for the workers' compensation industry in 
order to effectively evaluate the organization based on its financial statements. 
This may be challenging for WCB stakeholder groups as they do not have 
accountants or analysts available who could provide interpretation of the WCB's 
financial reports. 
This documentary review found that the WCBs have adopted a combination of 
accounting standards. Since the WCB meets the criteria of a GBE, it complies 
with commercial accounting standards. Evidence of its adoption of commercial 
accounting standards is illustrated through its reporting of year-over-year actual 
results (rather than actual to budget), fair value accounting for its financial 
instruments and reporting of comprehensive income. However, the WCB still 
retains elements of its historic adherence to life insurance accounting standards. 
For example, its benefits liability includes a provision for future administration 
costs, a requirement for life insurance companies but not for other entities. Despite 
the fact that the WCBs are not life insurance companies, they all adhere to this 
accounting standard. Another apparent deviation from commercial accounting 
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standards is the WCB's practice of establishing reserves in the absence of a 
surplus. These industry modifications may also potentially lead to situations 
where agencies can manipulate their results. 
Adherence to multiple accounting standards - commercial, life insurance and 
public sector - creates a situation whereby it is difficult to discern which standards 
should govem the WCB. It is challenging for stakeholders to determine if the 
WCB should comply with commercial or public sector standards and whether the 
adoption of certain life insurance standards is appropriate. 
As illustrated through the WCB industry adoption of certain life insurance 
accounting standards along with the practice of establishing reserves in the 
absence of an accumulated surplus, there is a possibility that financial results 
could be manipulated. However, the potential for such manipulation is largely 
mitigated through the actuarial requirement for consistent valuation of assets and 
liabilities. 
The following table identifies a number of gaps where, arguably, additional 
information and explanation would improve financial reporting to stakeholders. 
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Table 5.4: WCB Financial Statement Renartino C. nn. q 
Financial Statement Additional Information/Explanation _7 
Component 
Capital Assets - Business A listing of the components (hardware, 
Improvement projects software, consulting fees and staff salaries) 
along with the amortization start date would 
enhance readers' understanding of the costs of 
these projects. 
Investments - 'available for Disclosure of the rationale supporting the use of 
sale' versus 'held for trading' 'available for sale' and the impact which this 
has on the valuation of the investments and 
consequently on the funded position ratio could 
be helpful to stakeholders. 
Reserves Disclosure that reserves are not a mandatory 
requirement of either the WCB legislation or of 
the CICA Handbook. Since the WCB is in a net 
fund deficiency situation, rationale for reserves 
should be provided. An explanation supporting 
a reserve rather than a liability would be helpful. 
Unfunded liability Since reserves are optional (and should not even 
exist in a net fund deficiency situation), the 
calculation of the unfunded liability could 
possibly consider the exclusion of reserves. 
Further consideration of the inclusion of AOCI 
in this calculation is warranted. It would be 
helpful if the annual report provided an example 
of this calculation. 
Expenses - claims costs More explanation is needed regarding the claims 
costs incurred for prior years to show why it is 
comprised primarily of the growth in interest 
expense. The financial statement notes should 
provide readers with details of the three 
components of claims costs. 
Other administration costs All four categories could arguably be grouped 
under administration costs with the detailed 
listing disclosed in the note. The total cost of 
business improvement projects is difficult to 
discern since they are comprised of both capital 
and administration components. 
Actuarial adjustment More discussion on the nature of the actuarial 
adjustment would be beneficial in enhancing 
readers' understanding of the financial 
statements. These adjustments often have a 
material impact on financial results. 
To further assess the usefulness of the WCB's financial statements, they are 
compared to the CICA's recommended qualitative characteristics. The following 
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table depicts the author's assessment of WCB compliance with the qualitative 
characteristics of financial statements and identifies several areas where the WCB 
does not fully adhere to the CICA recommended qualitative characteristics. 
Table 5.5: WCB Financial Statement% OuqIit§ifivp. C. hnrnvfi-riQflvc 
CICA Qualitative Characteristic WCB Compliance 
Understandability (assuming an Moderate since users need to be familiar 
informed user) with the business, accounting and actuarial 
environment of the WCB industry 
Relevance 
a) Predictive and feedback value Moderate as this information is provided 
through the unftinded liability and net ftind 
deficiency. These terms may not be easily 
understood. Also, actuarial adjustments are 
shown separately. Budgets and projected 
financial statements are not provided. 
b) Timeliness Low since financial statements are not 
issued until at least six months after year- 
end. 
Reliability 
a) Representational faithfulness High owing to the liabilities and claims 
expenses by an external actuary. 
b) Verifiability High due to the actuarial review. 
c) Neutrality High due to the actuarial review. 
d) Conservatism High due to the actuarial review. 
Comparability Moderate for year-over-year comparisons 
due to frequent changes in accounting 
policies (even though they are disclosed in 
the financial statement notes). 
Low for comparison to other WCBs due to 
differing underlying assumptions, WCB 
coverage and benefits levels. 
CICA 1000.18-1000.22 
The importance of certain financial statement qualitative characteristics may vary 
among the stakeholder groups. For example, predictive value may be of more 
interest to employer stakeholder groups than trade unions since it provides an 
indication of potential premium increases. Relevance depends on the users' needs. 
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The CICA accounting guidelines (Section 15 10) call for assets and liabilities to be 
reported according to their short-term and long-term nature. This provides the user 
with sufficient information to evaluate the organization's working capital position. 
The WCB has not adopted this reporting method since it is the funding position, 
not working capital, which is of importance. However, this additional reporting 
does not extend to the inclusion of budgets and targets which are typically 
associated with public sector reporting. 
Another area where CICA guidelines are not strictly adhered to relates to the 
Management Discussion and Analysis (MDA) section. The provision of MDA is 
not mandatory, but it is recommended by the CICA. Although the WCB does not 
provide a MDA, it could be argued that this requirement is largely met through the 
BSC and related commentary that is published in the annual report. Also included 
in the annual report is the 'Report of the Chairperson and Chief Executive Officer' 
which could be viewed as fulfilling some of the requirements of a typical MDA 
section. 
Despite meeting the criteria of a government business enterprise, WCB's 
reporting is more in line with the public sector accounting standards rather than 
the commercial accounting standards. Although the WCBs are not required to 
comply with the PSA Handbook, they recognize certain key elements of 
goverment reporting which they need to consider, particularly with respect to 
performance reporting which extends beyond the financial statements to include 
supplementary financial and non-financial information. The agency recognizes the 
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multi -dimensional needs of its primary stakeholders by including in its annual 
report more comprehensive information such as the BSC and accompanying 
explanations along with certain key statistics. This additional financial and non- 
financial performance reporting information allows WCBs to discharge their 
stakeholder accountability obligations through the provision of non-financial 
performance information. 
Canadian Institute ofActuaries (CL4) 
The CIA is another major regulatory body which has developed standards to 
which the WCBs are expected to comply. Financial reporting to stakeholders is 
heavily influenced by the CIA standards. For example, the financial results of 
WCBs can be greatly influenced by the actuarial assumptions used in the 
calculation of liabilities. Indeed, a very small change in the Consumer Price Index 
(CPI) can result in significant fluctuations in liabilities. Such adjustments can take 
an organization from a surplus to a deficit position and also have a material impact 
on the unfunded liability. 
Given the significant financial impact of liability remeasurements, it could appear 
to stakeholders that the WCB is manipulating the actuarial adjustments in order to 
influence its operating results. Consequently, the WCBs need to consider how to 
explain actuarial assumptions and adjustments to stakeholders. An effective 
stakeholder reporting framework should provide meaningful reporting of such 
significant factors. Although there is no specific legislation requiring the actuarial 
valuation of the WCB liabilities, all jurisdictions have a valuation completed 
annually or bi-annually. The actuarial report is included with the WCBs financial 
statements. 
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Unlike the accounting profession, the CIA has recognized that specific standards 
are needed to govern the valuation of workers' compensation liabilities. In this 
regard, they assembled a committee of experts (actuaries who have considerable 
experience in the valuation of workers' compensation liabilities) and established a 
consultation process with the workers' compensation finance managers. 
Moreover, the CIA Committee on Workers' Compensation has met several times 
with the AWCBC Financial Reporting and Comparability Committee to solicit 
their input into the development of actuarial standards for the workers' 
compensation industry. In May, 2002, the CIA released its Practice- Specific 
Standards for Public Personal Injury Compensation Plans to address such factors 
as pricing stability, intergenerational. equity and indexation (CIA, 2006). 
The auditors place extensive reliance on the actuarial estimates of liabilities. 
While auditors familiarize themselves with the actuarial approach, they do not 
recalculate the actuarial liabilities for future claims costs. If the actuary issues a 
qualified opinion of the long-term liabilities, this will more than likely result in a 
qualified audit opinion. This is further complicated by the CICA's recent Audit 
Guideline 43 which stipulates that auditors must obtain an independent actuarial 
opinion rather than rely on the organization's actuary. Consequently, there is 
considerable interaction between the WCB's external auditors and actuaries. This 
additional verification of the actuarial valuation could mitigate the potential for 
WCBs to manipulate their financial results through the adoption of industry 
standards or modification of accounting standards. 
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In demonstrating accountability to their stakeholders, it is critical that the 
reporting model provides sufficient information and explanation regarding 
actuarial assumptions and adjustments, particularly when there are changes in 
assumptions. It is essential that the agency provide sufficient explanation in their 
financial reports to enable stakeholders to discern the impact of operations versus 
the impact of changes in actuarial assumptions on financial results. 
5.2 Wider performance reporting 
This section examines the WCBs wider performance reporting firstly from a 
Canadian perspective and secondly from a Newfoundland perspective. The 
voluntary and mandatory reporting documents are examined to identify areas 
where the various standards impact stakeholder reporting for these public sector 
agencies. 
5.2.1 Canadian Reporting Environment 
Association of Workers' Compensation Boards of Canada (A WCBQ 
This association is unique to the WCB, but it has been included in this section to 
illustrate how such professional associations can help develop accounting 
standards and non-financial performance reporting. Industry groups that formulate 
reporting standards have a profound influence on the ability of public sector 
agencies to demonstrate stakeholder accountability. The WCB's reporting 
frameworks have been heavily influenced by the studies and work of the AWCBC 
Financial Reporting and Comparability Committee. This group has collectively 
established financial and non-financial reporting standards for this industry. The 
WCBs have a long tradition of trying to compare performance for the Board of 
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Directors, its senior executives as well as employer and labour groups interested 
in inter-jurisdictional comparisons. This has been very difficult due to the 
variation in accounting practices, the broad array of valuation approaches for 
assets, differences in calculation methodologies for statistics and a variety of 
financial statement presentation formats. 
In 1992, the AWCBC, on behalf of all WCB jurisdictions, appointed the 
accounting firm Doane Raymond Pannell and the actuarial firm The Wyatt 
Company to jointly conduct a study on the compilation and reporting of financial 
data. This study, commonly referred to as the Doane Wyatt study, was pivotal in 
raising awareness of the vast differences in accounting practices, actuarial 
assumptions and statistical reporting of the WCBs. The Doane Wyatt study was 
the workers' compensation industry's first attempt to introduce compliance with 
generally accepted accounting practices, comparable financial statement 
presentation fonnat and standardized operational statistics. 
After the study was completed, the WCBs through the AWCBC formed the 
Financial Reporting and Comparability Committee comprised of finance 
representatives from each province and territory. Their objective was to develop 
definitions and calculation methodologies for the Key Statistical Measures 
(KSMs) developed by the consultants and to identify other relevant measures. 
This process resulted in the elimination of certain Doane Wyatt recommended 
KSMs and the addition of others to reach the current total of 36 KSMs (Appendix 
9). Some of these statistics are based on the recommendations of the Doane Wyatt 
study while others have been initiated by the Committee members. The additional 
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KSMs reflect information that the finance executives believed would be beneficial 
in explaining results to stakeholders, but they were developed in isolation of their 
stakeholders. While none of these KSMs are independently confirmed or audited, 
the Committee verifies their accuracy by preparing detailed calculation schedules 
which are reviewed jointly by statisticians and actuaries of the Ontario and 
Quebec WCBs. 
Of the thirty-six KSMs provided by the AWCBC (Appendix 9), only twenty 
(55%) could be classified as non-financial outcome measures or 'performance' as 
defined by Stewart (1984). The first sixteen measures in Appendix 9 can be 
described by the researcher as process statistics rather than performance outcome 
measures. For example, the number of claims reported and benefits payments are 
considered to be absolute figures that do not provide stakeholders with sufficient 
information to evaluate the performance of the agency. In comparison, other 
KSM's such as average composition duration and injury frequency provide more 
meaningful information which can be used to evaluate the agency's performance 
in meeting its mandate. While it is recognized that certain of the measures 
function as inputs into the calculation of some of the performance outcome 
measures, many do not provide meaningful comparative referents since they are 
expressed in absolute dollars, rather than percentages, and thus do not facilitate 
comparison among regions. 
Although WCBs have made a significant effort to develop comparable KSMs, true 
comparability is constrained by a number of key differences in claimant benefits 
and premium revenue structures of the various jurisdictions. Despite the level of 
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effort associated with gathering and reporting the KSMs, they are not widely 
disseminated beyond the AWCBC website. The exploratory interviews found that 
none of the employer or union respondents indicated they were aware of the 
AWCBC website. It is possible that very few extemal groups are aware of their 
existence. Presently, the WCB agencies appear to be the primary users of this 
information. From a public sector accountability perspective, it is important to 
ensure that KSMs respond to stakeholder needs by reporting on key financial and 
service outcomes. It is difficult to say with certainty that these 36 KSM's meet 
stakeholder needs since they were not consulted during their development. KSMs 
play a prominent role in any stakeholder reporting model since these are the key 
factors which are used to measure and compare performance among, and they 
have a major influence on the various jurisdictions. For example, Newfoundland 
measures its duration and average assessment rate relative to all other provinces. 
These national KSMs serve not only as comparative referents, but also as a target 
for some jurisdictions. In that sense, the KSM's function to identify areas of 
improvement for the WCBs more than as sources of information for their 
stakeholders. 
5.2.2 Newfoundland's Reporting Environment 
WCB Legislation 
The WCB Act is the provincial legislation which governs the operations of 
Newfoundland's workers' compensation agency. This legislation specifies that the 
WCB provide an annual report to the Minister of Labour, that government may 
appoint an auditor, that the Board of Directors may appoint auditors and that the 
Auditor General has the right to audit the accounts (WCB Act, 1991). Beyond the 
requirement to submit an annual report, the WCB Act does not identify any 
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specific reporting requirements, nor does it identify the commercial or public 
sector accounting standards which should be applied. Consequently, the WCB 
legislation is not considered a major source of guidance on appropriate 
stakeholder reporting. 
Auditor General 
Similar to other public sector agencies, the WCB falls under the scrutiny of the 
Auditor General, for audit purposes. Although the legislation grants the 
goverrinient the right to either appoint auditors or to have the Auditor General 
conduct an audit of the WCB, the practice has been for the Board of Directors to 
appoint auditors. The audited financial statements are included with the WCB's 
annual report to the Minister. To date, government has not appointed auditors for 
the WCB and the Auditor General has conducted only periodic audits of accounts 
such as travel, capital expenditures and the funding position. The Auditor 
General's lack of attention on claims cost can likely be attributed to the 
complexity of the accounting associated with these expenses, whereas travel and 
capital expenditures are generic from one government organization to another and 
are therefore easier for staff to audit. Since claims costs comprise more than 80% 
of the cost of operating the WCB, it could be argued the investment of time to 
conduct such an audit would be worthwhile. However, given time and resource 
constraints, the Auditor General has opted to rely on external commercial 
auditors. 
The PSA Handbook indicates that government should account for its agencies 
using the modified equity method. In the case of Newfoundland, however, the 
WCB's financial statements are not consolidated with govenunent's and, 
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consequently, do not comply with the PSA standards. Rather, government reports 
the WCB's financial results (surplus and unfunded liability) through note 
disclosure as a form of trust. Currently, the Auditor General does not appear to 
have a major influence on the reporting approach of the WCB. 
Balanced Scorecard 
The Newfoundland WCB introduced its first BSC in 2001 for the five-year period 
2001 - 2005 (refer to the accompanying Annual Report). The following table 
depicts the six goals and twenty-eight related strategies along with an indication of 
Norton and Kaplan's (1992) corresponding BSC perspective. 
Table 5.6: WCB Balanced Scorecard 
Goal Number of BSC Perspective 
strategies 
A. Prevention focus achieving results 4 Customer 
B. Injured workers and employers 7 Customer 
better served 
C. Financially secure 4 Financial 
D. Stakeholders sharing responsibility 4 Customer 
for changes 
E. WCB operating more efficiently 4 Internal Business 
Processes 
F. Knowledgeable employees 5 Learning and Growth 
satisfied and retained 
The six main goals are accompanied by a total of twenty-eight strategies for which 
most have quantifiable targets. For example, Goal A- Prevention focus achieving 
results, is supported by four strategies. As illustrated in Table 5.6, there are three 
main goals (A, B and D) which are aligned with Kaplan and Norton's customer 
perspective whereas there is only one main goal for each of the remaining 
perspectives - Financial, Internal Business Processes and Learning and Growth. 
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There are several concerns with the WCB's application of the BSC. To begin, 
some of the strategies to achieve Goal A are the joint responsibility of the WCB 
and OHS. Ideally, the BSC would include only those goals and strategies over 
which the WCB has control. It is difficult to be held accountable for a goal which 
requires the cooperation and involvement of another organization. A further issue 
relates to the WCB achieving targets well ahead of schedule, but not adjusting the 
targets accordingly for the subsequent years. Moreover, the large number of 
strategies may create difficulties for the WCB to focus effectively on all of them 
at the same time. Indeed, some of the strategies appear to be more operational than 
strategic. For example, it could be argued that it is sufficient to measure employee 
satisfaction through surveys rather than to measure detailed elements that might 
reflect satisfaction such as average number of sick days. The WCB's approach to 
its BSC may not necessarily provide information that is relevant for its 
stakeholders. 
Transparency and Accountability Act 
As explained in Chapter 3 (section 3.2.3), in Newfoundland the increased 
prominence of accountability culminated with the passing of its Transparency and 
Accountability Act in 2005. This Act specifies the wider perfonnance reporting 
requirements for government departments, boards and agencies. As noted in 
Chapter 3, the WCB meets the criteria of a Category I entity. The following table 
depicts the government's accountability guidelines for Category I entities, along 
with an indication of the Newfoundland WCB's compliance. This comparison is 
based on the Guidelines for Annual Performance Reports (Transparency and 
Accountability Office, 2005) and the WCB 2005 Annual Report which includes 
its Balanced Scorecard. 
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Table 5.7: WCB Compliance with Government's Accountability Framework 
Government Accountability Newfoundland WCB Compliance 
Guideline 





Performance objectives Yes 
Measures Yes 
Targets Yes 
Annual Operational Plan and Budget Yes (published internally only) 
Quarterly Financial Report No, only BSC published quarterly 
" Original budget 
" Year-to-date balances 
" Projected revised 
" Variance explanations 
Annual Financial Report 
" Audited financial statements Yes 
" Management letter from external Yes 
auditors 
" Response to management letter Yes 
Annual Performance report 
" Executive summary Yes 
" Summary of approved strategic 
plan, including goals and Yes 
objectives 
" Summary of program strategies No 
used to meet goals and objectives 
" Summary of financial report Yes 
Comparison of actual performance Yes, but only for categories included in 
to desired results BSC 
Variance explanations 
No 
Feedback No (limited) 
Many of the components of the Transparency and Accountability Act also reflect 
the spirit of the PSA reporting guidelines. It requires the WCB agency to be 
accountable in two main respects: (1) meet the accountability expectations of the 
WCB stakeholders and (2) meet the mandatory accountability requirements of 
government as reflected in the legislation (WCB Act and the Transparency and 
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Accountability Act). The agency complies with its own legislation, but displays a 
lack of compliance with the six following requirements of the government's 
Transparency and Accountability Act. 
i. The Transparency and Accountability Act requires that departments and 
agencies provide annual operational plans and budgets. The WCB prepares 
operational plans and budgets for internal use, but they are not 
disseminated to stakeholders. 
ii. The accountability legislation requires quarterly financial reporting with 
the original budget, year-to-date balances, projected revenues and variance 
explanations. This information is prepared, but is used for internal 
management purposes only and is not made available to the public. 
However, the WCB provides its Balanced Scorecard on a semi-annual 
basis to its round table participants. 
iii. The legislation indicates that public sector organizations must provide a 
summary of program strategies which are used to meet their goals and 
objectives. The WCB partially meets this requirement by reporting on how 
well the targets were met through the Balanced Scorecard. However, there 
is limited discussion of the WCB's program strategies in the BSC or 
Annual Report. Additional narrative explanations would enhance the 
relevance of the WCB's stakeholder reports. 
iv. Comparison of actual and budgeted performance is published internally, 
but is not available to stakeholders. The only performance comparisons 
provided are those included in the Balanced Scorecard. Comparison of 
budgeted and actual results is associated with the public sector and is not a 
characteristic of commercial reporting. 
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V. Variance explanations of actual performance to budget for administration 
and capital expenditures are provided for internal use, but are not reported 
to stakeholders. As noted in (iv) above, this is a public sector reporting 
standard. 
vi. The legislation states that feedback is a required component. While there is 
no formal feedback process for the development of the strategic plan, there 
is some limited opportunity for those stakeholder groups who are invited 
to participate in the round table meetings. 
The WCB's lack of compliance with six of the criteria of the Transparency and 
Accountability Act represents a major accountability gap. Ironically, the WCB 
agency actually produces much of this information, but provides it only to its 
executives and the Board of Directors for internal management purposes. 
However, it is not practical to provide some of the other information. For 
example, it is highly unlikely that the WCB would issue quarterly financial 
statements, since the calculation of the benefit liabilities for future claimant 
expenditures on a quarterly basis is not practical and would not produce 
meaningful information. This is due to the fluctuations in injuries and claims 
processing times from one quarter to another. This is an area where government 
needs to recognize that one size does not fit all. In this situation, the Transparency 
and Accountability Act needs to be flexible to accommodate the needs of certain 
public sector agencies. Such restrictive guidelines do not necessarily contribute to 
greater accountability. It would be feasible for the WCB to provide information in 
the remaining categories such as a summary of its program strategies and actual 
and budgeted operational results along with variance explanations. 
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Prior to the introduction of the Transparency and Accountability Act, the WCB 
prepared a five-year strategic plan, but did so without stakeholder consultation 
beyond that of the Board of Directors. Progress on the strategic plan is reported 
through the BSC. The WCB's strategic plan includes five-year targets, and its 
BSC provides commentary explaining the results, but it does not compare results 
to other jurisdictions. A further limitation of the WCB strategic plan pertains to 
the reasonableness of its targets. By 2002, for example, Newfoundland had 
achieved some of its targets for 2006. This situation raises the issue of whether the 
targets were initially set high enough and whether once targets have been achieved 
the organization should adjust its targets for subsequent years. 
One of the requirements of the Transparency and Accountability Act is that 
organizations submit their strategic plans to government for approval. This creates 
more of an accountability relationship between the WCB and government, thus 
weakening its arms length operating status. Before 2006, the WCB's five-year 
strategic plan was presented to government for informational purposes, not 
necessarily for approval. It appears that, through the Transparency and 
Accountability Act government has placed itself in a position of having more 
control over its various agencies. 
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5.3 Conclusions 
The WCB fits the criteria of government business enterprises and is expected to 
follow the CICA generally accepted accounting principles for commercial 
enterprises. The WCB appears to have also adopted some of the broader reporting 
standards associated with public sector organizations through its non-financial and 
performance reporting with the BSC, thereby exhibiting a somewhat hybrid 
reporting mechanism. 
As a government agency, the WCB appears to face a number of reporting 
challenges as it adopts the CICA commercial accounting standards for financial 
reporting while complying with the public sector nature of the Transparency and 
Accountability Act. This Act requires broader reporting to include quarterly 
financial statements, budgets and variance explanations which are not required for 
commercial enterprises. Indeed, it could be argued that the reporting requirements 
of the Transparency and Accountability Act are somewhat contradictory to the 
CICA commercial standards. 
Compared to other government departments and organizations, the WCB is 
expected to comply with a greater number of industry specific voluntary reporting 
standards. For example, the CIA has introduced actuarial guidelines specifically 
for the WCBs, and the AWCBC has developed 36 KSM's which all WCBs in 
Canada are expected to report. 
Overall, the reporting requirements and standards for the WCB industry have 
evolved significantly over the past decade, but as illustrated in this chapter a 
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number of reporting issues remain unresolved. Clearly, the workers' 
compensation industry is still in the process of determining which accounting and 
performance reporting standards to adopt. Consideration should be given to 
determining whether the commercial accounting standards are appropriate for the 
WCB. Alternatively, the WCB's could follow the lead set by the CIA and develop 
reporting standards specifically geared toward the WCB industry. 
This documentary review illustrates examples including liability for 
administration costs, unfunded liability, and actuarial net present value where 
additional narrative explanations would enhance stakeholders' understanding of 
the WCB financial performance. The reporting gaps, as identified in Table 5.4, 
will be taken into consideration when developing a stakeholder reporting model. 
This documentary review also highlights opportunities for an accountability 
reporting framework consistent with a greater level of compliance with the 
CICA's recommended financial statement qualitative characteristics, as depicted 
in Table 5.5. 
When developing a stakeholder reporting model for a public sector agency viewed 
as a goverm-nent business enterprise, it is important to balance commercial 
accounting implications with its broader public sector role. Consequently, a 
reporting model would need to address commercial accounting standards and the 
need for non-financial performance information. Alternatively, the WCB industry 
might wish to pursue the development of industry specific accounting standards 
with the CICA since the commercial accounting standards may not be appropriate 
for such a public sector organization. Ultimately, the objective of this research is 
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to develop a stakeholder reporting model which is relevant in meeting stakeholder 
needs while mitigating manipulation through external reviews of accounting 
modifications and industry specific standards. 
The next two chapters describe the results of the semi-structured interviews with 
the primary stakeholder groups and the WCB agency executives. Through these 
chapters stakeholders' views on the WCBs accountability obligations and 
reporting mechanisms are identified and analyzed. 
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CHAPTER 6: STAKEHOLDERS' PERCEPTION OF ACCOUNTABILITY 
6.0 Introduction 
The results of the semi-structured interviews are presented in Chapters 6 and 7. 
Chapter 6 explores the WCB's agency status, the role of the WCB, stakeholders' 
perceptions of their salience and the performance information of interest to 
stakeholders. Chapter 7 examines the information mechanisms which stakeholders 
would like as well as their involvement in the accountability process. Where 
applicable, the views of the WCB executives are compared to those of the 
stakeholders, providing insight into how well they understand the needs of those 
to whom they are accountable. The WCB executives are the senior managers who 
determine how the agency is operated. 
As discussed in Chapter 4, all interviews were taped, transcribed and coded using 
NVivo software. The listing of interview respondents is provided in Appendix 10. 
Responses for the checklist and Likert-scale questions are tabulated and 
summarized using Excel spreadsheets. The results are displayed in tables and 
graphs. The same interview questions are used for employer associations and trade 
unions, with many of the same questions posed to WCB executives to gain the 
agency's perspective. The responses for these two stakeholder groups are 
generally juxtaposed with the agency's perspective in charts, tables and direct 
quotations. Responses of WCB staff are presented in Chapter 7. The employer 
stakeholder group respondents are coded as ER, the trade union groups are 
depicted as TU and the WCB agency executive responses are displayed as EX. 
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The majority of the interview questions for government, health care providers and 
WCB staff are specific to these less salient stakeholders. As a smaller number of 
respondents are interviewed, their responses are presented in narrative and tabular 
format. The responses of government are coded as GV, health care providers are 
referenced as HC and the WCB staff members are referred to as WCBSU and the 
WCB Human Resources Department is identified as HR. 
6.1 Role of the WCB Agency 
The fundamental role of public sector agencies is to provide goods or services to 
citizens. The role and mission of such agencies should be defined in a manner that 
enables stakeholders to determine how well the organization is performing. In the 
case of the WCB, as the following chart illustrates, none of the employer 
respondents and only one trade union believe that the mission and role are clearly 
defined and understood. Chart 6.1 compares these results with the views of the 
WCB executives, with two agreeing and one strongly agreeing. This illustrates 
that WCB executives misjudge the perceptions of stakeholder groups. 
Chart 6.1: Mission and Role Clearly Defined and Understood 
Main Stakeholders Compared With WCB Agency Executives 
* Strongly Agree 
* Agree 
Ei Neither Agree/Disagree 
Em Disagree 
Ej Strongly Disagree 
Respondents 
Source: Semi-structured interviews 
ER TU EX 
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On the surface, it appears that the WCB's role and mission is fairly 
straightforward: it is a public sector agency that is funded by employers to provide 
benefits to workers who are injured on the job. However, a closer examination of 
the WCB's mission statement may provide a partial explanation for the apparent 
lack of understanding: 
'Utilizing skilled, professional employees, in partnership with workplace parties, we will 
facilitate safe and healthy workplaces by assisting employers and workers to prevent 
accidents, and manage workplace injurieslillnesses and return-to-work processes. 
Operating as the administrator of the workers' compensation insurance program, we ý1'1 . 11 
provide a reasonable level of benefits to injured workers and their dependents based on 
reasonable assessment ratesfor employers, while maintaining or exceeding service level 
performance when compared to otherjurisdictions in Canada'(Annual Report, 2004: p. 
10. ) 
The first part of the mission statement places emphasis on promotion of safe and 
healthy workplaces, imply a public sector mandate. However, the second part of 
the statement referring to the WCB operating as an insurance program may 
suggest that it is a business enterprise rather than a social agency. Furthermore, 
WCB's ftinding regime and reporting arrangements are more complex than those 
of directly funded government organizations and this may further contribute to 
this lack of understanding. 
Two employer respondents comment that although they believe that the role and 
mission is clearly defined, they claim that it is not well understood by the general 
public (secondary stakeholders). In saying that the general public does not 
understand the WCB's role and mission, it should be understood that they are not 
necessarily referring to their own constituents but rather to the public at large. The 
two health care stakeholder respondents also express doubt as to the general 
public's understanding of the WCB's role, with one respondent strongly 
disagreeing and one neither agreeing nor disagreeing that the agency's role is well 
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understood. An alternative explanation for why respondents think the public do 
not fully understand it may be that stakeholders' have gained extensive knowledge 
of the system from attending the semi-annual round table meetings. This may lead 
them to believe that they have more in-depth knowledge of the system than a 
member of the general public who does not have the opportunity to attend these 
meetings and attain such an in-depth understanding. 
Although public sector organizations expect the general public to comprehend 
their role and mission, it may be argued that as long as the primary stakeholders 
have a clear understanding, it is not essential that the general public fully 
comprehend its role. Further, while the employer associations and trade unions 
have a responsibility to ensure their constituents are fully infonned, it could be 
argued that they do not have a responsibility to the general public who are not 
members of their respective stakeholder groups. Rather, this responsibility rests 
with the agency and with governinent. The general public is considered to be a 
secondary stakeholder group and is, therefore, outside the scope of this study. 
The WCB is viewed as complex by one government respondent (GVI) and two 
WCB executives (EXI, and EX3), but this view was shared by only one 
stakeholder respondent (TU1). The perception of organizational complexity is 
reflected in the following comments: 
"The WCB's are the most unique entity that exists in the public sector, because the rest of 
the public sector entities in Newfoundland are so straightforward, even Memorial 
University to us is straightforward. Workers' Compensation is very unique. " (GVI). 
"I think one of the things that unfortunately get missed by a lot of not just stakeholders 
but anybody who works outside this organization is the complexity of it. It is an 
extremely complex organization ... on all levels. It is very complex, it has many 
stakeholders. " (EX3). 
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These responses indicate the WCB is complex due to its multiple stakeholders and 
independent funding. Directly funded agencies do not have accountability to 
outside funders, nor are they dependent on other public sector organizations, such 
as the WCB's reliance on health care providers. Stakeholders' perceptions of the 
WCB's complexity may be attributed to the fact that its services are not as widely 
used as other government departments and agencies, such as health care and social 
services. In Newfoundland, there are approximately 5,000 new claims annually 
from a workforce of 200,000. Therefore, only about 2.5% of the workforce has 
any contact with the agency. This lack of visibility and usage may contribute to 
the image of the WCB as a complex organization. 
Undoubtedly, the perceived complexity of the workers' compensation system 
negatively impacts stakeholders' ability to understand its mission and goals and to 
evaluate its performance. In reality, this view of the WCB as a complex 
organization seems unwarranted; rather, its lack of visibility and small client base 
contributes to the lack of understanding. That being said, the perception of a 
governrnent agency as complex is not unique. Scholars such as Jackson (1993) 
contend that public sector organizations are more complex than those driven by a 
profit motive, particularly as they are expected to respond to the differing 
expectations of multiple stakeholders. 
The WCB is somewhat differentiated from line government departments and other 
public sector agencies in the ambiguity over its role as a social program. A social 
program generally refers to benefits and services provided by government in 
response to economic needs of citizens. For example, government's Social 
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Services Department provides welfare benefits and housing to individuals and 
families who do not have employment or other types of income. Other social 
programs in Canada are outlined in Chapter 2. The interviews reveal that only two 
employer respondents regarded the WCB is a social program. As the following 
chart shows, the WCB is not considered a social program by any of the union 
respondents. 
Chart 6.2: View of WCB as a Social Program 
m Strongly Agree 
o Agree 
o Neither Agree/Disagree 
(D Disagree 
o Strongly Disagree 
Respondents 
Source: Semi-structured interviews 
This difference of opinion between employer respondents and trade unions is not 
surprising. Unions may perceive workers' compensation as an employee benefit 
(similar to private health insurance); while some employer respondents contend 
that the "no fault" component of this system makes it a social program. One 
government interviewee claimed that the WCB is indeed a public sector agency: 
"As long as government legislation is coordinated and controlled by government, as ]ong 
as the Minister is responsible for it, as long as the Board of Directors is appointed by Zn 
Cabinet, as lon- as oovernment controls the appointment process and as long as it is not t, In Z-1 
privatized, it is a government agency". (GV I) 
Clearly, WCBs are public sector entities as they are operating in a highly 
regulated, monopolistic market in which employers have a legislated obligation to 
pay premiums while employees are prevented from suing their employers. 
ER TU 
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6.2 Stakeholder Salience 
Since the WCB is accountable to multiple stakeholders, it is helpful to categorize 
stakeholders with similar interests to the same groups in order to facilitate 
stakeholder management. To this end Clarkson's (1984) primary/secondary 
classification typology has been adopted for this study. The scope of this research 
has been narrowed to the primary stakeholder groups as identified in Chapter 4, 
Table 4.2, and these groups have been ftirther delineated based on Mitchell et al's 
(1997) salience framework as depicted in Chapter 4, Table 4.3. 
Public sector organizations are accountable to multiple constituents; in fact, they 
may be viewed as being more accountable to the highly salient stakeholders than 
to others. According to the interview responses, stakeholders are prioritized 
according to perceived importance. This is in keeping with Mitchell et al's (1997) 
salience framework, whereby stakeholders are classified as high, medium and 
low. As the following table depicts, all six union respondents and six employer 
interviewees agree the WCB should be held accountable to employers while four 
employers and five unions believe the WCB should be accountable to injured 
workers and unions. 
Table 6.1: Stakeholders to whom WCB should be held accountable 
Responses ER TU 
Employers, employer associations 6 6 
(Injured) Workers, trade unions 4 5 
General Public 2 1 
Govermnent 0 2 
Source: Semi-structured interviews 
It is somewhat surprising that the unions perceive a greater level of accountability 
to employers than to injured workers. Perhaps they view the funders of the system 
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(employers) as holding more power and control. Overall, there seems to be 
relatively little perceived accountability to the general public (secondary 
stakeholders) and government (moderately salient primary stakeholders). Rather, 
there seem to be two levels of accountability -a higher level to employers and 
workers and a slightly lower level to government with no employer respondents 
and only two union respondents recognizing accountability to govermnent. 
Finally, two employer groups and one union believed the WCB should be 
accountable to the general public. This may reflect the perception of employers 
and unions as highly salient primary stakeholders, government as moderately 
salient primary stakeholders and the general public as secondary stakeholders (low 
salience). There is greater weighting on employer importance by both employer 
and union stakeholder groups, likely because employers fund the total cost of the 
WCB. This implies that they deserve a marginally greater level of accountability 
than the beneficiaries. It is interesting to note that one union respondent 
acknowledged the importance of employers: 
"The system is totally funded by employers, so WCB should be accountable to 
employers. The system provides protection for employers from litigation". (TU I) 
This view is not shared by one health care respondent who places the priorities of 
injured workers ahead of other stakeholder groups: 
"... based on our own code of ethics ... we're occupational therapists, we are a self- 
regulated group ... the bottom line is always going to be the safety of the 
injured 
worker ... what is in the worker's best interest". (HCI) 
It should be noted that since health care respondents are self-employed business 
operators, they may view injured workers as customers. This health care provider 
seems to be more focused on the clients (injured workers) than on accountability 
to the WCB agency which pays for these services. Further, another health care 
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respondent claimed they do not consider themselves to be stakeholders; rather, 
they define stakeholders only as employers and injured workers: 
"Physiotherapists are not stakeholders - we are service providers - no different from the 
photocopier company. Stakeholders are the people who pay for the system and use the 
system". (HC2) 
This is further evidence that health care providers consider themselves to be in a 
business relationship with the WCB. They are providing a service in return for a 
fee. It seems that the WCB's inclusion of health care providers as stakeholders is a 
view not shared by the health care respondents. However, Clarkson (1995) 
considers suppliers to be stakeholders. In fact, Clarkson classifies suppliers as 
primary stakeholders. This points to differing views of the term 'stakeholder'. 
Meanwhile, other stakeholder groups do not appear to weigh one group higher 
than another. Rather, they recognize the multi-faceted nature of accountability and 
indicate that the WCB should be accountable to employers, workers, the general 
public and government (EX2, ER2, TU6 and GV2). One WCB executive 
summarizes the WCB's accountability to its multiple stakeholders: 
I would say [accountability] to employers because employers are funding the system, to 
workers because workers rely on the system to provide the benefits that they require when 
they are injured ... to government because we are the producers of legislation and our 
mandate is to administer the Act as efficiently and effectively as we can, so we owe that 
accountability to government. We are accountable to the general public in that we have a 
mandate for prevention and our mandate is to communicate the importance of safe 
workplaces to the general public. " (EXI) 
In addition to its accountability to its primary stakeholders, it seems that the 
agency also recognizes it is subject to government control (through legislation) 
and thus accountable to government. 
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The combined responses of all stakeholder respondents in the table below reveal 
that employers are viewed as the most salient stakeholder group, followed by 
unions/workers, government and health care providers. 
Table 6.2: Stakeholder GrouD Rankinas bv DeLyree of Salience 
Ranking Stakeholder group 
First Employers/employer associations 
Second Workers/unions 
Third Goverrunent 
Fourth Health care providers 
Source: Semi-structured interviews 
These responses support the hypothesized salience levels of the primary 
stakeholder groups in Chapter 4, Table 4.3, whereby employers and injured 
workers are viewed as highly salient with government, health care providers and 
WCB staff regarded as moderately salient. Some stakeholder groups (TUI and 
ER6) attach a greater weighting to employers rather than injured workers since 
they are the funders of the system. Although the WCB is accountable to all 
primary stakeholders, this research indicates that when faced with competing 
priorities, stakeholders expect the agency to respond to the needs of its highly 
salient stakeholder groups before attending to less important groups. 
6.3 Accountability of the WCB Agency 
Public sector accountability empowers the general public to call service providers 
to account and requires those who have resources entrusted to them to provide an 
account of how they fulfil their responsibilities (Coy and Pratt, 1998; Glynn and 
Murphy, 1996: McCandless, 1993; Mulgan, 2002). Constituents of public sector 
agencies tend to have a multiplicity of accountability expectations and thus view 
accountability in both financial and non-financial terms (PSA 1100-41). 
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To gain a clear understanding of accountability, this research examines how 
stakeholders define accountability and to whom they believe the WCB agency 
should be held accountable. The interviews reveal that stakeholders view 
accountability in both financial and non-financial terms. Health care providers 
hold the broadest view by considering their professional accountability to injured 
workers, as well as the accountability of the WCB agency to the health care 
providers. 
Employer and union stakeholder interviewees perceive accountability as defined 
by Stewart (1984) and Chen (1975) in Chapter 2. As illustrated in the 
stakeholders' comments, while one respondent gave precedence to the financial 
stewardship aspect (TU2) others view accountability in much broader terms 
(TU6). One union respondent emphasized the importance of the financial aspect 
over service in his definition of accountability as: 
"The ability to demonstrate that the dollars are used in an effective and efficient manner. 
Secondary is the service that is promised". (TUI) 
Perhaps this focus on financial accountability is due to the WCB's recent efforts 
to work with stakeholders to improve the agency's financial position. This focus 
on financial accountability was shared by a WCB executive: 
"... in 2000 when we were facing a financial crisis, I will never forget the comments of 
our actuary. He told us if were don't take this issue seriously and try to arrest the financial 
bleeding, within five years we would have a situation that would be very difficult to turn 
around. So financial accountability is very important". (EX3) 
Conversely, another WCB executive described accountability in tenns of 
balancing priorities rather than just focusing on the financial results: 
"... trying to find a balance, to be fair, affordable and sustainable. You can't find three 
stronger words because that says it all". (EX2) 
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Beyond the financial aspect, stakeholders regard accountability as having a 
mandate, answerable for certain standards of behaviour, truthfulness, 
responsibility to the constituents and having measurable, attainable and realistic 
targets and goals (TU2, ER4, ER2, EX3 and ER6). 
Health care providers, including doctors, physiotherapists, chiropractors, are an 
integral component of the workers' compensation system. One health care 
respondent (HC2) claimed that they are accountable for the medical treatment of 
injured workers but do not play a role in the return-to-work process. This is 
viewed as the responsibility of the WCB agency. This respondent also notes that 
the WCB is not accountable for the work of health care providers. Rather, the 
providers are accountable for their professional action in the medical treatment of 
injured workers. This same respondent claimed that accountability between the 
WCB and health care providers is restricted to an administrative relationship 
(provision of/payment for services) and thus does not extend to professional 
matters. 
Examining the WCB's accountability to government includes considering the role 
of goverment as an intermediary for the public in ensuring the agency fulfils its 
obligations. Essentially, government must hold the agency to account to ensure 
the needs of the funders (employers) and beneficiaries (injured workers) are met. 
Although some employer and union respondents do not seem to recognize the role 
of government in ensuring that the agency meets its accountability expectations, 
accountability to govermnent is recognized by WCB and gover=ent stakeholders 
186 
(EXI, EX3, and GVI). In particular, one WCB executive emphasized its 
legislative accountability to government: 
"Clearly, as a statutory body, we have to be accountable to government. We are set up by 
statute and we have to be accountable to government in terms of what we do and how we 
do it". (EX3) 
The responses of government and the WCB lend support to Stewart's (1984) 
claim that accountability is a relationship or a bond, linking the accountor with the 
accountee(s) (Stewart, 1984). This bond is based on the power of the accountee to 
hold the accountor to account. The employer associations and trade unions do not 
have direct power to hold the agency to account, but they have indirect power 
through govermnent which they exercise through lobbying and participating in the 
Statutory Review process. Therefore, government plays a vital oversight role in 
ensuring that the agency provides an appropriate account to its stakeholders. 
As well as identifying the stakeholders to whom a public sector organization is 
accountable, it is also important to examine stakeholders' opinions regarding the 
organization's effectiveness in actually demonstrating accountability. The 
following chart depicts how well the WCB fulfils its accountability mandate as 
rated by employers, unions, and WCB executives. 
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Chart 6.3: WCB Demonstrates Accountability 
Main Stakeholders Compared With WCB Agency Executives 
* Strongly Agree 
* Agree 
* Neither Agree/Disagree 
UM Disagree 
0 Strongly Disagree 
Respondents 
Source: Semi-structured interviews 
Four of the six union respondents agree that the WCB effectively demonstrates 
accountability to its stakeholders but employer agreement is more muted with 
only three of the six in agreement. Meanwhile, two of WCB executives agree and 
one strongly agrees they are effective in demonstrating accountability. These 
responses show the disconnect between WCB executives' perception and the 
responses of the one salient stakeholder group. WCB has considerable work to do 
to improve accountability to both of these stakeholder groups, but particularly to 
employer groups. Ultimately, the accountability relationship between the agency 
and its stakeholders can be strengthened through mutual understanding of the 
issues and concerns for each group. 
6.4 Performance Reporting 
This research entails identification of key performance indicators preferred by the 
highly salient stakeholder groups, categorization of the performance indicators 
along Stewart's (1984) Ladder of Accountability and confirmation of the WCBs 
provision of the desired performance infon-nation. Table 6.3 displays the 21 
ER TU EX 
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financial and non-financial performance indicators of combined interest to the 12 
employer and union respondents. The researcher has categorized these 
performance indicators along the five bases (probity/legality, process, 
performance, programme and policy) on Stewart's Ladder of Accountability. As 
illustrated in Chapter 2, Table 2.1 the five bases of accountability may be fulfilled 
through financial statements and wide-ranging narrative reporting. A public sector 
organization's performance reporting includes information which extends beyond 
the financial statements (probity), to include outcomes (programme and 
performance) as well as efficiency, effectiveness and economy (process) of 
service delivery. 
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Table 6.3: ComDarison of desired and reDorted kev Derformance indicators 
Key Performance Indicators Combined 






Injury frequency 10 Yes Programme 
Types of injuries 10 Yes Process 
Time to first payment 11 Yes Process 
Return-to-work success rate 10 No Programme 
outcomes for Early & Safe Return-to-work 
program 
9 Yes Programme 
Outcomes for Duty to Accommodate program 9 Yes Performance 
Number of claims denied 11 No Probity 
Number of claims accepted 10 Yes Probity 
Number of claims paid directly by employer 7 No Process 
Percentage of claims appealed 10 Yes Probity 
Administration costs 9 Yes Process 
Funded positions 9 Yes Performance 
Total costs (employer paid and WCB paid) 9 No Process 
Investigation results 7 No Probity 
Average assessment rate 9 Yes Performance 
Percentage of claims in receipt of LTD 8 Yes Performance 
Cost per claim (WCB portion) 9 No Process 
Percentage of claims successfully appealed I No Probity 
Duration of claims by category of length I No Performance 
Period time from claim acceptance to case 
manager 
I No Process 
Cost per claims by injury type I No Process 
Source: Semi-structured interviews; Stewart (1984) 
In the preceding table, none of the key performance indicators desired by 
employer and union respondents reflect the highest step (policy) on Stewart's 
Ladder of Accountability. Of the 21 key performance indicators, five (24%) can 
be classified as probity; eight (38%) can be viewed as process; five (24%) can be 
categorized as performance and three (14%) can be considered as programme. As 
one moves up the Ladder of Accountability, there are fewer performance 
indicators. Policy indicators are possibly not provided since this is the 
responsibility of government rather than the agency. Government employs the 
Statutory Review process to facilitate stakeholder identification of proposed 
policy and legislative changes. 
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The remainder of this section contrasts the performance indicators of interest to 
employer versus union respondents, identifies whether the WCB provides this 
information, analyzes the potential reasons for differing levels of stakeholder 
interest and presents possible explanations for the WCB's failure to provide 
certain key performance information. There are four key performance indicators 
not reported which are of interest to 75% or more of the stakeholder respondents. 
These performance indicators include return-to-work success rates, number of 
claims denied, total costs (employer and WCB) and cost per claim (WCB portion). 
The return-to-work success rate indicator represents the basic objective of the 
WCB, to ensure that injured workers medically recover and, where necessary, 
obtain sufficient retraining to return to their pre-injury employment. Return-to- 
work success rate cannot, at this time, be reported since the datum is not captured. 
In view of the role of the WCB in facilitating the medical recovery and return-to- 
work of injured workers, it is surprising that a key perfonnance indicator for this 
crucial outcome does not exist. This incongruity is recognized in the following 
comments of a WCB executive: 
I don't think our balanced scorecard addresses that whole area of how effective we are at 
getting injured workers back to work. I think the balanced scorecard should be the overall 
umbrella that we use to gauge our performance, and the financial statements are just one 
aspect of what goes into the balanced scorecard. Some people tend to focus on the 
financial results and this is where it is important to maintain the balance. Priority... 
should be on measuring getting injured workers back to work and how effective the WCB 
is in making that happen" (EX I). 
This executive recognizes that the full story is not presented by the financial 
statements and that broader performance outcome information is needed. The 
WCB's concentration on financial results over qualitative outcomes may possibly 
be due to its unstable financial position for most of the past decade. This may have 
resulted in the WCB's strategic focus on financial results rather than on its main 
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mandate of facilitating claimants' return to work. Consequently, the larger social 
picture of the overall well-being of claimants and whether they are actually able to 
return to their previous employment does not appear to be the chief priority of the 
WCB. Currently, data are available on the number of claimants who are no longer 
in receipt of benefits, but there is no follow-up to determine if they returned to 
work and if so, whether they returned to the same employer (in the same job or 
another job) or to a different employer. Without this data it is extremely difficult 
to evaluate the WCB's success in administering claims. Rather, the approach 
taken by the agency is to view claimants no longer in receipt of benefits as a proxy 
for success. 
The number of claims denied performance indicator reflects the WCB's diligence 
in evaluating acceptable claims. A claim can be denied if it is determined that the 
injury did not occur during the course of employment. Despite availability of data 
on the number of claims denied, this performance indicator is not reported. One 
WCB executive also commented on the importance of reporting on employer 
cooperation in the return-to-work process: 
"There should be some measure of cooperation, because we can't do this on our own". 
(EXI) 
Finally, data on total cost (WCB and employer paid) are not currently captured. 
The need for this information may become more of an issue in the future as 
employers continue to participate in the Early and Safe Return to Work program 
which sees them, rather than the WCB, paying the wages of injured workers. 
As illustrated in following table, of the 21 key performance indicators, there were 
four measures of interest to all union interviewees: injury frequency, time to first 
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payment, outcomes for duty to accommodate, and number of claims denied. The 
number of claims denied is not currently reported. For the most part employer 
respondents display considerably less interest in these indicators, with the 
exception of the number of claims denied. The contrasting level of interest in the 
first three of these key performance indicators is not surprising since these issues 
are traditionally of concern to trade unions. Labour is interested in the nwnber of 
workers who are injured, the period of time it takes to process a claim and issue 
the first wage loss payment and duty to accommodate. Trade unions have lobbied 
for many years to have employers accommodate injured workers who are unable 
to return to their pre-injury job. Consequently, they are very interested in 
evaluating how well the new duty to accommodate program is operating. This 
program was introduced in 2002 as a result of the 2001 Task Force review. Since 
the workers' compensation legislation requires that employers facilitate injured 
workers' returri-to-work, the duty to accommodate measure is critical to the 
successftil performance of the agency. The fourth performance indicator, number 
of claims denied, interests both stakeholder groups, but likely for different 
reasons. Trade union interviewees are concerned that potentially legitimate claims 
may be denied, while employers would undoubtedly like to have more claims 
denied as this would reduce claim costs and assessment premiums. One union 
respondent stressed his interest in seeing more information on the number of 
claims accepted and rejected: 
"I'd like to see more infon-nation about the claims. How many people applied for 
compensation, how many were rejected, how many went through the appeal process after 
they were rejected, how many of these were overturned". (TU5) 
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Injury frequency 4 6 3 Yes 
Time to first payment 4 6 1 Yes 
Outcomes for duty to 
accommodate program 
3 6 2 Yes 
Number of claims denied 5 6 2 No 
Source: Semi-structured interviews 
As depicted in the following table, six employers, but only three union 
respondents are interested in the following four key performance indicators: 
administration costs, total costs (paid by employers and WCB), average 
assessment rate, and cost per claim. 
Table 6.5: Kev Derformance indicators of most interest to emDlovers 










Administration costs 6 3 3 Yes 
Total Costs (employer paid 
and WCB paid) 
6 3 1 No 
Average assessment rate 6 3 2 Yes 
Cost per claim 6 3 2 No 
Source: Semi-structured interviews 
It is not surprising that all employer respondents would like to see a key 
performance indicator related to administration costs. Employer groups have long 
complained and more particularly in recent years, about what they perceive as 
escalating administration costs. Currently, only the total annual cost is reported. 
The WCB does not provide performance indicators such as average administration 
costs per claim or per $ 100 of payroll, despite the ability of such indicators to 
facilitate year-over-year and inter-jurisdictional comparisons. Administration 
costs are further explored through open-ended questions and Likert-scale 
questions and these responses are discussed later in this section. 
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The financial statements and BSC report include the costs incurred by the WCB, 
but not the costs borne by employers related to workplace modifications and 
accommodating workers in new jobs. Total cost data (employer and WCB) is of 
particular interest due to the increased expectations for employers to participate in 
the Early and Safe Return-to-Work (ESRTW) program. Although WCB claims 
costs are declining, some employers argue that they are bearing a greater 
proportion of the costs since they are accommodating injured workers in return-to- 
work programs much earlier in the recovery phase than was previously the case. 
This could be viewed as downloading costs because employers, not the WCB, pay 
a greater proportion of the wages of injured workers than was traditionally the 
case. 
The average assessment premium rate is a key performance indicator which is of 
great interest to employers. It is a national performance measure that is widely 
known and compared. Since Newfoundland has the highest average assessment 
rate in Canada, employers have exerted considerable pressure on government and 
WCB agency to lower its premiums. Newfoundland's high assessment rate 
relative to other jurisdictions is due to a number of factors: highest injury rate, 
highest composite duration and the highest propensity for claimants to receive 
LTD benefits. All three of these factors contribute to high claims costs which 
require a greater level of revenue. One of the outcomes of the 2001 Task Force 
review was a commitment by the Board of Directors to reduce the average 
assessment rate from $3.24 to $2.75 per $100 of payroll by 2007. Since the 
assessment rate has a direct impact on the profitability of companies, they are very 
keen to monitor this performance indicator. 
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The fourth indicator, the cost per claim, is not currently published in the annual 
report. However, it is an ideal performance indicator to evaluate cost trends over 
time and to compare with other jurisdictions. Interestingly, these four key 
performance indicators are of interest to only three of trade union respondents. 
Cost concerns are frequently raised by employer groups, whereas trade unions do 
not emphasize costs since funding is the responsibility of employers. The 
contrasting levels of interest on the part of employers and unions in these four 
performance indicators reflect the multi-faceted and often conflicting objectives of 
stakeholders. 
As depicted in the following table, five key performance indicators are considered 
equally beneficial to employer and trade union stakeholder groups: types of 
injuries, return-to-work success rate, total number of claims accepted, percentage 
of claims appealed, and percentage of claims in receipt of long-term disability. 
The WCB currently publishes four of these performance indicators: types of 
injuries, number of claims accepted, number of claims appealed and the 
percentage of claims in receipt of long-term disability (LTD) benefits, but there is 
limited information on the types of injuries. Although LTD is the main cost driver 
of the WCB, it is perplexing that only four employer and four union interviewees 
express an interest in this key performance indicator, particularly since the role of 
LTD as a major contributing factor to the WCB's financial position is well known 
through round table meetings, the Task Force and Statutory Review processes. As 
a result of the round table consultation process, stakeholders are aware that 
Newfoundland has the highest rate of LTD as a percentage of lost-time claims in 
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Canada. One possible explanation for this apparent lack of interest in LTD could 
be that it is overshadowed by the recent significant improvements in injury 
frequency, claim costs and duration. However, the agency has a responsibility to 
inform stakeholders regarding the main cost driver. 
Table 6.6: Key performance indicators of equal interest to employers and 
unions 
Key Performance Employer Trade Union WCB WCB 
Indicator Response Response Response Reported 
Types of injuries 5 5 1 Yes 
Return to work success rate 5 5 3 No 
Number of claims accepted 5 5 2 Yes 
Percentage of claims 5 5 2 Yes 
appealed 
Percentage of claims in 4 4 3 Yes 
receipt of long-term 
disability benefits (LTD) 
Source: Semi-structured interviews 
According to the following table, two performance measures are of interest to a 
fairly high number of either employer or union respondents: outcomes for Early 
and Safe Return to Work (ESRTW) and funded position. It is expected that trade 
unions would be more interested in the ESRTW program outcomes than employer 
groups. Ensuring that claimants' return-to-work is a priority for trade unions, 
whereas this initiative was imposed on employers through legislation and it is a 
costly program for them to administer. The key performance indicator for ESRTW 
is reported in the BSC report. The funded percentage is an indicator of WCB's 
financial health, and it is a well-known performance indicator particularly among 
employer groups. Indeed government, the CEO and the Board of Directors 
frequently refer to the funded percentage as a gauge of WCB's financial health. 
This performance indicator is included in the BSC report. 
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Table 6.7: Contrasting levels of interest in certain key performance 
indicators 
Key Performance Employer Trade WCB WCB 
Indicator Response Union Response Reported 
Response 
Outcomes for Early and 4 5 4 Yes 
Safe Retum to Work 
Funding position 5 4 6 Yes 
Source: Semi-structured interviews 
There is a relatively modest level of interest on the part of the employer and 
injured worker respondents in the remaining six key performance indicators: 
seven of the twelve respondents indicated interest in the number of claims paid 
directly by employers, investigation results, while only one respondent desired 
information on percentage of claims successfully appealed, duration of claims by 
category, period of time from claim acceptance to case manager action, and cost 
per claim by injury type. Union concern with the number of claims paid directly 
by employers is lower than expected in light of the potential for this practice to 
introduce a two-tier system. Under such a system, claimants who continue to be 
paid by their employers do not experience any delay in obtaining benefits, 
whereas the majority of claimants are removed from their employers' payroll and 
have to wait for payment from the WCB. A possible explanation for the low 
interest may be lack of stakeholder awareness of this practice, coupled with its 
limited utilization. Employers are slightly more interested in investigation results 
than trade unions. This stands to reason since investigations could potentially 
result in denial of claims or in the termination of benefits. 
While five union respondents would like to know the number of claims appealed, 
only one trade union is interested in the outcome of appeals (percentage of claims 
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successfully appealed), and none of the employer respondents desire this 
performance indicator. Both employers and trade unions have the option of 
appealing the WCB's acceptance or denial of a claim. Typically, employers 
appeal on the grounds that a claim is not work-related, while injured workers 
launch appeals when their claim is denied. Strong trade union interest in this 
performance indicator is possibly due to injured workers' persistence and success 
in winning appeals. Since appeal decisions have a direct impact on claims costs 
and ultimately assessment premiums, greater employer concern with this key 
performance indicator would be expected. Employers' lack of interest in appeal 
outcomes possibly acknowledges the success rate of claimant appeals. 
Only one employer respondent and none of the union interviewees desire 
information regarding duration of claims by category. Although the WCB does 
not publish duration by injury type, information regarding total duration for all 
types of injures is reported. Consequently, it is possible that duration by category 
is not desired by stakeholders since the data on total duration is sufficient to meet 
their needs. The period of time from claim acceptance to action by a case manager 
is identified by only one employer respondent and by none of the union 
respondents. Since the WCB publishes data on the number of days from injury 
date to receipt of first payment, this possibly explains the lack of interest in other 
claims processing performance indicators. As cost per claim by injury type is 
identified by only one employer interviewees and none of union respondents, this 
does not appear to be a highly relevant performance indicator for stakeholders. 
However, it could be a useftil management tool to identify types of injuries that 
are contributing to claims costs. 
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Another pertinent issue for employer stakeholder groups concerns monthly billing 
rather than the existing annual billing for assessment premiums. During the 
exploratory interviews, several respondents raised a wish to have the flexibility of 
paying assessment premiums monthly rather than annually. Although this is a 
policy issue, it is included in the main research instrument since it seems to be a 
concem for employer stakeholder groups. This is an example of where 
government has an oversight role in amending its policies to address the needs of 
stakeholders' since govermnent, not the WCB agency, has the legal authority to 
implement this change. 
Currently, all employers must estimate their payroll for the full year and pay the 
related premium in advance by April 1; alternatively, they apply for monthly or 
quarterly payment arrangements with interest. Some employer respondents 
express interest in having this process changed to facilitate payroll reporting on a 
monthly basis rather than annual basis. Such a billing arrangement would improve 
employers' cash flows and reduce interest charges. As illustrated in the following 
chart, not surprisingly, only one union interviewee views this issue as important, 
while three disagree and three neither agree nor disagree that monthly billing is 
important for their organizations. Conversely, one employer interviewee agrees 
and four strongly agree that monthly assessment premiums are a major concern. 
This issue seems to primarily interest employer interviewee as only they, not 
workers, pay assessment premiums. 
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0 Strongly Disagree 
Respondents 
Source: Semi-structured interviews 
Throughout this research, employer stakeholder groups indicate their concern with 
the WCB's administration costs. This is likely due to the perception that public 
sector organizations are not administered as efficiently or effectively as those in 
the private sector (Broadbent and Guthrie, 1992). Since the WCB"s administrative 
costs represent approximately 20% of the total costs, this is a point of contention 
between the agency and employer stakeholder groups as noted by one respondent: 
"Administration costs have always been a thom in the side of employers (ER3) and 
administration costs of the WCB are probably one of the highest in the country in terms 
of percentage of the operating budget" (ER4). t) Zý 
Administration costs have come to the forefront in the past four years owing to a 
reduction in the number of new injuries, a reduction in the duration of claims and 
increased employer participation in return-to-work programs. These factors have 
significantly decreased the WCB workload and this has fuelled employers' 
expectations of a reduction in WCB staffing levels. Interest in administration 
costs could stem from the fact that these expenditures are likely much easier to 




According to Chart 6.5, the majority of the employer respondents do not agree 
that administration costs are reasonable (one strongly disagrees and four disagree). 
Conversely, opinion among the union respondents is evenly divided with two 
disagreeing, two strongly disagreeing and two neither agreeing nor disagreeing. 
Since over 80% of WCB's administration costs are comprised of salaries, unions 
are unlikely to advocate reduced staffing levels. Surprisingly, in response, the 
WCB agency executives do not appear to support the current level of 
administration expenditures, with two neither agreeing nor disagreeing and one 
disagreeing that they are reasonable. Evidently, the agency's executives also 
recognize that administration costs are relatively high. 
Stakeholder concern with administration costs reflects the issues of efficiency, 
effectiveness and economy that are discussed in the New Public Management 
(NPM) literature. Indeed, without competition, it is difficult to establish a 
reasonable level of administration costs. Ultimately, it may not be realistic to 
compare administration costs to the private sector, since public sector agencies are 
operating in a political, not a market, environment (Gagne, 1996). However, it 
seems reasonable for the WCB to compare its costs with WCBs in other Canadian 
jurisdictions. This would provide stakeholders with a benchmark to evaluate the 
agency. At the same time, in making such comparisons stakeholders would need 
to be cognizant of the underlying differences which could account for the 
significant variances in administration costs. 
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Source: Semi-structured interviews 
The research also reveals that the WCB is not fully meeting the needs of health 
care providers, classified as moderately salient stakeholders. One health care 
provider is interested in expenditures for each health care category, the average 
number of treatments per claimant per category, the number of injured workers 
participating in each treatment category, and the cost of clinic-based services 
(HCI). These four data categories are readily available and could be reported. 
Another health care respondent emphasizes the importance of interpreting results 
rather than providing just the raw numbers. For example, this respondent suggests 
the WCB consider the claimants' diagnoses in relation to the number of treatments 
(HC2). This data is not currently available. 
The topic of program evaluation is another important performance accountability 
issue identified in this research. In public sector organizations, the efficient and 
effective use of resources is a key accountability objective which is typically 
demonstrated through program evaluation (PSA 1100.41). One employer 
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interviewee expressed concern with the agency's approach, or lack thereof, to 
program evaluation: 
"There is a strong perception in the employer community that evaluation of a program or 
an initiative takes the form of 'we think it is a good idea'... we think it is working well as 
opposed to having someone assess how much each initiative contributed to the outcomes. 
We would like to have an independent consultant evaluate programs. " (ER3) 
Throughout the past five years, the WCB has invested in a significant number of 
new programs ranging from administrative projects (for example, data warehouse 
and a web initiative) to client service projects (assessment premium rate 
calculation model and a highly automated claims management system). Some 
respondents claim that there is an inadequate level of program evaluation and 
cost-benefit analysis. Since the total cost of these projects is expected to reach at 
least $10.0 million, stakeholders are concerned that the expectations associated 
with these projects were not clearly established, making evaluation difficult. 
In response to stakeholders' concerns about administration costs, it is important 
for the agency to demonstrate that the appropriate level of costs/benefit analysis is 
conducted and that new initiatives are reviewed periodically to determine if they 
are meeting their intended objectives. Undoubtedly, some stakeholders question 
whether the WCB is evaluating these initiatives and if they are, they want to know 
the outcomes of such evaluations. The WCB has not provided stakeholders with 
an evaluation of its ESRTW program, but business cases for the rate calculation 
model and information technology projects were presented to stakeholders at a 
round table meeting. It is possible that the ESRTW evaluation was not conducted 
since the criteria had not been established at the outset. 
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Health care providers express interest in monitoring their own performance in the 
medical management of injured workers. During the past two years, they have 
worked with the WCB to capture better quality data. In 2005, the WCB issued 
outcome evaluation reports to health care providers regarding the cost and 
duration of their programs. One health care respondent suggested that this 
information could be enhanced with data on return-to-work success rate (HC 1). 
In addition to specific performance indicators that stakeholders would like to have 
compiled, they are also interested in comparative information. As illustrated in the 
following table, all six employer respondents and five union respondents identify 
Atlantic WCB's as their preferred comparative referent. Atlantic Provinces refer 
to the region comprised of four provinces: Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, New 
Brunswick and Prince Edward Island. The second most desired referents are the 
national WCB key performance indicators. Currently, the WCB does not provide 
any national comparative referents in its annual report and publishes only two 
Atlantic referents. Of the six employer respondents, five also prefer year-over- 
year actual results, in contrast only three union respondents have this preference. 
The only reference to these national AWCBC comparisons is a link on the WCB's 
website. 
Table 6.8: Comnarative referents 
Preferred comparative referents ER TU WCB Response 
Atlantic workers' compensation agencies 6 5 2 
National workers' compensation statistics 5 4 0 
Budgets 3 2 3 
Targets 3 3 2 
Private sector insurance companies I 1 0 
Year-over-year actual results 5 3 3 
5-year actual results 4 2 2 
Canadian average 0 1 0 
Source: Semi-structured interviews 
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Given the emphasis on accountability, the limited stakeholder interest in 
comparing actual results to budgets or to targets is perplexing, particularly since 
this is the practice of goverment. This suggests that stakeholders view the 
reporting requirements of the WCB as somewhat different from government. The 
WCB does not publish its budget, but actual results for selected performance 
indicators are compared to targets in the BSC report. The lack of interest in 
comparing to the private sector insurance companies is surprising given the public 
demand for government services to be provided in a manner that is as effective 
and efficient as the private sector. Five-year actual results are of interest to more 
employer respondents than union respondents and are reported primarily for the 
WCB's financial results. Only one union interviewee, and no employer 
respondents identify the Canadian average as a desired comparative referent. 
Year-over-year comparisons are desired by employers, but are of limited interest 
to unions. When questioned about their views on appropriate comparative 
referents, the WCB executives indicate more interest than employers and trade 
unions in comparisons to budgets than year-over-year results. Comparisons to 
budgets portray the agency in a favourable light since they rarely exceed the 
budget, whereas comparison to year-over-year results highlights the agency's 
increasing cost trends. In addition, comparisons to other jurisdictions may lead to 
stakeholder requests for variance explanations where Newfoundland's costs are 
higher than some of their counterparts. 
Increasingly, public sector agencies are expected to compare their results with 
other government organizations, and the importance of such comparisons in 
demonstrating accountability cannot be underestimated. Ultimately, comparability 
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plays a central role demonstrating accountability as it creates pressure for public 
sector entities (such as hospitals and workers' compensation agencies) to explain 
their results relative to their respective counterparts. In the case of the WCB, as 
illustrated in the following table, opinion is divided as to how the agency 
compares to other public sector organizations in Newfoundland. 
Table 6.9: Comparability of WCB accountability with other government 
oreanizations 
Responses ER TU Total 
Compares favourably 2 3 5 
Comparability difficult to assess because WCB is unique 2 1 3 
WCB is more accountable than other government 
organizations 
1 1 2 
There is a deficit of accountability 1 1 2 
Source: Semi-structured interviews 
Five of the twelve employer and union respondents believe the WCB compares 
favourably with other government entities, while two indicate the agency is more 
accountable. Conversely, two stakeholder respondents claim the WCB is less 
accountable than its counterparts. One possible explanation for the stakeholders' 
apparent difficulty in comparing the WCB to other government organizations may 
be its perceived complexity; that is, three interviewees indicate it is difficult to 
compare the accountability of workers' compensation to other public sector 
organizations due to the perceived complexity of the WCB operations. 
"Don't know if you can really compare ... in some ways 
it would be unfair to compare. 
The WCB is a different beast. It's an insurance program but also a prevention program 
and it is meant to achieve something significantly different from any other public 
agencies" (ER3) 
One employer interviewee claimed that the WCB is more accountable than other 
public sector organizations: 
"The WCB has more accountability than health care because health care is not as direct as 
workers compensation. Workers compensation is constantly watched by employers and 
unions". (ER6) 
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This respondent appears to suggest that the WCB's direct impact on stakeholders, 
through premiums charged to employers and benefits provided to injured workers, 
has resulted in a greater level of accountability than agencies such as health care 
boards that are funded by government. Conversely, one union respondent claimed 
there was a greater level of accountability for the health care boards: 
"There is a much higher level of accountability for health care. There are more 
repercussions on a political level for failure in the health care system" (TU I) 
Since stakeholders have a very keen interest in comparing the performance of the 
WCB to other jurisdictions, they should be presented with inter-jurisdictional 
comparative information wherever possible. Otherwise, stakeholders who take it 
upon themselves to gather this information may, due to their lack of an in-depth 
understanding of differing calculations of certain indicators, unknowingly make 
invalid comparisons and conclusions. Therefore, it may be advisable for the 
WCBs to provide comparative referents. 
6.5 Conclusions 
This chapter identifies how accountability is viewed by the WCB agency 
executives and how its most salient stakeholders influence the development of a 
stakeholder reporting model for a public sector agency. It is vital that executives 
ensure that the agency's mission and role are clearly understood. Otherwise, it is 
extremely challenging to determine if the organization is meeting its mandate. The 
research supports the application of Clarkson's (1984) primary/secondary 
classification typology, as well as Mitchell et al's (1997) salience levels. When 
confronted with several stakeholder groups with multi -dimensional needs, an 
accountability model can likely only effectively respond to its primary 
stakeholders. The research supports the concept of agencies improving the 
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stakeholder management process by prioritizing their accountability efforts toward 
the most important or highly salient stakeholder groups. 
This research illustrates the importance of government's intermediary role in 
ensuring that the agency fulfils stakeholders' accountability expectations. 
Although government meets the criteria of a moderately salient stakeholder, the 
interviews reveal that stakeholders depend on the government to hold the agency 
to account. The implication of these findings suggests that a stakeholder reporting 
model needs to incorporate the oversight role of government in establishing a 
public sector agency's governance structure and policies. 
As discussed in Section 6.4, the research indicates that the majority of the 
performance indicators provided are on the lower levels of Stewart's (1984) 
Ladder of Accountability (probity, process and performance), with only three of 
the twenty-one indicators at the programme level and none at the highest level, 
policy. An effective reporting model ideally provides more measures at the 
programme level on Stewart's Ladder of Accountability since the programme 
rung focuses on whether the agency meets its goals and objectives. Although key 
perfonnance indicators are needed on the lower levels (probity, process and 
performance), it can be argued that accountability is enhanced when emphasis is 
placed on the higher levels (programme). When developing a reporting model, it 
is important to recognize that while the probity/legality and process issues need to 
be addressed, public sector agencies are expected to provide more information at 
the performance and programme levels. 
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The research identifies several gaps between the performance information desired 
by stakeholders and those provided by the WCB. Ideally, a reporting model would 
solicit input from stakeholders to ensure their preferred key performance 
indicators are selected. The research reveals that stakeholder groups are interested 
in expanded comparative infon-nation rather than merely year-over-year actual 
results. Respondents identify the importance of comparing the organization's 
performance to realistic targets and to other jurisdictions. Clearly, a stakeholder 
reporting model would need to determine, through stakeholder consultation, the 
appropriate comparative referents. The model needs to ensure that appropriate 
variance explanations are provided. The following chapter examines the 
mechanisms of accountability. 
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CHAPTER 7: MECHANISMS OF STAKEHOLDER ACCOUNTABILITY 
7.0 Introduction 
This chapter reports the remaining results of the semi-structured interviews, 
focusing on the various mechanisms which can demonstrate accountability and 
involve stakeholders in the accountability process. The WCB uses two main 
reporting tools: the annual report and BSC. The performance information 
currently provided to WCB stakeholders through the annual report consists 
primarily of financial statements, strategic plan, BSC report and statistics. The 
chapter analyzes the effectiveness of the information contained in the annual 
report and BSC in meeting stakeholders' accountability needs. The semi- 
structured interview results identify stakeholders' concerns and levels of 
satisfaction with the financial reporting and non-financial performance outcomes 
contained within the annual report statistical section and in the BSC. Other 
accountability issues include forum and frequency of reporting, stakeholder 
consultation, governance and audit. 
7.1 Stakeholder Reporting Mechanisms 
Public sector organizations demonstrate accountability by providing appropriate 
information regarding their operations. While this information is viewed as key by 
the WCB stakeholders and agency, it is only part of the equation. Ensuring the 
information is meaningful for stakeholders is critical. One WCB executive 
describes this in terms of really understanding stakeholders' needs: 
"To me it's almost like putting yourself in the place of a stakeholder, once you've 
identified who your stakeholders are. Especially for people like us who are in a position 
of trust ... Also important is the whole concept of transparency. 
You have to be able to put 
yourself in the shoes of a stakeholder, and provide them with the information and the 
feedback they require to make sure you're meeting their requirements. " (EX I). 
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The following sections present the two main reporting mechanisms used by the 
WCB: annual report and BSC. The annual report contains the financial statements, 
CEO's commentary, statistics, and BSC report with commentary on the strategic 
plan. Since a good understanding of stakeholders' informational needs is a vital 
aspect of a stakeholder reporting model, the views of the WCB agency executives 
are explored to identify how well they understand the needs of employers and 
unions. The responses of the WCB executives are compared to those of the highly 
salient employer and union stakeholder groups. 
7.1.1 Annual Report 
The annual report is regarded as the chief mechanism to discharge accountability 
since it is the most comprehensive document that organizations make available. 
However, the responses in the following chart clearly indicate that the two highly 
salient primary stakeholder groups (employers and unions) do not depend solely 
on the WCB annual report to provide them with information. In fact, all six 
employer respondents strongly disagree that the annual report is their main source 
of information; in comparison, among union stakeholder respondents, one 
strongly disagrees and four disagree. This lack of reliance on the annual report 
may be attributed to the participation of the respondent employer groups and trade 
unions in the semi-annual round table meetings where the CEO and senior 
executives provide interpretation of year-to-date operational results, the status on 
achievement of strategic plan targets along with future proposed plans. 
Consequently, round table participants have more frequent and timely information 
than that obtained solely from relying on the annual report. Further, the annual 
report is not a timely information source as it is usually not available until at least 
five - six months after year-end. 
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In comparison, WCB executives indicate that the annual report is their main 
source of information. It seems that not only are the WCB executives' views 
biased since they prepare the annual report, but they are also not attuned to the 
concerns of the employers and unions. Alternatively, the WCB executives may be 
satisfied that stakeholder informational needs are met through the round table 
meetings. To effectively manage stakeholder relationships, it is important that the 
agency be aware of stakeholders' views and needs (Friedman and Miles, 2006). 
Chart 7.1: Annual Report as a Source of Information 
Main Stakeholders Compared With WCB Executives 
Strongly Agree 
Ei Agree 
* Neither Agree/Disagree 
* Disagree 
ci Strongly Disagree 
Respondents 
Source: Semi-structured interviews 
Although the annual report is not their main source of information, of the twelve 
respondents, four unions and four employers agree that the information contained 
in the annual report is meaningful. The WCB executives also view the annual 
report as providing meaningful information, with two agreeing and one strongly 
agreeing, as shown in Chart 7.2. This response is not unexpected since they 
prepare the annual report and would naturally conclude that it provides 
meaningful information. There is a perception of the annual report as critical to its 
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most salient stakeholders, while in fact it is not their most significant source of 
information. 
Chart 7.2: Annual Report Information Quality 
Main Stakeholders Compared With WCB Executives 
m Strongly Agree 
Ei Agree 
ci Neither Agree/Disagree 
mi Disagree 
ci Strongly Disagree 
Respondents 
Source: Semi-structured interviews 
Coy and Pratt (1998) suggest that annual reports are not widely read due to the 
level of expertise and effort needed to understand them. However, the evidence 
gathered from the semi-structured interviews does not totally support this claim. 
According to the interview results shown in the following chart, the majority of 
employer and union stakeholder interviewees agree (five of six from each group 
respectively) that the annual report inforination is easy to understand. When 
saying this, the respondents are likely referring to the BSC and statistical, non- 
financial performance information rather than the financial statements since they 
later indicate that the financial statements are difficult to understand. Ironically. 
WCB executives are divided on this issue as one agrees that the report is easy to 
understand, one disagrees and one neither agrees nor disagrees. This raises the 
question why WCB executives would prepare annual reports in a manner which 
they believe stakeholders may not readily understand. This may be an area where 
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government needs to play a role regarding compulsion and oversight of 
appropriate reporting. 
Chart 7.3: Comprehension of Annual Report 
Main Stakeholders Compared With WCB Executives 
m Strongly Agree 
Ei Agree 
ED Neither Agree/Disagree 
a Disagree 
0 Strongly Disagree 
Respondents 
Source: Semi-structured interviews 
The financial statements form a critical component of the annual report and are 
viewed as essential to accountability (ER6). For some stakeholders, the act of 
providing the financial statement is, in itself, a form of accountability, even if the 
users do not have a good understanding of it. Three of the employer respondents 
claim that while the financial statements provide comfort, few people other than 
accountants understand them since they require interpretation and explanations 
(ER4, ER3 and ER I). 
The financial statements do not appear to meet the qualitative CICA characteristic 
of being easy to understand. As indicated in the following comments, two 
employer respondents need interpretation of the financial statements. 
"Unless you're an accountant, it would be difficult to understand. It would be useful to 
have a summary of what it all means" (ERI). 
ER TU AD 
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"The publishing of financial statements gives comfort ... but not a lot of people understand 
them. I think for the most part people trust accountants. We would like to hire someone to 
do an assessment on the financial statements and tell us what they mean" (ER3). 
Similarly, a union respondent claimed that the financial statements do not have 
significant meaning. Rather, as reflected in the following comment, one union 
respondent relies on the information disseminated at the round table meetings. 
"The numbers don't mean a whole lot. The numbers I'm more interested in are those we 
get at the round table meetings" (TU5). 
An employer respondent claimed that the usefulness of the financial statements 
may be enhanced by providing comparative referents, particularly from other 
jurisdictions. 
"Financial statements talk about the unfunded liability and deficit. The financial 
statements are the foundation for benchmarking for revenue and expenditures. We would 
like to see more comparisons with other jurisdictions and information about average 
assessment rates. " (ER6) 
The WCB presents only year-over-year comparisons, thereby limiting the ability 
of stakeholders to fully evaluate the agency's performance. Despite underlying 
differences in benefit structures, comparisons with other jurisdictions serve as a 
broad benchmark for stakeholders to evaluate performance. Interjurisdictional 
comparisons provide stakeholders with a broader context than year-over-year 
comparisons and enhance their understanding of the agency's performance 
relative to the industry. 
It is also helpful for financial statements to provide some indication as to the 
WCB's expected future performance, in accordance with CICA's predictive value 
characteristic (CICA 1000.18-. 22). Although the WCB prepares five-year pro 
forma financial statements, they are not disseminated to stakeholders. Instead, 
they are used by senior executives and the Board of Directors. A WCB executive 
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concedes that the financial statements are not forward looking and, therefore, do 
not meet the CICA's predictive value characteristic. 
"I don't think it is sufficiently forward looking. We don't necessarily share our financial 
targets or financial information. We should provide forward looking financial information 
for stakeholders so at least they can see how it all relates to the strategic plan and the 
strategic goals. We should share projections or budgets. " (EXI) 
Through the BSC the WCB reports its five-year targets for certain areas such as 
funding position and average assessment premium rate, but it does not issue 
budgeted financial statements. The provision of budgets enables users to 
determine how well the organization is performing relative to its plans. Variance 
explanations help identify why the budgeted results are not achieved. The 
provision of budgets and variance explanations is a further enhancement of 
stakeholder accountability. Despite these benefits to stakeholders in terms of 
enhancing the understanding of the WCB results, the agency does not provide 
budgets, targets and variance explanations. 
One union respondent claimed they place a minimal level of reliance on the 
financial statements, and this may be attributed to other timelier and meaningful 
sources of infonnation, along with stakeholders' preference for the statistics that 
are distributed at the round table meetings (TU5). Since the statistics and BSC 
disseminated at round table meetings are accompanied by WCB executives' 
interpretation, this possibly explains why stakeholders prefer this form of 
reporting over the financial statements which are published in the annual report. 
Two respondents noted that the statistics are more useful than the financial 
statements: 
"No, we are not waiting every time to see where the financial results are. To see our lost 
time accidents down ... that to me is more beneficial than financial statements. 
I think that 
the connection between the case manager and the injured worker is key. Also, then is the 
timeliness of the programs to the injured workers. " (TU6) 
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"More statistics are required regarding time to service a claim ... processing time. " (ER6) 
Stakeholders' preference for non-financial infonnation is consistent with the 
CICA's Public Sector Handbook view that the infon-nation needed to evaluate 
government operations must extend beyond deficits and surpluses (PSA 1000.21- 
24). These responses suggest that the WCB stakeholders prefer wider 
performance information than that provided by the financial statements. Thus, the 
wider perspective taken by the public sector accounting standards may be more 
advantageous in meeting users' needs than the commercial accounting standards. 
Some respondents appear to have relatively little interest in or understanding of 
the financial reporting component of the annual report. This may be due to its 
perceived complexity. Elements such as benefits liabilities and unfunded liability 
are not frequently used terms and may not be well understood. The financial 
statements are likely to be difficult to understand even for informed users due to 
unique industry accounting practices (and in some respect the lack of industry 
accounting standards). Conversely, it can be argued that readers of financial 
statements are expected to have a reasonable knowledge of business and 
accounting. The annual report, particularly its non-financial performance 
information, is beneficial to users, but the financial statements do not appear to aid 
stakeholders in their evaluation of the agency's performance. These findings 
indicate that the development of a stakeholder reporting model needs to 
incorporate meaningful financial reporting that is understood by reasonably well 
informed stakeholders. It is equally important that a reporting model encompass 
non-financial performance outcome reporting. It is also evident from the 
stakeholder responses that they require interpretation of the WCB financial 
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statements. Moreover, as they do not have this expertise within their own 
organizations, they depend on the BSC report and interpretation provided by the 
WCB executives. Finally, it seems that executives of public sector agencies need 
to strengthen their understanding of stakeholders' informational needs and where 
the annual report fits within that context. 
7.1.2 Balanced Scorecard Reporting 
The WCB includes the BSC in the annual report and distributes it semi-annually 
to the round table participants. The BSC is the second major medium by which the 
agency demonstrates accountability. Since the WCB utilizes the BSC to report 
progress toward achieving its strategic plan goals and objectives, the semi- 
structured interviews examined stakeholders' views of the BSC as a reporting 
tool. 
The WCB's strategic plan and BSC play an essential role in fulfilling the WCB's 
responsibilities under government's Transparency and Accountability Act. This is 
a new process for most government departments and agencies. Consequently, the 
WCB agency is viewed by one government respondent as more progressive than 
other government agencies and departments, since it introduced BSC reporting for 
its strategic plan in 2002, well in advance of the Governrnent's Transparency and 
Accountability Act (GV I). 
The WCB's balanced scorecard follows the perspectives, financial, customer, 
internal business processes and learning and growth, as outlined in Chapter 2. 
Although it includes mostly lagging indicators such as client satisfaction and 
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employee satisfaction, it also includes leading indicators such as percentage of 
soft-tissue injuries. This indicator is important as soft tissue injuries contribute to 
the average claims duration and LTD costs. The WCB employs the BSC to 
present its strategic plan and monitor performance. The use of the BSC, 
particularly among many public sector organizations, has grown in recent years. 
One WCB executive interviewee views the BSC as the overall umbrella to gauge 
performance; the financial statements are j ust one component of the BSC (EX I ). 
As illustrated in the following comment, one of the WCB executives has a strong 
appreciation for the vital role of both the financial statements and the BSC. 
Despite the popularity of the BSC, it cannot be used in isolation. Clearly, the 
financial statements are needed to supplement or accompany the BSC report. 
"The Balanced Scorecard is basically a snapshot of any number of key indicators as to 
where we are headed. It is certainly very much tied to the financial statements. So I think 
the two go very well together. Financial perfon-nance is obviously very critical, but how 
we deal with the injured workers, from the perspective of managing of Early and Safe 
Return-to-Work is also important" (EX3). 
To ensure the BSC report is beneficial to stakeholders, the indicators need to be 
accompanied by variance explanations. Although the WCB provides explanations 
for its BSC results, one employer interviewee expressed concern about the validity 
of the explanations: 
"We are confident it is accurate ... but some of it is questionable. For example, the average duration of claims is not shrinking very fast, but that depends on how you look at it. As 
short-term claims drop off, the duration of long-term injuries appear to be increasing. " 
(ER3) 
The research findings identify four issues with the WCB's strategic plan: lack of 
employer awareness of the plan, moderate stakeholder support of the plan, 
moderate support of the targets and failure to include certain critical performance 
indicators. As depicted in the following table, nine of the twelve employer and 
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union respondents, comprised of six unions and three employers, are aware of the 
WCB's strategic plan. 
Table 7.1: Stakeholder Awareness of Strate6c Plan 
Responses ER TU Total 
Not familiar, haven't reviewed recently 3 3 
Aware of strategic plan 3 6 9 
Source: Semi-structured interviews 
A potential explanation for three employer interviewees' lack of awareness may 
be that these respondents do not attend all the round table meetings. On occasions 
other representatives of their organizations may attend the round table meetings 
where the strategic plan results are disseminated. This suggests a lack of 
communication within the stakeholder groups since they may not have a process 
to communicate information gained at the round table deliberations. Since 
attendees may vary, the round table meetings may not be an effective consultation 
and feedback tool for all stakeholder groups. This consultation approach requires 
that the stakeholder representatives attending the round table meetings ensure their 
organizations are aware of the WCB's strategic plan and operational results. At 
issue is the responsibility of the agency to monitor its consultation approach to 
ensure stakeholders' needs are met. 
Although most stakeholders are aware of the strategic plan, this does not 
necessarily translate into support for the plan. Only four employer and four union 
interviewees believe the plan is appropriate, as illustrated in Chart 7.4. 
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Chart 7.4: Support of Strategic Plan 
Main Stakeholders Compared With WCB Agency Executives 
2 
ER TU EX 
Respondents 
Source: Semi-structured interviews 
N Strongly Agree 
C3 Agree 
0 Neither Agree/Disagree 
UM Disagree 
Io Strongly Disagree 
The moderate level of support by both primary stakeholder respondents (four each 
for employers and unions) is somewhat surprising since both groups were given 
an opportunity to have input into this plan through their Board representative on 
the Task Force. This may indicate that the Board of Directors did not adequately 
consult their primary stakeholder groups before agreeing to the strategic plan 
targets. This governance issue is discussed later in Section 7.5. As shown in 
Chapter 2, Table 2.3, stakeholders need involvement so they can impact 
organizational direction; this reflects Step 9 (involvement) on Friedman and 
Miles' (2006) Ladder of Stakeholder Management and Engagement. According to 
this framework, the WCB 2001 Task Force fits Step 5 (placation). Certain aspects 
of the WCB's 2001 Task Force reflect negotiation, collaboration and partnership. 
The agreement between the agency and its key stakeholders, employers and 
unions, to cooperate in return to work programs is an example of negotiation, 
while the agreement for the Federation of Labour to provide safety training to all 
Occupation Health and Safety committees represents partnership and 
collaboration. However, it seems that the highest level management styles were 
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used primarily at the strategic level and did not extend to the selection of specific 
targets and measures. Rather, the Board of Directors developed the strategic plan 
targets. As indicated from the interviews, stakeholders are clearly not satisfied 
with placation. Instead, they want to be truly involved in developing the strategic 
plan and targets. 
The WCB executives are equally divided on the appropriateness of the strategic 
plan. This may be attributed to the fact that the strategic plan was developed by 
the Task Force comprised of Board members with input from WCB executives. 
Although the Board of Directors is ultimately responsible for the strategic plan, 
there is a collective responsibility of the Board of Directors and the WCB 
executives for its development and implementation. The lack of full WCB 
executives' support suggests there is some gap between the approved plan and 
what the strategic plan would have contained had the executives been solely 
responsible for its development. 
An alternative explanation may be that as the agency nears the end of the strategic 
plan cycle, WCB executives may recognize that the original plan needs to be 
revised to reflect the organization's early achievement of its targets. To a certain 
extent, it seems that the strategic plan needs to be a living document which can be 
modified to be responsive to changed circumstances. Developing a five-year plan 
and not updating it does not seem to be in the best interest of the stakeholders. In 
this case, based on the interviews, it appears that while the executives initially 
agreed with the strategic plan, they would like to have it revised to reflect the 
organization's current operating conditions. 
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It should be noted that not all stakeholders believe in the necessity of stakeholder 
involvement in the strategic plan. For example, one health care respondent seems 
to be more focused on interacting with injured workers than on the strategic 
direction of the organization. 
Physiotherapists are not changing what they do with patients as a result of the strategic 
plan. We only need to be aware of the strategic plan if it impacts physiotherapy - for 
example, restricting the number of treatments. The strategic plan is the responsibility of 
the administrators. (HC2) 
When an organization, public sector or commercial, is developing targets for a 
strategic plan, it is essential that these targets be realistic, attainable and 
challenging. Some of the employer and WCB agency respondents claim that the 
targets were not set high enough, particularly since many of the five-year targets 
were achieved in the first two years. The perception of artificially low targets is 
not shared by most trade union respondents; the following chart shows that five of 
the six union interviewees support the strategic plan targets. Meanwhile, there is 
only moderate employer support with two agreeing and one strong agreeing with 
the targets. In response, one of the WCB executives concurs with the employers' 
view that the targets are not ambitious enough. This suggests there may be a need 
for government to play an oversight role in ensuring that public sector agency set 
appropriate strategic plans and realistic targets and that it is viewed as a living 
document. 
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Chart 7.5: Appropriateness of Strategic Plan Targets 
Main Stakeholders Compared With WCB Agency Executives 
* Strongly Agree 7 
* Agree 
E3 Neither Agree/Disagree 
* Disagree 
* Strongly Disagree 
Respondents 
Source: Semi-structured interviews 
Artificially low targets may cause constituents to lose faith in the strategic 
planning process and may negatively impact the organization's credibility. If after 
the first year or two it appears that the five-year targets have been achieved, one 
employer interviewee claimed they expect the agency to adjust them accordingly 
(ERI). This view is shared by a WCB executive who noted: 
"We need to go back and revisit the measures, the goals and make sure the goals are the 
ones that reflect our reason for being. The stakeholders would have to be involved in this 
process. There should some provision ... that we can modify the goals at some Zý 
predetermined interval, that you go back and revisit your goals. The current strategic plan 
4n 
less, we right now is so far ahead in certain goals that the original goals are really meaning 
should go back and revisit those and if we have to, revise the targets. " (EX I). 
One employer respondent expressed concern that the strategic plan involves goals 
over which the organization does not exercise full control. As pointed out by one 
respondent, the WCB has goals that involve two parties (WCB and OHS). This js 
not very practical or realistic due to the difficulty in holding both parties 
accountable (ER4). Conversely, it could be argued that this is an area where 
government could play an oversight role by ensuring the objectives for both the 
WCB and OHS are complementary and mutually supportive. 
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As illustrated in Chapter 6, there are a number of key areas where the WCB does 
not provide desired performance information. The existing performance indicators 
were selected by the Board of Directors with assistance from the WCB executives, 
without consultation with stakeholders. The respondents identified a number of 
deficiencies with the perfonnance indicators and targets used in the BSC. It can be 
argued that had stakeholders' input been solicited, then indicators such as return- 
to-work success rate, denial rate, total claims costs and average cost per claims 
would have been included in the strategic plan targets. 
The WCB's use of the strategic plan as an accountability tool and the BSC as a 
reporting mechanism is only moderately successful. This may be attributed 
primarily to the lack of stakeholder involvement in developing the strategic plan 
targets. While stakeholders were involved in developing the high level strategic 
plan (safety training and return to work programs), they were not sufficiently 
involved in selecting the specific performance indicators and targets to monitor 
and measure the success of the plan. In spite of the significant role played by the 
Board of Directors in implementing a five-year strategic plan, it appears that there 
was insufficient engagement of the stakeholder groups in the process. Their lack 
of involvement resulted in the agency omitting key performance as discussed in 
Chapter 6. The strategic plan and BSC report need to consider stakeholder needs 
in order to be a relevant accountability and reporting mechanism. 
7.2 Provision of Information - Forum and Frequency 
The provision of information is viewed as a means of fulfilling accountability 
expectations (Chandler, 1998). However, accountors must do more than merely 
publish information, they must distribute it and ensure the public is aware of its 
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existence and has access to it (Stewart, 1984). Therefore, the forum and frequency 
with which information is provided plays a critical role in demonstrating 
accountability. The following table depicts stakeholder preferences regarding 
reporting frequency: 
Table 7.2: ReDortine Freauenev 
Frequency ER Response TU Response WCB Reporting 
Practice 
Annually I 1 0 
Monthly 0 0 0 
Quarterly 4 4 2 
Semi-annually 2 1 1 
Real time 1 0 0 
Source: Semi-structured interviews 
Eight of the twelve respondents (four employers and four unions) prefer to receive 
information quarterly. In response, the WCB agency executives also prefer 
quarterly reporting. Only one employer respondent and one union interviewee 
expressed interest in information on an annual basis and there is no stakeholder 
interest in monthly information. However, there is moderate interest in semi- 
annual reporting. Only one employer respondent is interested in real-time 
information. Overall, it appears that the current practice of issuing the BSC semi- 
annually is not meeting stakeholder preference for quarterly information. 
To effectively demonstrate accountability, it is important for a public sector 
agency to make a reasonable effort to increase stakeholder awareness that the 
annual report is available (Coy et al, 2001). This responsibility can be discharged 
through press releases and websites (Hooks et al, 2002). The British National 
Health Service (NHS) Trusts offer an example to heighten awareness; a small 
number of hospital trusts distribute their annual reports by sending them out via 
local newspapers (Hodges et al, 2002). It has also been suggested that public 
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attention can be gained through cross-jurisdictional comparisons (Ammons, 
1995). The press releases and news conferences result in media coverage through 
radio, television and newspapers; thus increasing awareness of the availability of 
the annual report. 
To increase stakeholder awareness, the WCB issues press releases to advise the 
public that its annual report is available. These press releases summarize the 
highlights of the WCB's operating results. The annual report is posted on the 
website and is mailed to those who request a hard copy. It seems that the WCB is 
making a sufficient effort to increase awareness of the availability of the annual 
report. 
To fulfil its accountability obligations, it is vital for a public sector entity to 
provide information to its constituents through a convenient forum. To determine 
the best forum to provide information, stakeholders were asked to indicate their 
preference. As noted in the following table, most respondents prefer hard copy, 
web, and media release and have limited interest in newsletters, compact disk 
(CD) or meetings. 
Table 7.3: Forums to nrovide information to stakeholders 
Forum ER Response TU Response WCB Reporting 
Method 
Hard (paper) copy 4 4 y 
Web 4 6 y 
Media press release 3 4 y 
Workplace Newsletter 0 1 y 
Compact Disk (CD) 0 1 N 
Meetings 3 0 y 
Source: Semi-structured interviews 
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The WCB currently mails a quarterly newsletter to all employers. The value of 
this must be questioned since none of the employer respondents prefer to receive 
information via the newsletter, and only one union interviewee is interested in this 
forum. Meetings are the preferred method for three employer groups, but none of 
the unions are interested in this avenue. Since the WCB uses all of these forums 
(except CD's which are preferred by only one union and by none of the 
employers), the needs of stakeholders regarding information sources appears to be 
met. 
Since there is increasing reliance on the web as a source of information, the 
website should contain information that is beneficial to stakeholders. As depicted 
in the following chart, there is a significant level of support for the usefulness of 
the website among unions, with four employers, four unions and two WCB 
executives agreeing that the WCB's website contains pertinent information. 
Chart 7.6: Usefulness of Website 
Main Stakeholders Compared With WCB Agency Executives 
* Strongly Agree 
* Agree 
ca Neither Agree/Disagree 
* Disagree 
* Strongly Disagree 
Respondents 
Source: Semi-structured interviews 
Although there is a high level of satisfaction with the information on the website, 
both union and employer stakeholder groups do not to place a great deal of 
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reliance on it for performance information. Instead they use it to obtain policies 
and procedures, as indicated in the following table. 
Table 7.4: TvDes of Information Obtained from the WCB Website 




Annual Report 4 3 
Strategic Plan 4 2 
Policies and Procedures 6 5 
PRIME program 0 1 
Guidelines from Prevention Services 1 0 
Contacts (personal) 2 0 
News releases 1 0 
Source: Semi-structured interviews 
The reliance by all six employer respondents and four union interviewees on the 
website as a source of information primarily for policies and procedures reflects 
the WCB's change in practice of issuing policies and procedures only on the 
website. There is only moderate website use to access the annual report with four 
employers and three unions relying on this information source. This may be 
attributed to the WCB's practice of issuing hard copies of the annual report to 
those who request to be on the mailing list. In addition, respondents receive a hard 
copy of the annual report when they attend the round table meetings. Overall, it 
appears that the website is used primarily for items such as policies and 
procedures that are not provided at the meetings. Therefore, the WCB is not 
maximizing the potential of the website as a stakeholder accountability tool. 
Arguably, greater use of the website could provide more performance information 
on a more frequent basis. 
Generally, with the exception of reporting frequency, most stakeholders seem to 
be satisfied with the current forum and frequency with which information is 
provided. As discussed in Chapter 2, provision of information via the web, 
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newsletters and briefing sessions is considered by Friedman and Miles (2006) to 
be the lowest form of stakeholder management. In essence, this is largely one-way 
communication that may be viewed as Steps I and 2 (manipulation and therapy) 
on Friedman and Miles' Ladder of Stakeholder Management and Engagement. 
7.3 Stakeholder Consultation and Communication 
For public sector entities to demonstrate accountability there must be stakeholder 
consultation to determine their accountability needs. Through effective and 
meaningful consultation, a public sector entity can demonstrate understanding in 
meeting stakeholder accountability expectations. In the WCB case, stakeholders 
expect to be provided with financial and non-financial performance information, 
but they also expect to be consulted and have their feedback solicited. The 
interviews demonstrate that stakeholders view consultation and communication as 
central components of WCB accountability. Such consultation would enable the 
agency to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the financial and 
performance information that is relevant in meeting stakeholder needs. 
The WCB's consultation process is comprised of semi-annual round table 
meetings combined with ad hoc periodic meetings with the Federation of Labour 
and the Employers' Council, the largest labour and business organizations in the 
province. The WCB has also established liaison committees with various health 
care provider groups such as physiotherapists, occupational therapists, 
chiropractors and physicians. These health care provider groups are not involved 
in the round table meetings. The WCB meets with them periodically, usually on 
quarterly basis, to discuss issues of mutual interest. 
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The literature review indicates that communication is vital for accountability 
(Shelton and Albee, 2000), and this is reflected throughout the interviews. Both 
unions and employers stress the importance of having two-way communication. 
Three of the respondents claimed that just providing information is not sufficient; 
rather, the onus is on the WCB to report information that stakeholders can 
understand (EXI, TU5, and ER6). An employer respondent suggests the process 
should also encompass feedback: 
"I think it [accountability] would have to include providing information as well as a 
measure of feedback ... for example, if the WCB comes to employers and provide certain information - annual report or quarterly or monthly updates. It can't just be the provision 
of that data. It has to be the feedback that we would give, and then being flexible and 
being responsible in what we say in terms of our concerns. It is to be a two-way street, 
such that our concerns would be represented... " (ER4) 
The role of both oral and written communication in demonstrating accountability 
is recognized by a WCB executive who comments: 
"Yes, we can be more accountable ... be more transparent by providing more information. I think it is important that we improve the communication between the WCB and the 
stakeholders, especially in providing them the information they feel they need to assess 
whether or not we are accountable. " (EXI). 
One union respondent claimed the WCB has a one-way communications 
environment that is comprised of the WCB executives making presentations 
regarding operational and strategic plans (TUI). This is described by Friedman 
and Miles (2006) as inforining, which correlates with Step 3 on their 12-step 
stakeholder management ladder. There appears to be limited opportunity for 
stakeholders to have meaningful input. During the interviews, respondents 
frequently comment about how the WCB could improve its consultation process 
with stakeholders. For example, one employer respondent commented: 
"At the last round table meeting most people were disappointed. They just couldn't 
believe that they were given the annual report and the balanced scorecard, and then the 
WCB made a presentation on it. It should be provided a week before so you can analyze 
it. The WCB controls the consultation too much. I went to one of the round table 
meetings where we were provided with the agendas and documentation. It was very 
scripted. Nothing unexpected was said or done; there was some opportunity for questions, 
but relatively few. There is defensiveness in the culture of the WCB. There is not a real 
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culture of consultation; it is more of a culture of presentation ... check the list and say the 
consultation is done. No questions. " (ER4). 
The use of round table meetings fits, to a degree, on Step 5 (placation) of 
Friedman and Miles* (2006) Ladder of Stakeholder Management. These meetings 
are largely comprised of one-way communication, with the WCB giving 
presentations about its strategic and operational plans to stakeholder groups. 
While most respondents indicate the round table meetings are a step in the right 
direction, some claimed that they are too controlled and too tightly scripted to be 
anything more than placation of stakeholders. Similar comments were made by 
Hodges et al (2004) regarding their study of annual general meetings (AGM's) of 
the NHS Trusts. According to Hodges et al the agenda was controlled by the 
meeting organizers and the use of presentations may have discouraged public 
questions. The authors describe the AGM as a symbol of accountability and as a 
'ritual of accountability that is disconnected from other mechanisms of its system 
of govemance' (p. 397). 
One area where concern is warranted is the high level of reliance placed on the 
semi-annual meetings as a mechanism to engage stakeholders, solicit feedback 
and disseminate information. Stakeholder reliance on round table meetings also 
points to the ongoing requirement for the agency to provide interpretation of 
financial and other performance results. If these meetings were no longer held, the 
WCB would need to identify an alternate means to communicate and consult with 
its stakeholders. 
Although the round table meetings are intended to be a balanced consultation 
process including employer and worker stakeholder groups, one employer 
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interviewee prefers to have separate meetings without the unions present (ER6). 
Another employer respondent claimed that they sometimes refrain from 
expressing their opinions in order to be non-confrontational. Consequently, it 
appears that some employer groups feel constrained in this setting, thereby 
resulting in a less than effective forum. 
Conversely, in spite of the concerns voiced by some stakeholders, others think the 
round table meetings improve consultation and allow for stakeholder input (ER5, 
GV2, and TU2). This suggests the round table meetings help the agency be truly 
consultative, thereby moving up the stakeholder management ladder (Friedman 
and Miles, 2006) to Step 5 (placation). The input at the placation level consists of 
stakeholders providing feedback on the agency's plans. According to Friedman 
and Miles, the agency is not obliged to act on stakeholder advice at the placation 
level. 
As depicted in the following chart, more union respondents (three strongly agree 
and two agree) than employer respondents believe (two agree and two strongly 
agree) the round table meetings are effective. 
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Chart 7.7: Effectiveness of Round Table Meetings 
* StronglyAgree 
* Agree 
3 Neither Agree/Disagree 
El Disagree 
0 Strongly Disagree 
Respondents 
Source: Semi-structured interviews 
Some of the variation in opinion regarding the effectiveness of round table 
meetings can be explained by Friedman and Miles' (2006) Ladder of Stakeholder 
Management. The WCB characterizes these meetings as consultation, whereas 
Friedman and Miles describe this form of consultation as surveys. According to 
Friedman and Miles, round table meetings are a form of involvement where the 
participants have a degree of decision making. The basic problem here is that the 
WCB tends to portray the round table sessions as a form of consultation whereby 
stakeholders are involved (Step 8). Stakeholders, in contrast, regard the process 
as placation (Step 5) as it consists mostly of one-way communication and 
dissemination of information. 
Despite the WCB's attempt to portray the round table meetings as consultative, 
the stakeholders do not believe there is an adequate level of two-way consultation 
and communication, as denoted in the following chart. 
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Chart 7.8: Adequate Two-Way Communication 
Main Stakeholders Compared With WCB Agency Executives 
Fm -Strongly A-g-r-ee 
Ei Agree 




Source: Semi-structured interviews 
Clearly, with only one employer interviewee and three union interviewees 
agreeing that there is an adequate level of two-way communication, there is a 
major gap in the WCB's ability to meet these groups' accountability expectations. 
It should be noted that the fault does not necessarily lie with the round table 
meetings as a forum, but rather with the way these meetings are conducted. In 
contrast, the WCB executives believe the round table meetings afford 
opportunities to engage in two-way communication with stakeholders. This 
illustrates a significant disconnect. Stakeholders are not convinced that they are 
being fully engaged in meaningful consultation; in other words, they do not view 
themselves as being involved in the accountability process. The WCB executives 
do not recognize that a forum whereby the dialogue is largely one-way, comprised 
of presentations, does not constitute genuine consultation and feedback. This is an 
area where the WCB executives may need to survey stakeholders to ascertain the 
effectiveness of the round table meetings as a form of consultation or consider 
alternate meeting models. 
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In addition to the round table meetings, there are concerns with the frequent ad 
hoc consulting with the Federation of Labour and the Employers' Council. One 
employer respondent does not agree with the WCB's approach of relying on the 
Federation of Labour and the Employers Council as a means of achieving 
stakeholder consultation, since these two groups not necessarily represent all 
stakeholder groups (ER2). For example, the Employers' Council tends to reflect 
the views of large businesses in the urban centres, rather than small businesses and 
those operating in rural areas. Nevertheless, the Employers' Council and 
Federation of Labour appear to have more influence and power with the WCB 
than other stakeholder groups. Despite the considerable efforts of the agency to 
foster an enviroDment whereby stakeholders are engaged in a process of 
consultation and communication, there is a major gap in the perceived 
effectiveness of the WCB in this regard. It could be argued that the WCB agency 
is trying to placate stakeholders through round table meetings and ad hoc 
consultation; rather than providing stakeholders with a real opportunity for 
involvement in the agency, described as Step 8 on the Friedman and Miles' (2006) 
stakeholder management ladder. Additionally, the over-reliance on two 
stakeholder groups could be detrimental to the consultative process. There is a risk 
that there are significant issues of concern to other stakeholder groups which the 
Employers' Council and Federation of Labour would not be aware of or may not 
have a vested interest in having addressed. 
Another aspect of representing a constituency through the consultation, ralsed by a 
health care provider, relates to the time commitment required for such an 
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extensive process. This indicates that consultation could be dominated by better 
funded interest groups. 
"It's really been huge in terms of time commitment. My two-year term is due in May and 
I have absolutely no one stepping forward, no one is volunteering. I know it is because of 
the time required. When you are in private practice, you are not getting any money when 
you are sitting at a table revising this stuff. (HCP 1) 
The health care providers, members of the WCB Liaison Committee, are selected 
by their associations to represent their members in negotiations with the WCB 
regarding services and fees. Health care providers are self-employed and, 
consequently, when they attend liaison meetings they are unable to see clients. 
They attend these meetings on a volunteer basis and are not reimbursed for their 
time. This is a factor which organizations need to consider when establishing a 
consultation process. 
One of the key outcomes of an effective stakeholder consultation process is a 
collaborative approach in selecting performance indicators to be included in an 
accountability model. In the case of WCB there is strong support for a 
collaborative approach, as indicated in the following chart. It shows strong 
support among employers (one agreeing and four strongly agreeing), and unions 
(five agreeing and one strongly agreeing). In response, WCB executives are in 
total agreement with the importance of having a collaborative approach to identify 
performance indicators. Although it is very encouraging that the WCB executives 
totally agree with the concept of collaboration, they did not use this approach 
when the strategic plan performance indicators were chosen. This total agreement 
with the importance of collaboration, therefore, is not always applied in their 
actions. 
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Chart 7.9: Collaborative Approach to Develop Performance Indicators 
Main Stakeholders Compared With WCB Agency Executives 
F 
m Strongly Agree 
c Agree 
Ei Neither Agree/Disagree 
a Disagree 
Ei Strongly Disagree 
Respondents 
Source: Semi-structured interviews 
Since collaboration is heavily reliant on the round table participants being 
representative of the underlying population, it could be argued that the meetings 
should be open to the public rather than 'by invitation only'. However, the 
following chart shows there is virtually no support for this idea: two employer 
respondents strongly disagree and four disagree while five union respondents 
disagree. Currently, only representatives from the unions and employer 
associations (highly salient stakeholder groups) are invited to attend the round 
table meetings. These participants represent the interests of their memberships but, 
as discussed earlier in the chapter, there may sometimes be insufficient 
communication between the round table participants and their stakeholder group 
members, thus limiting the effectiveness of the meetings. 
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Chart 7.10: Open Round Table Meetings 
m Strongly Agree 
o Agree 
m Neither Agree/Disagree 
m Disagree 
o Strongly Disagree 
Respondents 
Source: Semi-structured interviews 
It is possible that this response could be biased because the stakeholder group 
representatives likely believe they are adequately representing the needs of their 
membership. Consequently, they may not perceive a need for the membership at 
large to attend the meetings. Rather, the membership should lobby their 
representatives to ensure their issues are raised during these round table meetings. 
Public sector accountability generally requires ensuring adequate consideration of 
all legitimate stakeholders. Consequently, the issue of more regional 
representation at the round table meetings is explored. As depicted in the 
following chart, two employers agree with the idea of regional representation 
compared to the support of four trade union interviewees. Two employer 
respondents (ER3 and ER5) claim that it would be extremely costly to move these 
meetings to various locations around the province since most participants are 
located in the St. John's area where the meetings are currently held. It could be 
argued that the stakeholder representatives must ensure they are aware of their 
members' needs in all regions of the province. Moreover, the stakeholder groups 
could also consider rotating their round table representatives periodically to ensure 
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regional representation. These alternate suggestions may be attributed more to 
financial implications rather than to lack of interest in regional representation. 
Chart 7.11: Increased Round Table Regional Representation 
m Strongly Agree 
Ei Agree 
Ei Neither Agree/Disagree 
a Disagree 
10 Strongly Disagree 
Source: Semi-structured interviews 
In public sector organizations, it is typically the senior executives, government 
and Board of Directors who are held accountable. However, in the case of the 
WCB, there has been an increase in the responsibility of the employers and 
unions, as funders and beneficiaries, to take an active leadership role to help the 
agency forward to financial recovery. In 2001 the Newfoundland government 
appointed a Task Force to review the WCB because it was facing a serious 
financial situation. The Task Force replaced the usual Statutory Review process as 
described in Chapter 1. It was comprised of Board members, whereas the 
Statutory Review would normally be comprised of non-Board members, 
appointed by government to represent the interests of all stakeholders. One of the 
main outcomes of this review was the recognition that stakeholders need to take a 
collaborative approach with the agency in order prevent its financial collapse, as 




" What we heard is a callfor afundamental change in how all of us collectively interact, 
participate and manage the workers' compensation system. Stakeholders recognized that 
only by working together can the system be effectively turned around and sustained over 
the longer term. There is no-",, a realization that it's OUR system (employers, workers 
and the WCB). It's notjust the WCBs system. It's all of ours to make or break. " 
(Changing the Mindset: Task Force Report on the Workers' Compensation Si, stem, 
FebruarY 16,2001, p. 4). 
The Task Force recommended a number of bold steps designed to help sustain the 
WCB. For the first time in the WCB's history, business and labour agreed to a 
plan of action that involved a significant level of safety training, employer 
participation in early and safe return to work programs, a new premium regime 
based on each employer's claims cost experience and compliance with safety 
programs. Although the WCB agency executives and Board of Directors, along 
with government, are responsible and accountable for the agency, all stakeholders 
have a role to play. Clearly, highly salient primary stakeholders, employers and 
workers, are now expected to play a pivotal role in prevention, safety and return- 
to-work programs. The Task Force recommendations mirror Steps 9 and 10 
(collaboration and partnership) on Friedman and Miles (2006) Ladder of 
Stakeholder Management and Engagement. These are the highest steps 
appropriate to manage the relationship between a public sector agency and its 
stakeholders, since Steps II and 12 are under the domain of government. 
When the Task Force conducted its review of the WCB in 2001, they solicited 
input from all stakeholder groups in recommending changes and in setting the 
direction of the organization. The importance of soliciting stakeholder input was 
recognize ya WCB executive who stated: 
"We also have to look at the measures that we're capturing in our Balanced Scorecard to 
make sure that they are relevant to our stakeholders. We would have to consult with our 
stakeholders. It would have to be more round table type sessions, but more focused" 
(EXI). 
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However, when the WCB developed performance indicators to evaluate these 
changes, a collaborative approach was not taken. Instead, the performance 
indicators were selected by the agency. Therefore, there appears to be a gap 
between stakeholder expectations and the approach adopted by the agency. 
Overall, the WCB has only partially moved up to the highest levels (negotiation 
and collaboration) on Friedman and Miles' stakeholder management ladder. At 
best, the agency has achieved Step 5, with most of its efforts directed in the area 
of round tables and ad hoc consultation. The Task Force and Statutory Review are 
considered as Steps 9 and 10 (collaboration and participation), but the lack of 
collaboration in selecting the performance indicators seems to indicate that Steps 
9 and 10 are not ftilly achieved. Even though the WCB partially attains Steps 9 
and 10 through the Task Force and Statutory Review processes, these consultative 
initiatives occur only every five years, thus limiting their usefulness in providing 
timely feedback and input. 
The relationship between the agency and govermnent plays a critical role in the 
accountability process (EX2 and EX3). The level of concern expressed by 
respondents regarding this relationship may be attributed to apparent government 
dissatisfaction. For example, in the past five years, government has appointed two 
successive CEO's and three Board Chairs. Frequent changes in CEO and Board 
Chair positions are not a new phenomenon. In fact, in the last 20 years, the 
Newfoundland WCB has had seven CEO's and five Board Chairs. 
The CEO position is recruited by the Board through a public competition, with the 
candidate approved by government. Although the CEO is appointed for a five- 
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year term, which is subject to extension, to date none of the CEO's contracts have 
been renewed. These frequent changes are sometimes the result of a change in 
government, a change in Ministers, or concerns with the WCB's financial 
viability. These frequent changes at the senior level undoubtedly impact the 
relationship of the WCB with its stakeholders, as discussed in Chapter 2, since 
each CEO and Board Chair brings distinct views of accountability (Sinclair, 
1995). These frequent changes also impact the organization's accountability 
arrangements as the views of CEO's and public servants influence their 
organization in fulfilling its stakeholder accountability obligations (Sinclair, 1995; 
Gagne, 1996). These frequent changes may impede the agency's ability to form 
meaningful relationships with primary stakeholder groups. This is an issue which 
government needs to consider in its relationship with various agencies. 
7.4 WCB Staff 
The WCB staff members are considered primary stakeholders who play an 
integral role. Since their issues pertain to their employment relationship with the 
agency, a separate interview instrument is employed and the responses are 
presented in the following sections. As moderately salient primary stakeholders, 
the WCB staff members' views identify the information which they would like to 
have compiled. This information could be provided to staff through an internal 
report. As illustrated in the following table, while both the Human Resources 
Department (HR) and the WCB staff union (WCBSU) would like information on 
employee turnover, retention rates, skills shortages and promotions, this 
information is not provided: 
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Table 7.5: Recruitment and Retention Information 






Employee turnover Y Y N 
Retention rates Y Y N 
Number of applicants per job 
posting 
Y N 
Levels of skills shortages Y Y N 
Number of employees 
promoted 
Y Y N 
Remuneration policies Y 
Introduction of new area of 
business 
Y N 
WCBSU - Workers' Compensation Board Stajj Union; HR - HumanResources 
Dept. 
The union lack of interest in remuneration information is likely due to the fact that 
they have all bargaining unit salary information in their collective agreement and 
management salaries are disclosed in job postings. Notably, the WCBSU appears 
to be satisfied with the level of remuneration. The WCBSU is interested in the 
number of applicants per job posting; this information is available and could be 
provided to the union. 
Most information desired by HR and WCBSU is readily available, with the 
exception of a new area of business related to the transfer of OHS (prevention and 
training) from the provincial government (Department of Labour) to the WCB. 
This transfer brought an entirely new function to the WCB and the integration of 
staff from two organizations. Further, since the transfer of this ftinction to the 
WCB, the HR Department has experienced considerable difficultY in recruiting 
and retaining staff in this area. This may account for the HR Department's interest 
in gathering more information on the impact of this organizational change. 
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As indicated in the table below, the HR Department and the WCBSU are 
interested in the annual number of training days and the number of 
leadership/career development courses taken by staff members. 
Table 7.6: Training and Develonment Informqtinn 
Performance Measures WCBSU HR Reported by 
Response Response WCB 
Number of training hours/days y y y 
Number of course taken y N 
Number of staff denied course N 
reimbursement 
Number of leadership/career y y N 
development courses taken 
In-house training seminars y N 
(especially for management) 
The WCB publishes the number of training days per person in the BSC section of 
the annual report, but it does not report information on leadership/career 
development courses. The HR Department indicates that information on in-house 
training seminars would be useful, particularly for management. Information on 
these three topics is tracked by the HR Department. There is no interest in the 
number of staff denied course reimbursement, and this may be attributed to the 
fact that nearly 100% of courses taken are reimbursed. 
The following table depicts the types of information of interest regarding 
employee morale and motivation: 
T. qhle 7-7-- Fmnlovee Moraleand Motivation Information 






Employee feedback results (survey) Y Y Y 
Absenteeism Y Y 
Level of employee engagement N 
Performance goals and periodic review Y Y 
Exit interviews Y N 




The HR Department and the WCBSU express interest in the level of staff 
satisfaction. A survey is conducted annually by an external research company, and 
the results are published both internally and externally in the BSC section of the 
annual report. Included also are absenteeism rates and the number of staff 
performance reviews completed. There is no interest on the part of either group in 
the level of employee engagement. The WCBSU indicates that summary 
information from exit interviews would be beneficial. Since the HR Department 
conducts exit interviews, this information could be provided. Meanwhile, the HR 
Department indicates that they would like information on the factors which 
contribute to current staff negativity. It could be argued that some of this 
information exists in the staff surveys and the feedback derived from the exit 
interviews. 
The WCB does not report workforce profile information. As reflected in the 
following table, the WCBSU is interested only in seniority information while the 
HR Department indicates that statistics regarding the number of employees with 
degrees, professional qualifications and years of experience in the various 
departments would be useful. 
Table 7.8: Workforce Profile Information 
Performance Measures Union HR Reported by 
Response Response WCB 
Number of employees with university X N 
degrees 
Number of employees with X N 
professional qualifications 
Seniority X N 
Years experience with organization X N 
and in a particular position or 
department 
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When asked about the type of information that prospective employees may find 
helpful, the HR Department indicates the following information would be 
beneficial: 
a) Four-year HR plan (the WCB planned staffing reductions due to 
organizational and technological change) 
b) Training programs 
c) Hours of work (flex-time, compressed work schedule, family leave, sick 
leave) 
d) Job classification process (how positions are rated for salary purposes) 
e) Benefits (health, dental, long-term disability) 
Given the WCB's financial challenges, the future viability of the organization 
concerns the staff union. This concern is not unexpected since organizations, 
when faced with financial difficulty, tend to reduce staffing levels as a cost 
reduction measure. Historically, the WCB has responded to financial crises by 
reducing benefits to injured workers, increasing premiums for employers and 
freezing staff salaries rather than resorting to staff layoffs. Since administration 
costs, including staff salaries, represent only 20% of the WCB's operating cost, 
staff layoffs would not make a significant financial contribution. 
When exploring the issue of staff health and safety, the HR Department claims 
that staff members do not know enough about health and safety. So more training 
is necessary. Conversely, the WCBSU does not share this opinion and claims the 
organization is proactive in health and safety. The WCBSU claims that programs 
are piloted among employees before introduction in other workplaces. The wide 
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variation in the HR and WCBUS views on employee health and safety may be 
explained by the level of injuries sustained by WCB staff. The HR Department 
seems to attribute staff injuries to a lack of knowledge about health and safety 
practices rather than to working conditions. The HR Department's view may be 
misguided since a significant number of staff members perform repetitive duties 
such as typing and scanning, so they are prone to repetitive strain injuries. 
When asked about the WCB demonstrating accountability, not surprisingly, the 
WCBSU representatives associate accountability with financial controls rather 
than with service delivery. This focus on financial accountability may be 
attributed to the WCB's emphasis in recent years on addressing its poor financial 
performance. This attitude is expressed in the following: 
"... accountability means we're the keepers of the organization. Employers are paying us 
money, claimants are having accidents, we have to ensure that everything is in order 
before we dispense any money or before we take any money in" (WCBSU). 
As hypothesized in Chapter 4, the WCBSU views injured workers and employers 
as the most salient stakeholder groups. This supports Mitchell et al's (1997) 
salience framework, whereby certain stakeholders are viewed as more important 
or salient than others. 
"We [WCB staffl are accountable to everyone ... injured workers, employers, 
government ... we're accountable to every stakeholder that 
deals with the WCB. There is a 
pecking order of accountability ... first and foremost 
is the injured workers. Then the 
pecking order falls to employers because the employers pay the bill. Then last but not 
least we [WCB staff] are on the bottom. When it comes to WCB staff, we are the low 
man on the totem pole. We have to accept that ... there 
is not a whole lot we can do about 
it, the pecking order is the pecking order and it has always been that way". (WCBSU) 
The staff union appears to accept that they are not the most salient stakeholder 
group. This view seems to be shared by the WCB executives as they place more 
emphasis on the informational needs of employers and unions than on needs of its 
own staff members. 
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7.5 Governance and Audit 
Since responsibility for the workplace injuries insurance program has been 
delegated to the WCB, it is incumbent on government to play an oversight role to 
ensure the agency fulfils its accountability obligations. As a public sector agency, 
it is essential that the WCB adhere to a high standard of governance. The 
importance of governance is illustrated through three mechanisms to ensure that 
the needs of stakeholders are met: Statutory Review, appeals bodies and the Board 
of Directors. 
The Statutory Review is the main mechanism currently utilized for a broad based 
independent evaluation of the WCB and is regarded as an excellent accountability 
tool (EXI and EX3). This process enables all stakeholders to provide government 
with input regarding changes that should be made to the agency. In the event 
stakeholders believe they are not adequately represented by their stakeholder 
group or Board representative, this affords them the opportunity to make their 
views known. 
Injured workers and employers may also avail of an external appeals body if they 
disagree with a decision of the WCB agency. This external appeals body is 
comprised of Review Commissioners appointed by government. Their decisions 
are final and must be implemented unless the agency applies to the courts for a 
judicial review. This recourse is used only in exceptional circumstances when the 
agency believes the Commissioner erred in interpreting the WCB legislation. 
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In addition to the appeals mechanisms, three union respondents (TU2, TU3 and 
TU4) claimed that another level of an independent review, such as an 
Ombudsman, would be beneficial. This suggests that some stakeholders do not 
believe that their appeals are given adequate consideration. This illustrates a 
perceived gap in the organization's ability to provide stakeholders with an 
adequate level of independence in appeals. It could be argued that if the 
stakeholders perceive the appeal process to be a fair and unbiased, then an 
additional independent review in the form of an Ombudsman would not be 
needed. 
The Board of Directors is one of the chief mechanisms through which the WCB's 
accountability obligations are met. The Board of Directors is comprised of three 
employer representatives, three union representatives, three public representatives 
and the Deputy Minister of Labour. This structure is intended to strengthen 
accountability by ensuring that the key stakeholder groups are represented. One 
employer expressed concern with how government selects Board members and, in 
turn, how the Board represents their constituents (ER4). In response, a WCB 
executive also shares this viewpoint. 
"If government was prepared to leave ... the identification of potential 
board members up 
to the various stakeholder groups and let them nominate their representatives, I think the 
Board would be more effective. And have government pick from a list of nominees 
prepared by the Employers' Council or Canadian Federation of Independent Business. I 
think that the system of political appointees doesn't necessarily give you the best people 
on the Board. " (EXI) 
Although the oversight role of government in appointing Board members is 
outside the scope of this study on accountability of the agency, it is a crucial 
underlying component of an effective accountability arrangement. Respondents 
are concerned with the accountability of the Board of Directors to the 
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stakeholders, owing to government's political appointment of its members. It is 
incumbent on the government to have a governance process which meets the 
accountability needs of the primary stakeholder groups. Government is obliged to 
ensure such appointments reflect the accountability needs of the agency's 
stakeholders. One WCB executive claims this could be accomplished by 
government soliciting suggestions for Board candidates from the emPloyer and 
union stakeholder groups. 
One employer interviewee expressed concerns about the lack of consultation 
between the Board members and their constituents: 
"There seems to be some disconnect in employers feeling they're really linked to the 
Board in terms of representation ... one would think that as an employer, the employer Board members would be contacting me on a quarterly basis ... to ask my views on 
matters. I know some consultation takes place through the Employers' Council, but we've 
never been contacted by the employer representatives on the Board. You can ask some 
employers who their representatives are on the Board, they wouldn't know. " (ER4). 
The governance of a public sector agency may be viewed as Steps 11 and 12 
(delegated power and stakeholder control) on Friedman and Miles' (2006) 
stakeholder management ladder. Only government, not the agency, has the power 
to delegate authority to stakeholders to control the organization. Government 
determines the Board structure, appoints the Board members and Chair and 
approves the appointment of the CEO. Since the structure and operations of the 
Board are under the purview of government, not the WCB agency, this is outside 
the scope of this research. The focus of this study is on how the agency can be 
accountable to its stakeholders, not on how goverment establishes the 
governance structure of such agencies. 
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Public sector entities rely on external audits to enhance the credibility of their 
financial reporting. It must be recognized that the audit itself does not demonstrate 
accountability; rather, it adds credibility to the account and thus enhances the 
value of the account. The WCB annual audit is conducted by commercial auditors 
and attests only to the validity of the account. Although the Auditor General's 
scope is broader, his role does not currently include accountability: rather, the 
focus is on compliance with legislation. Some stakeholders may place undue 
reliance on the audit to confirm/verify that the agency is meeting its accountability 
obligations. An audit provides the public with a level of assurance that it is 
meeting its financial stewardship expectations and legislative obligations. Within 
public sector entities, there is a further debate regarding the use of the Auditor 
General versus commercial auditors. 
The WCB stakeholders express a fairly wide range of views regarding the external 
auditor's role. While the role of Newfoundland's Auditor General is restricted to 
performing an attest audit and a review of compliance with legislation, three 
employer respondents would like to see this role expanded to include program 
evaluations, BSC reports and statistics. There is a strong perception in the 
employer community that the WCB's evaluation of a program or initiative takes 
the form of 'we think it is a good idea' (ERI, ER3 and ER4). Therefore, an 
independent audit of program evaluations would provide stakeholders with greater 
confidence in the results. One union respondent claimed that the Auditor General, 
as an arm's length organization, should play an impartial role in the analysis of 
government agencies (TUI). According to the Auditor General's Office, they do 
not perform value-for-money or comprehensive auditing, nor do they audit 
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statistics; rather they focus on legislative auditing (GVI). In response, a WCB 
executive concurs with the need for independent verification or audit of statistics. 
"I think there still might be a tendency (not that numbers would be deliberately 
manipulated) for people to put their own spin on the results. So I think we need to have 
some standard ... independent review of the statistics. It is something that could be done 
either by the internal audit or by the external auditor. It is very similar to what the public 
companies are going through with respect to CFO and CEO certification of the financial 
statements, and the information contained in the financial statements. " (EX I) 
The research indicates that stakeholders expect a more comprehensive audit than 
just an attest audit. For example, one employer respondent (ER4) indicates that 
they would like to have the BSC results audited, but Newfoundland's audit does 
not extend to the BSC. Indeed, only one WCB jurisdiction has its performance 
indicators audited. The lack of audited performance indicators presents difficulties 
in terms of the level of reliance which stakeholders can place on unaudited 
performance results. Two employer interviewees would like to have the WCB's 
various programs formally evaluated from a cost-benefit perspective (ER3 and 
ER4). A govermnent interviewee preferred that the Auditor General conduct the 
attest audit owing to a perception that a private sector audit can be manipulated 
since it is paid for by the WCB (GV2). Consequently, there are two audit issues 
which the WCB needs to address: (1) stakeholder interest in having the BSC 
indicators audited and (2) the perception that an audit conducted by the Auditor 
General rather than commercial auditors provides a greater degree of 
accountability to stakeholders. It appears that accountability would be enhanced if 
the Auditor General conducted the attest audit and also verified the BSC results 
and other statistics. 
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7.6 Conclusions 
This chapter highlights the views of primary stakeholders conceming the 
mechanisms of accountability and stakeholder reporting. The information 
gathered through the interviews provides valuable insight into the factors to be 
considered in designing a public sector accountability model. The research found 
that the major mechanisms of accountability are comprised of two elements: (1) 
provision of meaningful performance information and (2) stakeholder 
involvement in the accountability process. 
As with most other organizations, the financial statement information only 
partially addresses stakeholders' accountability needs. Employer associations and 
trade unions expect greater non-financial performance outcome information. In 
spite of the increased accountability expectations of its funders (employers) and 
beneficiaries (injured workers) for explanations of significant inter-jurisdictional 
performance variances, the WCB rarely provides this type of comparative 
information. Rather, it provides comparisons of actual results to preceding years 
or to pre-determined targets for selected KSMs. 
The overriding theme of stakeholders' responses centres on the provision of 
information as vital in demonstrating accountability. Stakeholders view the simple 
dissemination of infonnation as insufficient. Instead, the WCB is expected to 
ensure that the information is easily understood, that stakeholders' input is 
solicited, and that only essential information is disseminated. 
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The research indicates that a stakeholder reporting model should not exclusively 
rely on the annual information. Rather, it should also emphasize quarterly 
reporting of non-financial dimensions. The research also suggests that the model 
include realistic targets and inter-jurisdictional comparisons. Stakeholders would 
like to have the strategic plan targets set at a reasonably challenging level (and 
updated as they are met) and to be provided with inter-jurisdictional comparisons. 
The research reveals that stakeholders would like to have more involvement (Step 
8 of Friedman and Miles' Ladder of Stakeholder Management), whereas they 
believe they only had reached Step 5 (placation). This suggests that a stakeholder 
reporting model must move beyond mere placation (Step 5) towards Steps 8 and 9 
(involvement and collaboration). Only then are stakeholders likely to accept that 
accountability has been fully achieved. Public sector agencies need to be aware 
that merely holding round table meetings does not necessarily constitute 
consultation and two-way communication. These research findings show that an 
effective stakeholder accountability model needs to encompass stakeholder 
participation in the development of the strategic plan and selection of key 
performance indicators and targets. Ideally, a stakeholder reporting model would 
include feedback from a broad base of primary stakeholders rather than rely on 
one or two highly salient primary stakeholder groups. Stakeholder involvement 
would assist the agency in ensuring its financial and performance reporting meets 
stakeholder needs. 
The next chapter presents a stakeholder reporting model which may be used to 
address the needs of the primary stakeholders of the WCB agency. 
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CHAPTER 8: STAKEHOLDER ACCOUNTABILITY MODEL 
8.0 Introduction 
This chapter introduces the multi -dimensional WCB stakeholder reporting model 
comprised of financial and non-financial reporting combined with stakeholder 
consultation. The primary WCB stakeholders and their stakes or needs are 
identified. The reporting model is developed through linking Stewart's (1984) 
Ladder of Accountability and Friedman and Miles' (2006) Ladder of Stakeholder 
Management and Engagement. 
8.1 Stakeholder Reporting Model - Public Sector Agencies 
The proposed reporting model is comprised of three strands: stakeholder 
identification and classification, stakeholder needs assessment and stakeholder 
management. The objective of this model is to enhance how public sector 
agencies demonstrate accountability to stakeholders. It illustrates the importance 
of not only providing financial and performance outcome information, but also the 
need to adopt a stakeholder management style which actively encourages and 
facilitates the involvement of stakeholders in the agency. The level of involvement 
goes beyond conducting surveys and soliciting feedback on ideas and plans 
proposed by the agency. Rather, the stakeholder management approach proposed 
under this model enables stakeholders to submit their own ideas and proposals to 
the agency. As explained in Chapter 9, this stakeholder reporting model may be 
used by WCB agencies in Newfoundland as well as other jurisdictions and is 
transferable to other public sector agencies such as health care boards, school 
boards and hydroelectric crown corporations. The utilization of this model is 
expected to improve accountability to stakeholders of public sector agencies. 
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8.1.1 Stakeholder Identification and Classification 
The first major theoretical underpinning for this model is a narrow view of 
stakeholders which is informed by Clarkson's (1995) definition: persons or groups 
that have or claim ownership, rights or interest in an organization which may be 
legal or moral, individual or collective. According to Mitchell et al (1997), 
scholars who prefer a narrow definition of stakeholders are those searching for a 
normative core of legitimacy that enables managers to focus on the claims of a 
few legitimate stakeholders. This supports the underlying premise of this model: 
that managers should focus on the accountability needs of its most salient 
stakeholders. The narrowing of stakeholders is based on the premise that an 
agency cannot be everything to everyone. Thus, by concentrating on the most 
salient stakeholders, the agency may identify and meet their needs. This narrow 
view of stakeholders is considered in the context of the public sector which has by 
definition, considerably wider stakeholder groups than commercial stakeholders 
who are primarily concerned with investors and creditors. 
Having chosen a narrow view of public sector stakeholders, this study adopts 
Clarkson's (1995) typology to classify stakeholders as primary or secondary. This 
typology defines primary stakeholders as those whose continuing participation in 
the corporation is essential for its survival. As illustrated in Chapter 2 the primary 
stakeholders for the WCB agency are employers, (potential) injured workers, 
goverment, WCB staff and health care providers. These groups are all essential 
for the continued operation of the WCB. Secondary stakeholders are described as 
those who can influence or effect or are influenced or affected by an organization, 
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but are not critical for its survival (Clarkson, 1995). In the WCB example, the 
general public and environment are secondary stakeholders and thus excluded 
from this study. 
In developing a model to demonstrate accountability, it is important to make the 
accountability process more manageable, this can be accomplished by assigning 
individual stakeholders to related groups. According to Clarkson (1995), 
stakeholders who have similar interests can be classified as belonging to the same 
group. In this case study, individual employers are represented by employer 
associations, (potential) injured workers by trade unions, WCB staff by their 
union and HR Department and health care providers by their respective 
associations. The assignment of individuals to groups facilitates communication 
and consultation with stakeholders. However, a major risk with reliance on 
stakeholder groups is that they may not be effective representatives of the 
underlying individual stakeholders. For example, the groups could portray their 
personal views to the focal organization rather than the perspectives of their 
constituents, they may not effectively consult their members or they may not 
disseminate essential information to their constituents. 
The final step in narrowing the groups of stakeholders is to identify their relative 
importance (or salience). This can be accomplished through the application of 
Mitchell et al's (1997) stakeholder salience framework. As depicted in Chapter 4 
(Table 4.3), all WCB primary stakeholders meet the criteria of moderate or high 
salience. The salience criteria are based on stakeholder attributes of power, 
legitimacy and urgency. Stakeholder groups displaying all three attributes are 
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classified as highly salient while those with only two attributes are moderately 
salient and those having one attribute are described as having low salience. In this 
case study, those exhibiting only one attribute are considered to be secondary 
stakeholders and are, therefore, outside the scope of this research. It is suggested 
through this research study that only those in the high and moderate salience 
categories within primary stakeholder groups be considered in order to effectively 
manage the accountability process. Since public sector agencies have many 
stakeholders with often conflicting multi-dimensional needs, it may be 
advantageous to focus on the needs of the most salient groups rather than attempt 
to respond to all groups. This stakeholder classification typology is depicted in 
























8.1.2 Stakeholder Needs and Hypothesized Stakes 
The second major theoretical underpinning of this model is a broad view of 
accountability whereby public sector agencies are expected to provide a 
meaningful report on the organization's financial condition but also meet further 
stakeholder needs. This wider perspective encompasses a broad array of non- 
financial performance indicators regarding service delivery, efficiency, 
effectiveness, consultation, communication and strategic planning. As a public 
sector agency, the WCB has an obligation to demonstrate more than financial 
accountability. It must demonstrate accountability to multiple stakeholders over a 
broad array of non-financial categories such as service, meeting the mandate of 
the agency, and stakeholder consultation and involvement. Public sector agencies 
are expected to report on the organization's financial condition in a manner that is 
meaningful for stakeholders. This research suggests that the financial condition be 
reported in accordance with industry specific accounting standards and include 
certain public sector accounting characteristics such as comparisons to budgets, 
rather than simply adhering to commercial accounting standards. According to 
GASB (2006), in government the budget is the main source of control over 
expenditures and is thus a public document. Demonstrating accountability through 
compliance with budgets is one of the key objectives of government reporting. 
Overall, in order to ensure that stakeholder reporting is relevant, it is necessary to 
identify the stakeholders and their stakes (needs). 
Stewart's (1984) Ladder of Accountability fonns the basis of this broad 
perspective with its five steps: legal/probity, process, performance, programme 
and policy. When examining the application of Stewart's Ladder of 
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Accountability to the WCB, it appears that probity and legality are discharged 
through the maintenance of records verified by the audit function. It is the 
responsibility of management to provide the account in a manner that can be 
confirmed. The process rung is addressed through statistical information. It is 
argued that the performance and programme rungs are addressed through the 
strategic plan and BSC. The fifth step, policy, is a vital aspect of accountability. In 
the case of the WCB, as well as in many other public sector agencies, high level 
policy is the responsibility of government. WCB policy is determined through the 
Minister's legislative responsibility which is largely met through the Statutory 
Review process and more recently the Transparency and Accountability Act. In 
response to pressure from stakeholders through the Statutory Review process, the 
Newfoundland goverm-nent periodically amends the WCB Act to change benefit 
levels and revenue arrangements. While the WCB agency must adhere to 
government policy, it should be recognized that policy development is largely the 
responsibility of government. It is essentially excluded from this study since the 
research focus is on the accountability of a public sector agency, not on the 
accountability of government itself. 
Certain public sector agencies that provide goods or services to citizens are 
classified by the CICA accounting guidelines as a govenu-nent business enterprise 
(GBE). In the WCB example, this agency meets the criteria of a GBE as outlined 
in Chapter 5 and is consequently expected to adhere to commercial accounting 
guidelines. However, the WCB is also a public sector organization since it 
provides essential services which, arguably, may not be available at the same level 
or at the same cost in the private sector. It is essential that public sector agencies 
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such the WCB be held accountable due to their monopoly power. Since there is no 
market to ensure that employers' and injured workers' needs are met, this presents 
a strong case for a high degree of accountability. 
Since financial reporting is the cornerstone of accountability, it is critical that a 
stakeholder accountability reporting model clearly identify the underlying 
accounting framework. When determining the accountability standards for a 
public sector agency, consideration should be given to the development of 
industry- specific standards where the existing standards are not appropriate. For 
example, the fair valuation of financial instruments may not be the best approach 
for the WCB since these assets are held for the long tenn. In this instance, the life 
insurance standards may be more appropriate since they value financial 
instruments on a moving average market (MAM) basis. While it can be argued 
that adoption of industry specific standards may appear non-compliant with the 
accounting standards, the conceptual framework actually allows for an industry to 
develop standards where they do not exist or where the existing standards do not 
meet the needs of stakeholders. In fact, there are two recent examples where the 
WCBs developed their own standards: adoption of the life insurance MANI 
valuation standard for long-term investments until 2004, and adherence to the life 
insurance standard of recognizing the liability for future administration cost. 
The proposed stakeholder reporting model is based on the premise that if a public 
sector agency meets the criteria of a GBE and hence must comply with the 
commercial accounting standards, that these standards be adopted with the 
provision that in situations where the needs of stakeholders are not fully 
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addressed, i ndustry- specific standards be developed. Despite the CICA's 
conceptual framework provision for accountants to use their professional 
judgment and modify commercial standards, it may be challenging to determine 
when the existing standards are lacking or do not meet stakeholders' needs. A 
disadvantage of modifying accounting standards to accommodate industry specific 
reporting is the possibility that public sector agencies may manipulate their 
financial results. Although the WCB agency is regarded as a GBE that is subject 
to commercial accounting standards, it is still a public sector organization and is 
therefore expected to demonstrate accountability to its stakeholders. One of the 
main vehicles to accomplish this is the provision of information beyond the 
financial statements to include comparisons to budgets, targets, and other 
jurisdictions as well as key performance outcome indicators. 
The proposed model is based on the assumption that when commercial accounting 
standards have been adopted, the public sector agency should fulfil its wider 
accountability obligations by providing additional narrative and key performance 
indicators in a manner consistent with public sector accounting guidelines. Since 
public sector agencies should arguably be held to a higher standard of 
accountability than government departments, they must endeavour to ascertain 
stakeholders' informational and other accountability needs. To accomplish this, it 
is suggested that the focal organization undertake a two-way consultative process. 
Camaghan et al (1996) suggest that stakeholder interests and concerns can be 
summarized and described as their stakes. The following tables depict the stakes 
of the primary stakeholder groups. The specific performance indicators of interest 
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are discussed in Chapter 7. Before embarking on the development of a stakeholder 
reporting model, it is suggested that the public sector agency gain an 
understanding of its stakeholders and their stakes through a case study entailing 
open-ended questions, Likert scale questions and checklist questions. It is 
important to note that the concept of stake is not limited to Performance 
indicators; it also encompasses how stakeholders view consultation issues along 
with financial and performance reporting mechanisms. Tables 8.1 - 8.5 (adapted 
from Carnaghan et al) on the following pages depict the WCB primary 
stakeholders and their stakes as ascertained through the interviews. The results are 
based on responses of interviewees from six employer associations, six unions, 
two government officials, two health care providers and two WCB staff 
representatives. 
Table 8.1: Emplover (Funder) Stakeholders and Their Stakes 
Hypothesized Hypothesized Research Unmet User Needs 
Stakes Accountability Validation 
Criteria 
Minimize premiums Funding position 5 in agreement Total cost 
Average premium rate 6 in agreement Cost per claim 
Types of injuries 
Reduce injuries Injury frequency 4 in agreement Number accepted 
Percentage appealed 
Prompt return to RTW success rate 5 in agreement Percentage on LTD 
work ESRTW outcomes 4 in agreement ESRTW RTW 
Operated efficiently Reduce administration 6 in agreement 
Monthly billing 
and effectively costs 
Comparative 
Total costs 6 in agreement referents 
Cost per claim 6 in agreement 
Involvement 
Collaboration Number claims denied 5 in agreement Two-way Percentage claims 5 in agreement 
appealed communication 
Legend: LTD -Long-term disability; ESRTW- Early and SajeReturn-to- Work 
RTW- Return-to-Work 
The WCB stakeholders and their hypothesized stakes are presented in Chapter 4, 
Table 4.4. Through this research study, these hypothesized stakes and 
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accountability criteria are analyzed. As depicted in Table 8.1, employer 
respondents agree with most of the hypothesized stakes and criteria. However. 
their preference for injury frequency (5 respondents) and outcomes for ESRTW (5 
respondents) is somewhat lower than expected. The high degree of interest in 
funding position and assessment rate reflects stakeholder concern with the WCB's 
financial health. As indicated in Chapter 7, stakeholders indicate they do not place 
a high level of reliance on financial statements, but rather, depend on statistics and 
the BSC report. According to the documentary review, performance indicators are 
not provided for some of the validated accountability criteria: RTW, ESTRW, 
total costs, cost per claim, number of claims denied, and percentage of claims 
appealed. Overall, six of the ten (60%) accountability criteria desired by employer 
respondents are not provided by the WCB. Furthermore, as depicted in Table 8.1 
there are several other areas where stakeholders' needs are not fully addressed: 
monthly billing, comparative referents, percentage of claimants receiving LTD, 
involvement, collaboration and two-way communication. Claims cost and 
monthly assessment information reflect the employers' stake of lower premiums; 
types of injuries, as well as number of claims accepted and appealed respond to 
their stake of reduced injuries; and the return-to-work stake is addressed by LTD 
and ESRTW indicators. According to this research, employer interviewees 
express a strong desire to be involved in the accountability process in tenns of 
developing the strategic plan and targets along with other performance indicators. 
Employer respondents indicate that comparative referents to the Atlantic WCBs or 
national AWCBC statistics are considered more helpful than year-over-year actual 
results. 
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Table 8.2: Iniured EmDlovees (Beneficiarv) Stakeholders and Their StAk,, q 
Hypothesized Hypothesized Research Unmet User Needs 
Stakes Accountability Criteria Validation 
-Vehabilitation and RTW success rate 5 in agreement Number of claims 
return to work ESRTW outcome 5 in agreement denied 
Duty to accommodate 6 in agreement Types of injuries 
Number accepted 
Improved safety Injury frequency 6 in agreement Percentage appealed 
ESRTW 
Operated Reduce time to first 6 in agreement RTW 
efficiently and payment LTD 
effectively Number of claims denied 6 in agreement Comparative 
Number of claims referents 
accepted 5 in agreement Involvement 
Percentage of claims collaboration 
appealed 5 in agreement Appropriate strategic 
Funding position 4 in agreement plan targets 
Administration costs 3 in agreement 
As illustrated in Table 8.2, the research reveals that all six union respondents, 
representing injured workers, express a strong interest in injury frequency, time to 
first payment, duty to accommodate, number of claims denied while five union 
interviewees were interested in RTW, ESRTW, number of claims accepted, and 
percentage appealed. There is considerably less interest in administration costs 
and funded position. As depicted in Table 8.2, there are several areas where 
stakeholders' needs are not fully met. For example, although all six respondents 
indicate they would like information on the number of claims denied, and five 
would like performance indicators on types of injuries, RTW and percentage 
appealed, this information is not reported. In fact, six of the ten (60%) of the 
validated accountability criteria are not provided. Like the employer associations, 
trade unions are also interested in more relevant comparisons along with increased 
involvement and collaboration, particularly with the development of the strategic 
plan and targets. 
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Table 8.3: Government Stakeholderk and ThiAr qfaUg-c 
Hypothesized Stakes Hypothesized Research Unmet User Needs 
Accountability Criteria Validation 
Adherence to Audit opinion (Auditor Transparency and 
legislation General) Accountability Act 
(Strategic Plan) 
Financially viable Funding position Compliance with WCB 
insurance coverage Average premium rate legislation 
for employees and Wage replacement rate 
employers Reduce administration 
costs 
Minimize financial Number of claims 
impact on other accepted 
government social Number of claims 
programs denied 
As displayed in Table 8.3, goverrinient interviewees do not express interest in any 
of the hypothesized accountability criteria but are primarily concerned with the 
Transparency and Accountability Act and the WCB legislation compliance. It 
appears that government defers decisions regarding the specific dimensions to be 
measured to the WCB agency. Government's relinquishment of operational 
control of the WCB correlates with their focus on the higher policy issues that can 
be addressed through legislation. To demonstrate accountability to goverm-nent, 
the agency needs to focus on compliance with relevant legislation. Currently, 
there is no mechanism to ensure legislative compliance. Instead, verification of 
compliance with legislation is the responsibility of the Auditor General. This may 
be problematic since the Auditor General conducts only periodic audits every four 
to five years of selected accounts of the WCB agency. Consequently, the agency 
may need to consider expanding its attest audit to include legislative compliance. 
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Table 8.4: WCB Staff Stakeholders and Their Stakes 
Hypothesized Hypothesized Research Unmet User Needs 
Stakes Accountability Validation 
Criteria 
Recruitment and Employee turnover rate HR and WCBSU Skill shortages 
retention agreement Career development 
courses 
Training and Number of training HR and WCBSU 
development days agreement 
Employee morale Staff satisfaction HR and WCBSU 
agreement 
The research shows that WCB staff members, represented by the Human 
Resources Department and the WCB staff union, are in agreement with the 
hypothesized accountability criteria. In addition, both the union and the HR 
Department express interest in having information on skills shortages and career 
development courses. Data regarding skills shortages enables the staff union to 
advise their members of possible areas for advancement and where they might 
wish to upgrade their skills and education. Both the HR Department and the staff 
union indicate an interest in the number of career development courses offered. 
This would supplement the information on the number of training days which is 
currently published. 
Tahle 8-5-- Health Care Provider Stakeholders and Their Stakes 
Hypothesized Stakes Hypothesized Research Unmet User Needs 
Accountability Validation 
Criteria 
WCB as a revenue Funds available I in agreement Quality and efficiency 
source for health care of work; 
providers Amount spent on each 
Maintain professional 2 in agreement health care category; 
standards Average number of 
treatments per 
Assist injured 2 in agreement on claimant; 
workers medically medical recovery Number of claimants 
recover and return to aspect (not on participating in 
work return to work) treatments; 
Amount spent on clinic 
based services 
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One health care interviewee claimed her organization does not view the WCB as a 
revenue source. Instead, they are interested in information regarding any 
restrictions on the number of treatments they are entitled to provide to injured 
workers. Perhaps they perceive a focus on revenue as unprofessional. However, 
their concentration on treatments ultimately has revenue implications. 
Both health care respondents agree with the importance of maintaining 
professional standards. Their emphasis is on professional medical conduct in the 
treatment of in ured workers. They view accountability to the WCB as restricted i 
to administrative issues such as invoicing and payments. At the outset of the 
research, it was hypothesized that one of their stakes would be assisting injured 
workers medically recover and return to work. However, both health care 
interviewees claimed they are interested in the medical recovery aspect, but they 
view return-to-work as the responsibility of the WCB. Again, the focus is on their 
professional responsibility to the injured worker, not on their accountability to the 
WCB. 
Finally, the two health care interviewees indicated they would like to have 
information in the following five areas: 
a) Quality and efficiency of work; 
b) Expenditures on each health care category; 
c) Average number of treatments per claimant; 
d) Number of claimants participating in treatments; 
e) Amount spent on clinic based services. 
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Information regarding the quality and efficiency of health care providers' work is 
the only outcome based informational item identified. The WCB does not directly 
measure or monitor quality and efficiency; rather, the agency captures data on the 
number of claimants receiving treatments. One health care provider argued that 
simply providing raw data is not beneficial. Instead, they prefer to have more in- 
depth analysis by considering how the diagnosis of the injured workers might 
explain success or failure of the patients' return-to-work. The remaining four data 
categories are captured by the WCB and could be reported. 
As illustrated in Tables 8.1 - 8.5, the research validates most of the hypothesized 
accountability criteria and identifies areas where stakeholder reporting needs are 
not fully addressed. The research found that although the WCB agency provides 
some of the information needed by stakeholders, there is opportunity for 
improvement both in the type of information reported and in the approach to 
stakeholder management and consultation. 
8.1.3 Managing Stakeholder Needs 
As discussed earlier, public sector agencies are responsible for managing the 
relationship with their primary stakeholders. This study argues that the broad view 
of stakeholder management that embraces both the agency executives and the 
stakeholder groups, as advocated by Friedman and Miles (2006) is appropriate for 
public sector agencies. It is suggested that public sector agencies endeavour to 
utilize the management tools on the higher steps of Friedman and Miles' (2006) 
Ladder of Stakeholder Management. As illustrated in Chapters 6 and 7, only when 
managers apply steps 6-10 on Friedman and Miles' Stakeholder Management 
Ladder do they tend to achieve the higher steps on Stewart's (1984) Ladder of 
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Accountability. In the case of the WCB, stakeholders view accountability as more 
than the agency disseminating information. Stakeholders want to be involved in 
the development and evaluation of the strategic plan and related targets. 
Table 8.6 illustrates the proposed stakeholder reporting model for semi- 
autonomous public sector agencies. This model is essentially three dimensional in 
that it identifies and classifies stakeholders, links their main stakes to Stewart's 
(1984) Ladder of Accountability, and employs Friedman and Miles' (2006) 
Ladder of Stakeholder Management and Engagement method in managing 
stakeholder relationships. The proposed stakeholder reporting model illustrates the 
relationship between the accountability and stakeholder management ladders. This 
reporting model focuses on the stakes of its primary stakeholders. Emphasis is 
placed on employer associations and trade unions as highly salient stakeholders; a 
lesser degree of attention is placed on the moderately salient stakeholders: 
goverment, WCB staff and health care providers. 
As discussed earlier, Tables 8.1 - 8.5 present the hypothesized stakes and related 
accountability criteria for each stakeholder group. The research validates most of 
these hypothesized stakes and identifies areas where user needs are not fully 
addressed. These research results are summarized and categorized along the 
corresponding rungs of Stewart's (1984) Ladder of Accountability and Friedman 
and Miles' (2006) Stakeholder Management Ladder in Table 8.6. As shown in 
this table, the stakes for each primary stakeholder group are summarized into main 
categories. For example, Table 8.1 shows employers' concern with minimizing 
premiums as measured through funding position and average premium rate, and 
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this is summarized and disPlayed in Table 8.6 as a main stake of financial viability 
on Step I (probity and legal) on Stewart's Ladder of Accountability. Similarly. 
employers' concern with prompt return to work, as reflected through RTW 
success rate and ESRTW outcomes, is included in Table 8.6 under Step 4- 
Programme as a main stake of achievement of the agency's goals. 
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The proposed stakeholder reporting model is based on five underlying principles 
that emerge from this research study: 
1) The model should be reviewed and updated on a regular basis to reflect 
changing environmental and operational conditions. 
2) Stakeholder involvement and collaboration needs to occur more frequently 
than every three to five years when the strategic plan is developed. This 
involvement extends to stakeholders working with the organization to 
establish the strategic plan and targets and performance indicators. 
3) Stakeholder representatives should be responsible to represent their 
membership, seek their constituents' input and disseminate essential 
information. The agency needs to be cognizant of potential risk of placing 
excessive reliance on the advice of one or two powerful stakeholder 
groups. 
4) Govermuent is expected to play an active oversight role to ensure the 
agency's targets are rigorous and its reporting mechanisms meet 
stakeholder needs. 
5) Government is expected to exercise an accountability role by soliciting 
input from stakeholder groups when selecting the Board of Directors. 
Government is also expected to recognize the impact of frequent CEO and 
Board Chair personnel changes on the agency's accountability relationship 
with govemment and other stakeholder groups. 
8.1.4 Aligning the Rungs 
As stated, the stakeholder reporting model in Table 8.6 correlates Stewart's (1984) 
Ladder of Accountability with Friedman and Miles' (2006) Ladder of stakeholder 
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Management and Engagement. The primary stakeholders with a stake or interest 
at each level on Stewart's Accountability Ladder are displayed, along with their 
combined main stakes. The main stakes identified in the model differ somewhat 
from the stakes depicted in Tables 8.1-8.5 because they represent the overall 
interests of all stakeholder groups associated with each rung on the Accountability 
Ladder. The form of accountability refers to the reporting mechanisms and 
stakeholder management style employed to demonstrate accountability for each 
rung of the Accountability Ladder. The method of account refers to the 
mechanisms utilized to demonstrate accountability such as the annual report. 
Finally, the performance indicators reflect the specific indicators and statistics that 
are desired by stakeholders. These key performance indicators are classified 
according to the relevant rung on the Accountability Ladder. As one moves up the 
rungs of both ladders, the accountability base and stakeholder management 
approach becomes wider and more complex. The following sections explain and 
justify how the steps on Stewart's Ladder of Accountability are linked with those 
on Friedman and Miles' Ladder of Stakeholder Management and Engagement. 
Probity and legality with manipulation and therapy 
As outlined in Chapter 2, Table 2.1, the probity and legality rung is concerned 
with fiscal accountability and legal compliance. This rung is of interest to the 
highly salient stakeholder groups (employers and trade unions) and moderately 
salient group (government). Accountability at this rung may take the fonn of 
audited financial statements and confirmation of compliance with legislation. The 
method of account is through the published annual report and legislative 
compliance, as verified by the Auditor General's report. In addition, the types of 
performance indicators employed at this step are concerned with fiscal 
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accountability (number of claims accepted and denied) and legality (investigation 
outcomes, number of claims appealed, and percentage of appeals won). 
The stakeholder management approach suggested to address accountability for 
probity and legality is manipulation and therapy (Steps I and 2 of Friedman and 
Miles' Ladder of Stakeholder Management). Friedman and Miles describe this as 
largely a public relations exercise which relies on the most basic form of 
stakeholder management: corporate reports, newsletters and other publications. 
There is virtually no dialogue. In the case of the WCB, the agency influences or 
manipulates stakeholders' views of the organization by illustrating fiscal 
responsibility through audited financial statements. The therapy aspect is 
addressed through the non-financial information in the narrative section of the 
WCB annual report, aimed at convincing stakeholders that the agency is indeed 
meeting its fiscal and legal accountability obligations. In other words, the 
financial statements and the annual report are used in a 'therapeutic' fashion to 
cure stakeholders of the notion that the WCB may not be fiscally responsible. 
Legal compliance is addressed through the periodic audits conducted by the 
Auditor General. Friedman and Miles' stakeholder management techniques of 
manipulation and therapy are one-way communication tools comprised of 
financial statements and the annual report; these tools are sufficient to meet only 
Stewart's lowest level of stakeholders' basic needs, probity and legality. 
Process with informing and explaining 
The process accountability rung of Stewart's Ladder of Accountability 
emphasizes efficiency, adherence to procedures and effective administration. At 
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this level, stakeholders are seeking information, confirming that the agency is 
operating efficiently, and ensuring that all applicable procedures are followed. 
This rung is of interest to employers and trade unions, and their high level stake is 
efficiency. The form of accountability proposed for this rung is comprised of the 
annual report and statistics. The method of account is the publication and 
distribution of the annual report in hard copy format and through the web. The key 
performance indicators represent the type of data that should be included in the 
statistical section of the annual report. 
The stakeholder management approach at the second irung is characterized as 
informing and explaining, which employs workshops and reports containing both 
good and bad news. Steps 3 and 4 (informing and explaining) of Friedman and 
Miles' Stakeholder Management Ladder are employed to disseminate information 
on various process indicators. This involves corporate statistics that are typically 
provided in the WCB's annual report, such as time to first payment, time from 
claim acceptance to case manager referral and cost per claim. This one-way 
communication tool is described by Friedman and Miles as informing. 
The WCB uses its annual report and BSC information, distributed at its round 
table meetings, as the main mechanisms to explain its operational results from a 
process perspective. During the round table meetings, the agency's executives 
explain its results and progress towards achieving its strategic plan as reflected in 
the BSC report. The WCB also demonstrates accountability by explaIning 
decisions and processes to independent third parties such as the Statutory Review 
Committee (which is appointed by government every five years to review the 
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WCB agency) and the external appeals body. These two-way communication 
tools characterize Step 4 (explaining) of Friedman and Miles' Ladder of 
Stakeholder Management. Friedman and Miles' informing and explaining 
stakeholder management techniques, achieved through dissemination of financial 
and non-financial information supplemented by verbal explanations, will meet 
only Stewart's second rung of accountability for process. 
Performance with placation 
The performance step on the Accountability Ladder correlates with Step 5 
(placation) on Friedman and Miles' Stakeholder Management Ladder and is 
primarily concerned with its highly salient stakeholders. According to Stewart, at 
the performance rung, output data should be provided. At this step, the emphasis 
is on whether standards and targets are met; this is of particular interest to 
employers and trade unions and can be captured under the heading of performance 
outcomes. This information is included the annual report with its financial and 
non-financial performance information, narrative explanations, statistics and BSC. 
The method of account is round table meetings where information is disseminated 
and explained and the annual report and BSC are distributed. The obligation to 
give an account as to whether the WCB meets its standards implies that specific 
targets already exist. Indeed, the WCB's targets and standards are included in its 
strategic plan, reported on through its BSC. It should be noted that it is not 
essential for an agency to use the BSC to demonstrate accountability for the 
perfonnance rung. Rather, the objective is to provide stakeholders with sufficient 
information to illustrate that the agency has achieved the required or expected 
standards. 
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The chief stakeholder management technique employed to demonstrate 
accountability for performance includes advisory panels, task forces and two-way 
dialogue; this is described by Friedman and Miles as placation (Step 5). Placation 
certainly fits the WCB's stakeholder management approach, built on round table 
meetings and ad hoc consultation. To demonstrate performance, the WCB relies 
on Friedman and Miles' placation strategy whereby round table meetings are held 
with the primary stakeholder groups. These meetings enable the WCB to have 
two-way dialogue with stakeholders, through which participants may provide the 
agency with their expert opinion. However, the agency is not obliged to accept 
this advice. Friedman and Miles (p. 170) caution that this level of stakeholder 
management can be used for political purposes to portray a degree of legitimacy. 
As some of the interviewees indicated, the WCB appears to use placation to 
portray a higher level of stakeholder involvement than is actually the case. The 
WCB sets the agenda for the round table meetings and uses this forum to present 
information to stakeholders. According to one of the respondents, the round table 
meetings are highly scripted and too tightly controlled. One of the main 
disadvantages of placation relates to the possibility that some stakeholder groups 
may not be comfortable providing their opinion in the round table meetings as 
they do not want to appear to be in conflict with other constituencies represented 
such as union groups. Friedman and Miles suggest when placation is used as a 
one-way communications vehicle, it will be viewed as a form of tokenism. 
Although the placation management style facilitates stakeholder input and 
feedback, it is largely a reactive rather than proactive approach. It engages 
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stakeholders and seeks their opinions on plans developed by the organization 
rather than proactively soliciting proposals from stakeholders. 
Programme with consultation, involvement, negotiation, collaboration and 
partnership 
Stewart describes the programme rung as demonstrating that the organization has 
achieved its goals and objectives. At the programme level, all primary stakeholder 
groups are involved since the overriding stake is achievement of the agency's 
goals. This is the highest level of accountability for a public sector agency. 
Essentially, this rung evaluates whether the agency has achieved its mandate. For 
the WCB, this rung is concerned with whether the agency ensures that injured 
workers return to work and that the WCB programme is delivered at a reasonable 
cost to employers. 
The programme level is associated with Steps 6-10 on the Stakeholder 
Management Ladder (consultation, negotiation, involvement, collaboration and 
partnership). The main form of accountability includes consultation and all the 
previous forms. The preferred method of account is stakeholder consultation and 
involvement. This research shows that stakeholders do not want to rely 
exclusively on the form of consultation described by Friedman and Miles as 
surveys; rather, they prefer involvement and collaboration. Unfortunately, when 
the WCB engages in what it perceives to be consultation, it could be argued its 
actual approach more aptly fits the description of placation. The WCB does not 
fully involve stakeholders, on an ongoing basis, to the degree suggested by 
Friedman and Miles. 
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As illustrated through the semi-structured interviews, stakeholder groups regard 
accountability as comprising both information and involvement. Stakeholders 
expect to have greater influence on the direction of the agency. To demonstrate 
programme accountability to stakeholders, it is argued in this research that 
agencies should encourage stakeholders to play a role in setting the organizational 
direction by working together to set goals, targets and meaningful performance 
outcome indicators. Arguably, five of Friedman and Miles stakeholder 
management strategies (consultation, negotiation, involvement, collaboration and 
partnership) facilitate programme accountability to varying degrees. 
The proposed reporting model suggests that stakeholder accountability at the 
programme level is fully achieved when stakeholders have an opportunity to 
influence the agency. The most basic level of stakeholder influence is the 
consultation rung (Step 6) which Friedman and Miles define as surveys, a token 
measure, since the organization controls, through the questions posed, the issues 
to be examined. Consequently, there may be areas not addressed which are of 
concern to stakeholders. The WCB engages a marketing research company to 
conduct annual stakeholder surveys of employers and injured workers. Survey 
results provide management with a general impression of stakeholder expectations 
and their level of satisfaction. It is suggested in the proposed model that a survey 
serve as the first step in the stakeholder consultation process. 
While the WCB does not use negotiation (Step 7) on a regular basis, it was 
employed in the 2001 Task Force initiative to facilitate agreement between 
employers and trade unions on a course of action to ensure the continued viability 
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of the system. Both primary stakeholder groups agreed to mandatory participation 
in Early and Safe Return to Work and Duty to Accommodate programs. This 
negotiation exercise was pivotal in securing cooperation from stakeholders and 
helped the agency achieve its programme goals of fewer injuries and earlier return 
to work. According to Friedman and Miles (p. 163), negotiation is the first 
category in which the stakeholder group has a realistic probability of influencing 
the agency. However, Friedman and Miles also classify negotiation as a form of 
tokenism and as a reactive process. This classification is illustrated in the situation 
encountered by the WCB when it did not utilize negotiation with its stakeholder 
groups until it faced significant financial challenges. Friedman and Miles contend 
that negotiation is not ranked higher since the organization may force the 
stakeholders to agree to an action plan. Consequently, negotiation may offer 
stakeholders only minimal opportunity for true involvement and influence on the 
organization. In the WCB setting, the highly salient stakeholder groups do not 
necessarily have the power to influence decisions through the control of resources, 
in the sense of employees threatening a strike. Rather, the highly salient 
stakeholder groups (employers and unions) may hold out the possibility of 
-facilitating or guaranteeing the co-operation of their constituents in improved 
workplace safety and participation in return to work programs. 
Friedman and Miles characterize the stakeholder management strategy of 
involvement (Step 8) as the first rung where stakeholders have a proactive say in 
the direction of an organization. Involvement can be achieved through stakeholder 
round table meetings where representatives are expected to draft Proposals rather 
than just respond to management plans or provide advice. Arguably, when 
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stakeholders are involved and have a say in decision making, true accountability is 
achieved. To ascertain stakeholder expectations, the WCB should provide them 
with an opportunity to advance proposals rather than merely respond to its ideas. 
The distinction here is that stakeholders be given an opportunity to advance their 
own ideas rather than respond to the ideas of the agency. Once the agency has 
fully ascertained stakeholders' expectations, they are well positioned to determine 
if their programs meet these expectations. In other words, it is challenging to 
demonstrate accountability when the agency does not have an in-depth 
understanding of stakeholder expectations for its programs. 
Other mechanisms which the WCB may use to demonstrate accountability for 
program delivery include collaboration and partnership (Steps 9 and 10). 
Friedman and Miles (p. 174) describe collaboration as "marriages between the 
organization and its stakeholders". The organization and its stakeholders 
contribute skills and resources which aid in the achievement of the organization's 
programs. Partnerships are typically joint ventures between the organization and 
its stakeholders. In differentiating partnership and collaboration, Friedman and 
Miles (p. 176) describe collaboration as focused on joint outcomes while 
partnerships involve joint processes leading up to joint outcomes. One of the 
outcomes of the 2001 WCB Task Force was a partnership with the Federation of 
Labour (umbrella group representing individual trade unions) which delivered, in 
return for a substantial fee, safety training to all Occupational Health and Safety 
Committees in Newfoundland. The WCB's motive for this partnership was to 
achieve worker buy-in for improved workplace safety and early return to work 
initiatives. Ultimately, this partnership was instrumental in helping the WCB 
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achieve financial stability through reduced injury frequency and increased worker 
co-operation in return to work programs. 
Clearly, by employing the stakeholder management techniques of consultation, 
involvement, negotiation, collaboration and partnership, the WCB was able to 
demonstrate programme accountability during the 2001 Task Force review. 
Unfortunately, the agency used Friedman and Miles' higher level stakeholder 
management approaches only at a critical stage. Based on the interview responses, 
the stakeholders felt the agency did not continue with this management style. 
Rather, despite the initial success achieved with increased stakeholder 
involvement, negotiation, collaboration and partnerships, the WCB reverted to 
operating for the subsequent five-year period with placation and consultation 
(surveys) stakeholder management styles. It seems that the WCB used higher level 
stakeholder management techniques only to secure stakeholder buy-in for the 
major changes needed to save the system; once these changes had been 
implemented, the organization appeared to limit stakeholder involvement by using 
a predominately placation style. 
Policy with delegatedpower and stakeholder control 
The highest level on Stewart's Accountability Ladder is policy and on Friedman 
and Miles' Stakeholder Management Ladder it is delegated power and stakeholder 
control. These levels are under the domain of government and are excluded from 
this study on the agency's responsibility to demonstrate accountability. It is the 
responsibility of government to set policy through legislation and to establish 
stakeholder control through the appointment of the Board of Directors. 
Govermnent fulfils its accountability obligations to the public through the 
286 
Statutory Review and the Transparency and Accountability Act. The method of 
account is comprised of government's broad consultation with the general public 
through its Statutory Review process. Compliance with the WCB Act and the 
Transparency and Accountability Act can be achieved through periodic legislative 
audits performed by the Auditor General. In the same fashion, WCB's in other 
jurisdictions as well as other self-funded agencies would not have responsibility to 
demonstrate accountability at the highest levels of these models. 
Concluding comments on aligning the rungs 
The demonstration of accountability at each of the levels of Stewart's Ladder of 
Accountability requires varying types of stakeholder management. To 
demonstrate accountability for the first level, probity/legality, minimal stakeholder 
management is needed. At this level, the one-way provision of information is 
sufficient. The next level of accountability, process, requires an increased level of 
stakeholder management including a basic level of two-way dialogue with 
stakeholders. The provision of non-financial performance information fits with the 
informing rung of Friedman and Miles' stakeholder management ladder, while 
WCB executives' discussion at the round table meetings reflect the explaining 
rung. 
The third rung on Stewart's Ladder of Accountability, performance, requires more 
interaction with stakeholders in order to demonstrate accountability for outcomes 
and expected standards. Friedman and Miles' Ladder of Stakeholder Management 
includes advisory panels and task forces as ways to solicit stakeholder feedback 
regarding their performance outcome expectations. The WCB's use of the round 
table meetings to solicit stakeholder feedback on its plans and objectives reflects 
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Friedman and Miles' advisory panels and tasks forces. This style of stakeholder 
management is described by Friedman and Miles as placation. 
Stewart's programme rung needs the highest level of stakeholder management 
techniques. To determine if the agency has fulfilled its accountability obligations 
for programme delivery, a number of stakeholder management techniques may be 
employed: consultation, involvement, negotiation, collaboration and partnership. 
The proposed model suggests that public sector agencies should aim, at a 
minimum, to employ the stakeholder management techniques of consultation and 
involvement (Steps 6 and 8 on Friedman and Miles' Ladder of Stakeholder 
Management). Consultation, defined as surveys by Friedman and Miles, enables 
the agency to ascertain stakeholders' views, while involvement invites 
stakeholders to advance proposals regarding the organization's strategic direction. 
According to the interviewees, stakeholders want to be more involved and have a 
greater control over the direction of the organization. They want to submit 
proposals rather than just provide feedback on the agency's plans. 
Whenever feasible, it is further suggested that negotiations, collaboration and 
partnerships be employed to more fully engage stakeholders and demonstrate 
accountability. It may not always be feasible for organizations to employ 
negotiation, collaboration and partnership (Steps 7,9 and 10 on Friedman and 
Miles' Ladder). However, as illustrated through the WCB case study, these three 
levels are effective stakeholder management tools since they gain union and 
employer buy-in to the agency's strategic plan, thus aiding its programme 
delivery. Given the WCB's initial success with these higher level stakeholder 
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management approaches, it is interesting that the agency did not continue to 
utilize these techniques. 
In the case of the WCB, it took a major crisis, the near financial collapse of the 
system, for the agency to invoke the higher levels of stakeholder management: 
involvement, negotiation, collaboration and partnership. Once a resolution to the 
crisis had been agreed upon with the stakeholders, it seems that the agency no 
longer wanted to use involvement, negotiation, collaboration and partnership with 
stakeholders. Rather, they reverted back to regular operations and their former 
placation and consultation management styles. It could be argued that these higher 
level management styles give greater power to stakeholders and that the agency 
was willing to share power only when there were no other alternatives. 
As the agency moves up the rungs on Stewart's Ladder of Accountability, it 
becomes necessary to supplement financial information with narratives and 
comparisons to budgets and targets, to provide non-financial performance 
outcome information and to consult stakeholders and involve them in setting the 
organizational direction. The model integrates stakeholder theory and 
management with Stewart's accountability ladder. As the rungs on the ladder are 
linked, enhanced stakeholder accountability is achieved. 
The following chapter presents the contributions and limitations of this research 
study as well as overall conclusions. 
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CHAPTER 9: CONTRIBUTIONS, LIMITATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
9.0 Introduction 
This chapter identifies the contributions of this research to the stakeholder 
reporting and accountability literature. It also examines the limitations associated 
with this study and how these limitations have been minimized or mitigated. The 
application of the model to other government agencies is discussed before 
drawing overall conclusions. 
This research explored stakeholder accountability of public sector agencies and 
culminates in a model for stakeholder reporting. The first major aspect of the 
research encompassed how the identification and classification of stakeholders 
enhances accountability. Identification is achieved by first narrowing stakeholders 
to groups representing the underlying individual stakeholders and then 
determining the relative salience of these groups. 
The second aspect of this research centred on the demonstration of accountability. 
It is argued that to be truly accountable to their stakeholders, public sector 
agencies should provide relevant financial reports and wider non-financial 
infonnation. Relevant financial information requires consideration of the nature 
and purpose of agency reports. The model calls for the financial report to be 
supplemented with comparisons to budgets as well as additional narrative 
explanations regarding actuarial assumptions, basis for investment accounting and 
calculation of funding position. Agencies are also expected to provide wider 
performance reporting that includes outcome based information with comparisons 
to targets and to other jurisdictions. It is advocated that, at their highest levels, 
public sector agencies should demonstrate accountability by moving beyond 
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merely disseminating information. They should involve stakeholders by soliciting 
their input and engaging in a two-way consultation process to determine their 
needs, subsequently incorporating this feedback into the organization's strategic 
plan and related targets. In essence, the stakeholder reporting model is comprised 
of three main strands: relevant financial statements with budgets, supplementary 
narratives, wider performance outcome information and stakeholder consultation. 
Consultation is utilized to ensure stakeholder needs are adequately identified and 
that the reporting model is relevant and provides meaningful information. 
The WCB agency in Newfoundland, Canada, is used as an example of how a 
semi-autonomous public sector agency demonstrates accountability to its 
stakeholders. Govermnent delegated responsibility for workplace injury benefits 
to the WCB agency, and both the ftinders and beneficiaries have relinquished 
significant rights as they participate in this 'no fault' system. Consequently, these 
stakeholders should be afforded a high level of accountability. In view of 
government's ongoing devolution of essential services to such agencies, this topic 
is timely and relevant. The stakeholder reporting model may be used by other 
public sector agencies to demonstrate accountability as discussed in Section 9.1. 
Chapters two to seven provided a context for stakeholder accountability of public 
sector agencies through a literature review, documentary review and semi- 
structured interviews with the primary stakeholder groups. The stakeholder 
reporting model was presented in Chapter 8. 
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9.1 Contributions 
This research provides insight into how public sector agencies may utilize a 
reporting model to demonstrate stakeholder accountability. Since there is a 
paucity of research in the area of accountability for public sector agencies, this 
study contributes toward an understanding of the issues. This is particularly timely 
in the context of increasing public demand for accountability. The proposed 
reporting model is not only relevant for the Newfoundland WCB, but may be used 
by the WCB's in other jurisdictions. In addition, the model, with some 
modification for industry specific performance indicators and context, may be 
used in the wider public sector for self-funded and government-funded agencies. 
For example, as discussed later, it is suggested that the model could be adapted for 
government owned hydroelectric utilities, health care boards and school boards. 
This is significant, since health care and education represent an important and 
substantial proportion of government spending. As more programs are devolved to 
an increasing number of agencies, it is timely that such an accountability reporting 
model be available for adoption. 
This research study makes three important contributions: firstly, an approach to 
identify and classify stakeholders; secondly, the development of a stakeholder 
reporting model embracing financial statements, wider performance information 
and the linkage of Stewart's (1984) Ladder of AccountabilitY with Friedman and 
Miles' (1997) Ladder of Stakeholder Management and Engagement. Both these 
contributions are implicit in the model and are transferable to other government 
agencies. The third contribution of the thesis is the potential to aid the WCB in 
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Newfoundland reform its stakeholder accountability arrangements and generate 
AWCBC interest in industry-specific accounting standards. 
This first contribution of this research stems from the application of Clarkson's 
(1995) primary/secondary typology and Mitchell et al's (1997) salience 
framework to classify stakeholders. Stakeholders whose participation is vital for 
the organization are classified as primary, while all others (general public and 
environment) are considered secondary. The proposed model advocates further 
delineation of the primary stakeholders according to salience level (high, 
moderate or low). The combination of both Clarkson's and Mitchell et aYs 
classification frameworks provides a model which narrows and prioritizes the 
stakeholder groups to a manageable number rather than expecting the organization 
to be accountable to everyone. 
The second contribution of this research is the development of a multi- 
dimensional stakeholder reporting model which not only identifies the various 
forms and methods of accountability, but also links the basis of accountability 
(Stewart) with a stakeholder management approach (Friedman and Miles). Many 
of the multi-dimensional performance reporting frameworks in the literature 
emphasize including both financial and non-financial measures, but this approach 
assists agencies in identifying stakeholder needs and ensuring a relevant 
stakeholder report is provided. This multi-dimensional model is based on the 
premise of compliance with the underlying commercial accounting standards 
supplemented by budgets, narrative explanations and the introduction of industry- 
specific standards where necessary. The model also includes the wider 
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performance outcome information which stakeholders would like to have 
compiled. 
A key contribution of this model is the linking of Stewart's Ladder of 
Accountability with Friedman and Miles' Ladder of Stakeholder Management and 
Engagement. This linkage recognizes that at the performance and programme 
accountability rungs, agencies need to more fully involve stakeholders in order to 
adequately demonstrate accountability. This research study revealed that 
stakeholders are not satisfied with a superficial approach to consultation. Instead, 
they want to have a deeper level of involvement including making proposals to the 
agency rather than just providing advice and feedback on the agency's plans. The 
linking of Stewart's Ladder of Accountability with Friedman and Miles' Ladder 
of Stakeholder Management and Engagement makes an important contribution to 
accountability research in the public sector. The integration of the stakeholder 
dimension (their needs, management and engagement) strengthens public sector 
accountability. The proposed model advocates that different stakeholder 
management styles are needed to demonstrate accountability on the various rungs 
of Stewart's Ladder of Accountability. To meet stakeholders' accountability 
expectations, public sector agencies need to match the management style with the 
level of accountability being demonstrated. The chief contribution to the literature 
is the linking or merging of stakeholder management styles to Stewart's Ladder of 
Accountability. Stewart's Ladder of Accountability is strengthened and expanded 
through this linkage. 
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The third contribution of this research is its potential to reform the Newfoundland 
WCB's accountability arrangements and to encourage the development of 
industry- specific accounting standards at the national AWCBC level. It is 
expected that the WCB will examine its stakeholder consultation approach in light 
of this study's findings. The research shows that stakeholders want to be 
proactively involved in setting organizational direction rather than reactively 
providing feedback to the agency's plans. 
The model provides an approach that is transferable to other government agencies. 
As indicated in Chapter 4, Newfoundland's hydroelectric corporation, health care 
boards and school boards have governance structures that are virtually identical to 
the WCB: govermnent appointed Board of Directors, Board Chairperson and CEO 
hired by the Board. The Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro Corporation (NLHC) 
generates revenue through the production of electricity which is sold to 
commercial and retail customers. It does not receive government funding; rather, 
it is a revenue source for government. There are eight health care boards and 
eleven school boards in Newfoundland. Unlike NLHC, the health care and school 
boards' operations are jointly funded totally by the federal and provincial 
governments. Although this does not limit the scope of the agencies' Boards of 
Directors, the provincial government may intervene on school or hospital closures. 
These organizations are subject to strong political scrutiny and the stakeholder 
model must be modified accordingly to include greater political accountability for 
spending and consideration of political objectives and targets. 3 For example, in 
addition to its general purpose health care funding, the federal governinent has 
3 Ellwood and Rixon (2006) found the UK industrial injures system (which unlike the Canadian 
WCB system is government funded) had strong political accountability through Resource 
Accounting and Budgeting and public service agreements. C, 
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provided additional funding targeted to reduce patient wait times for certain key 
services such as hip replacement, heart surgery and cancer treatment. 
The only further changes needed to adopt the proposed WCB reporting model to 
other public sector agencies relates to the stakeholder consultation approach and 
the identification of industry-specific performance outcome information. For 
example, when applying this model to NLHC, the WCB performance indicators 
such as duration and retum-to-work would be replaced by industry- specific 
indicators such as average rate per kilowatt hour charged to various customer 
groups and generating capacity. Similarly, when applying the model to health care 
boards, the performance outcome measures would be extensive and likely include 
wait times for certain tests and procedures. 
The approach taken for consultation would need to be modified to reflect the 
primary stakeholder groups which are unique to these organizations. Possible 
stakeholder groups are outlined in Appendix 12 for the NLHC, school boards and 
health care boards. Just as the WCB consulted with employer and union 
stakeholders, other government agencies need to include their stakeholders and 
representative groups when undertaking a consultation process. In addition, to 
soliciting the input of the indicative stakeholder groups, the NLHC, school boards 
and health care boards would also need to consider other mechanisms, such as 
holding consumer forums and public meetings and inviting written submissions, 
to ensure that the concerns of all interested citizens are heard. 
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As a prerequisite to applying this model to other public sector agencies, it is 
suggested, in addition to the surveys, that semi-structured interviews with 
stakeholders be held to inform the selection of performance indicators. The 
participants for the semi-structured interviews could be selected through an 
advertised call for expressions of interest or by soliciting the participants from the 
public meetings. The semi-structured interviews would provide the agency with 
insight into stakeholders' accountability expectations. Overall, the stakeholder 
reporting model remains the same, but modifications are necessary for the 
particular public service area and relevant indicators. Adaptation of the model to 
directly funded government agencies will require greater consideration of the 
goverm-nent stake and political accountability. 
9.2 Limitations 
While this study makes several contributions to the stakeholder accountability 
theory, it is acknowledged that there are a number of limitations. For example, this 
case study cannot be generalized to the population at large since it is not based on 
a statistical sample. That being said, this case study approach to developing a 
user-needs based accountability reporting model is applicable to other public 
sector agencies. It can be argued that the mixed data collection methodology 
employed by this case study provides more in-depth and richer information than 
that which could be obtained from a large quantitative statistical sample. 
Administering a survey to a large statistical sample of employers and injured 
workers is not as fruitful as a case study in fully identifying user needs. A further 
limitation of this research is the assumption that stakeholder groups represent the 
interests of their constituents. The investigation of how well these groups 
represent their membership would constitute a separate study itself 
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The researcher's employment in the focal organization may appear to limit 
objectivity in forming the research questions, analysis and conclusions. Although 
it is possible that the researcher's extensive experience with the WCB system may 
contribute to a degree of bias, this is largely mitigated through confirming the 
research findings and verifying assumptions with experts in the field. In addition, 
it is argued that the value of the researcher's insight adds to the interpretation of 
the findings. In addition, further bias was limited as a result of the researcher's 
decision not to attend the round table stakeholder meetings as discussed in 
Chapter 4. 
As the research indicates, governance of a public sector agency plays a central 
role in accountability. However, the inclusion of governance issues such as its 
appointment of the Board of Directors and the accountability of government to 
citizens could easily constitute another thesis. As the scope of this research is 
focused on the agency's accountability to its stakeholders, it includes a limited 
examination of government's accountability to citizens. In light of government's 
trend of delegating essential services to agencies, further study on government's 
accountability issues would be a fruitful area of research. 
Although this study identified areas where commercial standards may not be 
appropriate for the WCBs, further research is also warranted to develop a method 
or system to identify situations where accounting standards are not appropriate in 
providing a meaningful account. This is particularly relevant for government 
agencies classified as GBEs that are required to adhere to commercial accounting 
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standards. Adherence to commercial standards is becoming more problematic as 
international accounting develops. Due to the growing trend to delegate 
responsibility for certain key government services to agencies, such a study would 
be particularly relevant, beneficial and timely. 
This study found that greater interaction between the CICA and groups like the 
WCBs would be beneficial in establishing accounting and reporting standards to 
meet stakeholders' needs and reflect the substance of their financial environment. 
The relationship of accounting standard-setting bodies with those public sector 
agencies that are designated GBEs is another area where further research is 
warranted. The exploration of the approach to the CICA's standard setting is 
outside the scope of this study, but it represents an area where additional research 
would be worthwhile. 
Finally, this model has been developed on the basis of research on a self-funded 
public sector agency. Consequently, as discussed in preceding section, the model 
will need refinement for those agencies whose funding is provided by 
goveniment. 
9.3 Conclusions 
Using the WCB as a case study, the objective of this research was to develop a 
comprehensive stakeholder reporting model to enhance accountability. It emPlOYS 
Friedman and Miles' stakeholder management techniques to demonstrate 
accountability on the probity, process, performance and programme rungs of 
Stewart's Ladder of Accountability. It is a comprehensive reporting model which 
299 
moves beyond the mere provision of information to embrace a deeper level of 
stakeholder involvement. The model includes financial and wider non-financial 
performance information, along with an increased focus on stakeholder 
communication and engagement. 
Accountability, it is shown, is enhanced when stakeholders are more fully or 
actively involved in the agency, rather than passively receiving information and 
providing feedback on the organization's plans. By utilizing a management style 
that engages and involves stakeholders, the agency can better demonstrate 
accountability. The stakeholder reporting model has predictive value since it 
consults and involves stakeholders to ascertain their accountability expectations. 
This requires two-way communication through which stakeholders influence the 
organization rather than simply respond to its proposals. The stakeholders have 
significant input, it can be predicted that the accountability measures will reflect 
the articulated stakeholder needs. Thus, the model not only improves the quality 
of the account, but it aids public sector agencies in fulfilling stakeholder 
accountability expectations. 
The model will be presented to the CEO and senior executives of the 
Newfoundland WCB. It is expected that the WCB will take the findings of this 
research into account by providing more detailed narrative explanations to 
accompany the financial statements and by including wider performance outcome 
infon-nation desired by stakeholders. In addition, the WCB may act upon the 
research findings by introducing stakeholder involvement into its stakeholder 
consultation and management style. 
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The model and the research findings will also be presented to the AWCBC 
Financial Comparability Committee. It is expected that the Committee will 
undertake an examination of the performance outcome information desired by 
stakeholders as well as act upon the need to develop industry- specific accounting 
standards for investments, reserves and funding position. The proposed public 
sector stakeholder reporting model can be used without major modification by all 
WCB jurisdictions in Canada to improve their accountability to stakeholders. 
With modification, the model could be extended to other public sector 
organizations. 
The foundation of the proposed stakeholder reporting model is StewarCs (1984) 
Ladder of Accountability. As one progresses up the rungs of the ladder, the forms 
of accountability become wider and include more dimensions. At the lower levels 
of Stewart's ladder, accountability involves one-way communication in the form 
of audited financial statements. At the higher levels, financial statements are 
supplemented with the annual report narrative, statistics, BSC, performance 
outcomes, comparisons to budgets, targets and other jurisdictions; ultimately, at 
the programme level, stakeholder consultation is required in the form of 
involvement and collaboration. 
The research shows that stakeholders prefer to receive performance information 
on a quarterly basis. There is limited interest in financial statements as 
stakeholders prefer performance outcome information that is generally available 
in the BSC. The research also indicates that stakeholders prefer comparisons to 
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targets and to other jurisdictions, rather than year-over-year actual results. 
Therefore, the proposed model suggests that financial statements be issued 
annually but that key performance outcome information (BSC) be provided 
quarterly either through the web or at the round table meetings. It is suggested the 
agency comply with the commercial accounting standards but also provide wider 
performance outcome information, budgets and interjurisdictional comparisons to 
satisfy the service expectations of stakeholders. 
The documentary review found that the WCB agency meets the criteria of a GBE 
and is thus subject to commercial accounting standards. Although researchers 
such as Ellwood and Newbury (2006) and Barton (1999) argue that commercial 
accounting standards may not necessarily be the best fit for public sector 
organizations, the proposed reporting model suggests the continued adoption of 
commercial accounting standards where designated, supplemented by budgets and 
any industry specific standards necessary to meet the needs of stakeholders. It is 
important for the WCB agency not to lose sight of the purpose of financial 
statements and to always remain cognizant of the users' needs and modify the 
accounting standards when necessary. When modifying accounting standards to 
develop industry specific standards, the agency should consider taking steps to 
mitigate the potential to manipulate results. In the case of the WCB, such 
mitigation mechanisms include independent review by an external actuary and the 
extemal audit. While it is argued that the WCB should adhere to commercial 
accounting standards, the research found that the value of financial statements 
could be enhanced by providing additional comparisons to budgets and narrative 
explanations to aid readers' understanding of such concepts as unfunded liability. 
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The model calls for non-financial performance information and comparisons with 
budgets, targets and other jurisdictions. 
Although the model was developed for the self-ftinded WCB agency, the 
accountability rungs and stakeholder management rungs are also applicable for 
government ftinded public sector agencies. The provision of financial statements 
and wider performance outcome information along with stakeholder consultation 
involving round table meetings and submission of proposals can be employed by 
other public sector agencies. This model can also be applied to other self-funded 
public sector agencies as well as those funded directly by government. It is argued 
that agencies' sources of funding should not have a significant impact on their 
ability to involve stakeholders. The model would also be beneficial for self-funded 
agencies such as hydroelectric crown corporations as well as govermnent funded 
agencies such as health care boards and school boards. Although the discussion in 
Section 9.1 of the model's application to other public sector agencies is based on 
Newfoundland's agencies, it could be utilized across Canada since each province 
has similarly structured agencies. 
This study into stakeholder reporting for a public sector agency is particularly 
timely due to the heightened awareness of public sector accountability. Recent 
govermnent spending scandals by both the Canadian and Newfoundland 
governments have heightened public scepticism and the need for government to 
implement transparency and accountability legislation. This research is also 
beneficial at a time when governments are delegating essential services to 
agencies. As goverrunents continue to delegate various services to agencies in the 
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form of government business enterprises, they need to ensure agencies are 
accountable to their stakeholders. This is particularly pertinent in situations where 
agencies have a monopoly, since ftinders and beneficiaries have relinquished their 
right to a market-based service. Research suggests that a higher level of 
accountability is warranted. It is essential that goverinnent and executives 
recognize the while these agencies are often regarded as GBEs, ultimately they are 
public sector organizations. Therefore, their financial statements and financial 
reporting should comply with required commercial accounting standards, but at 
the same time provide the level of accountability that is expected from a public 
sector organization. This encompasses the provision of budgets and variance 
explanations, comparisons with other jurisdictions and key performance 
indicators. The proposed stakeholder reporting model suggests mechanisms to 
effectively manage stakeholders and demonstrate accountability on various levels. 
In addition to the provision of financial and performance information, it calls for 
involvement and collaboration with stakeholders in an effort to identify their 
needs and concerns. Finally, the model assumes that government will play an 
oversight role to ensure its agencies provide meaningftil information and meet the 
accountability needs of primary stakeholders and the scrutiny of a more sceptical 
public. 
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History of Workers' Compensation 
Appendix I 
The Canadian workers' compensation system was developed largely by Sir 
William Meredith, who was a lawyer, politician and a judge. In 1910, Meredith 
was asked to head up a Royal Commission into workers' compensation in 
Ontario. The full title of the Commission was "Royal Commission Relating to the 
Liability of Employers for Injuries Received in the Course of their Employment". 
The principles outlined in his report formed the basis of workers' compensation in 
Canada. Ontario passed worker' compensation legislation in 1914 to take effect on 
January 1,1915. Meredith outlined the following principles to govern workers' 
compensation: 
1) An insurance system with collective liability 
2) The plan would be compulsory for defined groups of workers 
3) Workers would not have to show fault 
4) The system would be state-run 
5) The system would be financed entirely by employers and levies would be 
based on different classes of industry. 
6) Workers' compensation and health care would continue as long as the 
disability lasted (Mastromatteo, 1993). 
Subsequent to the Ontario workers' compensation legislation, all other provinces 
in Canada introduced similar legislation. Prior to joining Canada, Newfoundland 
had operated its workers compensation system in accordance with British-style 
employer liability laws. After joining Canada in 1949, Newfoundland appointed a 
Workmen's Compensation Committee to oversee the creation of the new agencY. 
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Newfoundland's workers' compensation system, which was based largely on the 
Canadian model, came into effect on April 1,195 1. 
Up until 1984, the Newfoundland WCB had a disability system which 
compensated injured workers based on the nature of their disability rather than 
replacing their lost wages. In 1984 the legislation was changed from a disability 
system to a wage loss system. Until this legislative change, the WCB was 
financially stable. However, by the early 1990's it became apparent that due to the 
lack of historical claims cost information surrounding the new system, it was 
extremely difficult to estimate the future costs of injuries which had occurred 
since 1984. In fact, the actuaries determined that during the 1980's since the 
change in legislation, there were substantial future liabilities for which there was 
no funding. This is referred to as an "unfunded liability" and it had grown by 1991 
to $176 million. The WCB embarked on a strategy to lower benefits and increase 
premiums in order to reduce the unfunded liability and by 1997 had reduced its 
unfunded liability to $92 million. However, by 1999, the unfunded liability had 
again grown to $180 million. This level of deterioration from 1997 to 1999 is 
largely attributed to a legislated increase in benefits in conjunction with overall 
increases in the injury rate and duration periods (Auditor General, 2002). 
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Appendix 2 
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Responsibility of CEO and Board of Directors 
As Outlined in the WCB Act 
Board of Directors 
(1) The board of directors shall establish policies and programs consistent with 
this Act and regulations in relation to 
(a) compensation benefits to injured workers and dependents; 
(b) rehabilitation and return to work of injured workers; 
(c) assessments and investments under this Act; and 
(d) and the policies shall ensure the intent of this Act and regulations is 
being applied to provide services to injured workers and dependents and 
shall promote adequate funding for the services through sound financial 
management. 
The board of directors shall 
(a) consider and approve annual administrative and operating budgets and 
appoint auditors to audit the books and accounts of the commission, in 
addition to those audits that may be done under section 11; 
(b) enact by-laws and regulations for the adoption of a seal and for the 
conduct of the business and affairs of the commission; 
(c) establish, maintain and regulate advisory committees and their 
function and composition; and 
(d) review this Act and regulations and recommend to the minister those 
changes that it considers advisable. 
(3) The board of directors may delegate in writing the powers of the board of 
directors to a director and the powers may be subject to the limitations, 
conditions and requirements that may be noted in the delegation. 
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Chief Executive Officer 
The board of directors shall, subject to the prior approval of the Lieutenant- 
Governor in Council, appoint a chief executive officer of the commission who 
shall devote the whole of his or her time to the performance of duties under this 
Act. 
Source: Workplace Health, Safety and Compensation Act (2006) 
320 
Appendix 4 
Semi-structured Interview Questions 
Employer Associations and Trade Unions 
Open-ended questions 
1. What does the concept of accountability mean to you? Does it include 
stewardship and financial accountability? 
2. To whom do you think the WCB should be held accountable? What are the 
consequences of the WCB not being accountable? 
3. Is accountability just about providing information? 
4. Do you think stakeholders should be able to sanction the WCB? How should 
stakeholders call the WCB to account? How does your organization want to 
exercise accountability? Is an intermediary necessary? What aspects of the 
WCB do you want to impact upon? 
5. How can the WCB improve its accountability to stakeholders? 
6. How does the accountability of WCB compare with other organizations? 
Would being more accountable improve WCBs performance? 
7. What purpose is served by the WCBs financial statements? Are there 
particular problems that should be addressed? Are further disclosures needed? 
8. Is the accounting information sufficient? Is it sufficiently forward looking? 
9. What work should the auditor do? Who should the auditor report do? Who 
should appoint the auditor? 
10. How can the WCB improve on its stakeholder consultation process? 
11. What changes should the WCB take to improve its strategic plan? 
12. What is meant by WCB performance? Does it involve financial performance, 
getting injured workers back to work, other? 
13. Do you have confidence in the reliability and validity of the PM information 
which the WCB is currently providing? Would an audit of these statistics 
improve your comfort level? 
14. What additional information should the annual report contain? 
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Checklist Questions 
The following topics were addressed through checklist-format questions and 
participants were asked to check off all responses that apply: 








2. Please identify which of the following groups you consider to be stakeholders 
of the WCB system. 
Government 
WCB administrators 
Board of Directors 
Employers/employer associations 
Workers/unions 
Health care providers (doctors, physiotherapists, etc. ) 
Others (specify) 





4. Which of the following forum(s) should be used to provide infonnation to 
stakeholders? 
Hard (paper) copy 
Web 
Media press release 
Others (specify) 
5. Which of the following performance measures are of interest to you and your 
organization? 
Injury frequency 
Types of injuries 
Time to first payment 
Return to work success rate 
Outcomes for Early and Safe Return to Work Program 
Outcomes for Duty to Accommodate Program 
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Number of claims denied 
Number of claims accepted 
Number of claims paid directly by employer 
Percentage of claims appealed 
Administration costs 
Unfunded liability percentage 
Total costs (employer paid and WCB-paid) 
Investigation results 
Average assessment rate 
Percentage of claims in receipt of long-term disability 
Cost per claim 
Others (specify) 
6. Which of the following comparative referents are of interest to you when 
comparing the results of Newfoundland's WCB? 
Atlantic WCBs 
National WCB statistics 
Budgets 
Targets 
Private sector insurance companies 
Year-over-year actual results 
5 years actual results 
Others (specify) 
7. Which of the following information do you obtain from the website? 
Annual Report 
Strategic plan 





Strongly Disagree Neither Agree Strongly 
Disagree Agree/ Agree 
Disagree 
1. The WCB effectively demonstrates accountability to its stakeholders. 
2. The WCB annual report provides sufficient information. 
3. The WCB annual report provides meaningful information. 
4. The annual report is your main source of information. 
5. The information provided in the annual report is easy to understand. 
6. The annual report recognizes the contribution of stakeholders. 
7. The website contains information that is useful. 
8. Administration costs are reasonable. 
9. The strategic plan is appropriate. 
10. The targets contained within the strategic plan are appropriate. 
11. The measures are appropriate in relation to the WCBs goals and objectives. 
12. The Round Table meetings are effective. 
13. Round Table meetings should be open to the public rather than by invitation 
only. 
14. More regional representation is needed at the Round Table meetings. 
15. It is important to have a collaborate approach in the development of KSMs. 
16. There is an adequate level of two-way consultation and communication 
between the WCB and its stakeholders. 
17. WCB is a social program. 
18. Monthly assessment premium billing is important for my organization. 




Semi-structured Interview Questions 
WCB Executives 
Open-ended Questions 
1. What does the concept of accountability mean to you? To what extent does it 
include stewardship and financial accountability? 
2. To whom do you think the WCB should be held accountable? Prompts (if 
required) employers, workers, government, public, etc. 
3. With the introduction of government's Bill 39 (Transparency and 
Accountability Act), do you foresee any need to change the Commission's 
existing accountability arrangements? 
4. Is the Transparency and Accountability Act likely to require changes in the 
Commission's strategic plan and Balanced Scorecard reporting process? If so, 
will the changes be to the direction of the Strategic Plan or more in how it is 
reported, monitored and measured? 
5. What role does the Statutory Review have on WCB's accountability? Does it 
improve accountability or does it just ensure that the Commission continues to 
be accountable to its stakeholders? 
6. Do you view the Board of Directors as adequately representing the interests of 
stakeholders of the workers' compensation system? 
7. Do senior management and the Board of Directors receive or seek direction 
from government when developing its strategic plan? 
8. Can you suggest means by which the WCB can improve its accountability to 
stakeholders? 
9. Is the current level of accounting information sufficient? Is it sufficiently 
forward looking? 
10. What is the relative importance of the Commission's Balanced Scorecard 
versus its financial statements? Does the Balanced Scorecard drive the 
organization or is it a tool to help monitor performance? 
11. What changes, if any, should the WCB take to improve its strategic plan? 
12. Should WCB performance be measured bY financial performance, getting 
injured workers back to work, social/environmental performance or other 
indicators of success? 
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13. Do you have confidence in the reliability and validity of the performance 
measurement information which the WCB is currently providing? Would an 
audit of these statistics improve your comfort level? 
14. What additional information should the annual report contain? 
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Checklist Questions 
The following topics were addressed through checklist-format questions and 
participants were asked to check off all responses that apply. 




Board of Directors 
Employers/employer associations 
Workers/unions 
Health care providers (doctors, physiotherapists, etc. ) 
Others (specify) 
2. Please identify which of the following groups you consider to be 
stakeholders of the WHSCC system, ranking them in order of importance 
(I - highest, 7- lowest, etc). 
Government 
WHSCC administrators 
Board of Directors 
Employers/employer associations 
Workers/unions 
Health care providers (doctors, physiotherapists, etc. ) 
Others (specify) 






4. Which of the following forum(s) should be used to provide information to 
stakeholders? 
Hard (paper) copy 
Web 
Media press release 
Others (specify)_ 




Types of injuries 
Time to first payment 
Return to work success rate 
Outcomes for Early and Safe Return to Work Program 
Outcomes for Duty to Accommodate Program 
Number of claims denied 
Number of claims accepted 
Number of claims paid directly by employer 
Percentage of claims appealed 
Administration costs 
Unfunded liability percentage 
Total costs (employer paid and WHSCC-paid) 
Investigation results 
Average assessment rate 
Percentage of claims in receipt of long-term disability 
Cost per claim 
Others (specify) 
6. Which of the following are of interest to you when comparing the results 
of Newfoundland's WHSCC? 
Atlantic workers' compensation agencies 
National workers' compensation statistics 
Budgets 
Targets 
Private sector insurance companies 
Year-over-year actual results 




Please respond to the following questions by circling one of the following to 
indicate your level of agreement with each of the following statements: 
1 
Strongly Disagree Neither Agree Strongly 
Disagree Agree/ Agree 
Disagree 
1. The WHSCC's mission and role is clearly defined and understood by the 
general public. 
2. The WHSCC effectively demonstrates accountability to its stakeholders. 
3. WHSCC is meeting Government's accountability guidelines. 
4. The Board of Directors is effective in ensuring the needs of stakeholders are 
met. 
5. The strategic plan is appropriate. 
6. The targets contained within the strategic plan are appropriate in relation to 
WHSCC's goals and objectives. 
7. The WHSCC annual report provides meaningful information. 
8. The information provided in the annual report is easy to understand. 
9. The website contains information that is useful. 
10. It is important to have a collaborate approach in the development of 
performance measures. 
11. There is an adequate level of two-way consultation and communication 
between the WHSCC and its stakeholders. 
12. Administration costs are reasonable. 
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Appendix 6 
Semi-structured Interview Questions 
Government 
Open-ended Questions 
1. What does the concept of accountability mean to you? To what extent does 
it include stewardship and financial accountability? 
2. To whom do you think the WCB should be held accountable? Prompts 
required) employers, workers, government, public, etc. 
3. Do you have any issues or concerns regarding WCB demonstrating 
accountability? How does government ensure that stakeholders' 
accountability expectations for WCB are adequately addressed? 
4. Is accountability more of an issue for government departments than for 
workers' compensation? 
5. Does government have different accountability expectations for 
agencies/crown corporations than for line government departments? Are 
there any advantages, from an accountability perspective, in having a 
stand-along agency rather than direct government provision for workers' 
compensation? 
6. Are there different accountability expectations for agencies that contribute 
to government revenue (e. g. Hydro, and Liquor Corporation) than those 
such as workers' compensation which levy their own revenue to provide a 
service? If so, what are these differences? 
7. Can you suggest means by which the WCB can improve its accountability 
to stakeholders? 
8. Is the current level of accounting information sufficient? Is it sufficiently 
forward looking? 
9. Would there be any benefit in having the Auditor General audit the WCB 
rather than allow the Board of Directors to appoint external auditors? What 
is the role of the Auditor General as it relates to WCB? 
10. What is the approach of the Auditor General - is it an attest function to 
give an opinion on the accounts or does it also have a wider perspective in 
terms of a 'value-for-money' audit? 
1. How much reliance is placed on the Commission's Balanced Scorecard 
versus its financial statements? 
12. What changes should the WCB take to improve its strategic plan? 
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13. Should WCB performance be measured by financial performance. getting 
injured workers back to work, social/environmental performance or other 
indicators of success? 
14. Do you have confidence in the reliability and validity of the performance 
measurement information which the WCB is currently providing? Would 
an audit of these statistics improve your comfort level? 
15. What additional information should the annual report contain? 
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Checklist Questions 
The following topics were addressed through checklist-format questions and 
participants were asked to check off all responses that apply. 
1. Which of the following groups should the WCB be held accountable to? 
Government 
WHSCC administrators 
Board of Directors 
Employers/employer associations 
Workers/unions 
Health care providers (doctors, physiotherapists, etc. ) 
Others (specify) 
2. Please identify which of the following groups you consider to be 
stakeholders of the WCB system, ranking them in order of importance (I - highest, 7- lowest, etc). 
Government 
WHSCC administrators 
Board of Directors 
Employers/employer associations 
Workers/unions 
Health care providers (doctors, physiotherapists, etc. ) 
Others (specify) 





4. Which of the following forum(s) should be used to provide information to 
stakeholders? 
Hard (paper) copy 
Web 
Media press release 
Others (specify)_ 




Types of injuries 
Time to first payment 
Return to work success rate 
Outcomes for Early and Safe Return to Work Program 
Outcomes for Duty to Accommodate Program 
Number of claims denied 
Number of claims accepted 
Number of claims paid directly by employer 
Percentage of claims appealed 
Administration costs 
Unfunded liability percentage 
Total costs (employer paid and WCB-paid) 
Investigation results 
Average assessment rate 
Percentage of claims in receipt of long-term disability 
Cost per claim 
Others (specify) 
6. Which of the following are of interest to you when comparing the results 
of Newfoundland's WCB? 
Atlantic workers' compensation agencies 
National workers' compensation statistics 
Budgets 
Targets 
Private sector insurance companies 
Year-over-year actual results 




Please respond to the following questions by circling one of the following to 
indicate your level of agreement with each of the following statements: 
1 
Strongly Disagree Neither Agree Strongly 
Disagree Agree/ Agree 
Disagree 
1. The WCB's mission and role is clearly defined and understood by the 
general public. 
2. The WCB effectively demonstrates accountability to its stakeholders. 
3. WCB is meeting Govemment's accountability guidelines. 
4. There is a higher level of government monitoring of WCB than other 
Crown Corporations. 
5. The strategic plan is appropriate. 
6. The targets contained within the strategic plan are appropriate in relation 
to WCB's goals and objectives. 
7. The WCB annual report provides meaningful information. 
8. The information provided in the annual report is easy to understand. 
9. The website contains information that is useful. 
10. It is important to have a collaborate approach in the development of 
performance measures. 
11. There is an adequate level of two-way consultation and communication 
between the WCB and its stakeholders. 
12. Administration costs are reasonable. 
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Appendix 7 
Semi-structured Interview Questions 
Health Care Providers 
Open-ended Questions 
1. What does the concept of accountability mean to you? How do you view the 
reciprocal accountability between WCB and health care providers? Do you 
consider your organization to be a partner in the workers' compensation 
process? 
2. The WCB is accountable to its stakeholders (claimants and employers) for the 
performance of health care providers. Do you think the WCB is effective in 
demonstrating to these stakeholders that it is holding health care providers to 
account? 
3. How do you view your organization's role in helping WCB achieve its goals 
of effective claims management and return-to-work recovery process? 
4. WCB expects increased accountability from health care providers in terms of 
achieving results in injury recovery and return to work. Are WCB's increased 
expectations reasonable? Does it cause a conflict between your accountability 
to the WCB versus your client (the claimant)? If so, how do you prioritize? 
5. How is your performance monitored by WCB? Is the Commission's approach 
to monitoring appropriate and effective? Are there changes which should be 
made to how the WCB monitors the performance of the health care providers? 
6. Are WCB's accountability expectations (in terms of results/outcomes) higher 
for claimants than is expected for your other clients? 
7. How should the WCB be held accountable to health care providers? Can you 
suggest means by which the WCB can improve its accountability to health 
care providers? Is there any particular type of information/statistics which the 
WCB should provide to health care providers? 
8. How should health care providers call the WCB to account to them? How does 
your organization want to exercise accountability? 
9. How can the WCB improve on its stakeholder consultation process? Is your 
organization as involved as you would like? 
10. Are you aware of the WCB's strategic plan? What changes should the WCB 
take to improve its strategic plan? Is the role of health care providers 
adequately recognized in the strategic plan? 
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Checklist Questions 
Please respond to the following questions by checking any or all responses that 
apply: 
1. To whom (which stakeholders) should the WCB be accountable to? 
Health care providers (OT, chiropractors, physiotherapists, physicians) 
Goverment 
WCB administrators 




2. Please identify which of the following groups you consider to be 
stakeholders of the WCB system, ranking them in order of importance (I - highest, 7- lowest, etc). 
Health care providers 
Govermuent 
WCB administrators 




3. Which of the following information is of interest to you and your 
organization? 
Amount spent on each health care category (OT, physiotherapy, 
chiropractors, physicians and hospitals) 
Average number of treatments per claimant for each category (OT, 
physiotherapy, chiropractors, physicians and hospitals) 
Number of injured workers participating in each treatment category 
(OT, physiotherapy, chiropractors, physicians and hospitals) 
Others (specify) 
4. How frequently should the WCB provide corporate performance 






5. Which of the following forum(s) should be used to provide corporate 
performance information to stakeholders? 
Hard (paper) copy 
Web 
Media press release 
Others (specify) 
6. Which of the following information do you obtain from the website? 
Annual Report 
Strategic plan 




Please respond to the following questions by circling one of the following to 
indicate your level of agreement with each of the following statements: 
1 
Strongly Disagree Neither Agree Strongly 
Disagree Agree/ Agree 
Disagree 
1. The WCB's mission and role is clearly defined and understood by the 
general public. 
2. There is a reciprocal accountability relationship between the WCB and 
health care providers. 
3. The WCB effectively demonstrates accountability to health care providers. 
4. WCB clearly defines the outcomes/results which it expects health care 
provider to achieve. 
5. The level of health care provider monitoring by WCB is appropriate. 
6. Health care providers play a critical role in the workers' compensation 
system. 
7. The WCB provides an adequate level of feedback regarding the 
performance of health care providers. 
8. There is an adequate level of two-way consultation and communication 
between the WCB and its stakeholders. 
9. The strategic plan is appropriate. 
10. The annual report is your main source of information. 
11. The WCB annual report provides meaningful infon-nation. 
12. The information provided in the annual report is easy to understand. 
13. The website contains information that is useful. 
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Appendix 8 
Semi-structured Interview Questions 
WCB Staff 
Open-ended Questions 
1. What does the concept of accountability mean to you? 
2. Is the WCB sufficiently accountable to its employees? How do you feel the 
WCB is demonstrating accountability to its employees? Which aspects of 
accountability are important to you? 
3. Can the WCB do more to demonstrate accountability to its employees? 
4. What information about the organization do you think employees would want 
to know before taking a job with the WCB or continuing their employment? 
5. Do you think employees and potential employees have concerns about the 
viability of the organization? Would this create a need for information about 
its ability to pay wage increases as well as comparative employment and 
training information? 
6. What type of information would you like to have regarding health and safety 
issues which might impact staff members? 
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Checklist Questions 
Please respond to the following questions by checking any or all responses that 
apply: 
Types of recruitment and retention information which would be beneficial 




Number of applicants per job posting 
Levels of skills shortages 




2. Types of information would you like to have provided on training and 
development? 
Number of training hours 
Number of courses taken 
Number of staff denied course reimbursement 
Number of leadership/career development courses taken 
Other(specify 
3. Types of information you would like regarding employee morale and 
motivation? 
Employee feedback results 
Absence rates 
Level of employee engagement 
Performance goals and periodic performance reviews 
Other(specify 
4. Types of performance and workforce profile information which would be 
of interest? 
Number of employees with university degrees 





AWCBC Key Statistical Measures 
The following table shows the performance categories measured and reported by 
the AWCBC along with the researcher's classification of key statistical measures 
(17 -3 6) as outcome measures: 
AWCBC KEY STATISTICAL MEASURES - 2006 Non-financial 
Outcome 
Measure 
I Number of Claims Reported 
2 Number of New Lost-Time Claims for Assessable Employers 
3 Number of New Lost-Time Claims for Self-Insured Employers 
4 Total Number of Lost-Time Claims 
5 Number of Fatalities Accepted 
6 Current Year Benefit Costs Incurred for Assessable Employers 
7 Current Year Benefit Costs Incurred for Self-Insured Employers 
8 Benefit Payments for All years Paid During the Year for Assessable 
Employers 
9 Benefit Payments for All years Paid During the Year for Self-Insured 
Employers 
10 Benefit Costs Incurred 
II Total Benefit Liabilities for Self-Insured Employers 
12 Administration Costs for Assessable Employers 
13 Total OH&S Costs Paid 
14 Assessment Revenue for Assessable employers 
15 Total Premium Revenue 
16 Assessable Payroll for Assessable Employers 
17 Actual Average Assessment Rate for Assessable Employers X 
18 Provisional Assessment Rate for Assessable Employers X 
19 Market Rate of Return X 
20 Percentage Funded X 
21 Average Calendar Days for Injury to First Payment Issues X 
22 Average Calendar Days from Registration to First Payment Issues X 
23 Average composite Duration of Claim X 
_ 24 Average New Impairment Award Percentage X 
25 Proportion of Claims Awarded Impairment Benefits X 
_ 26 Injury Frequency (per 100 workers of assessable employers) X 
27 Percentage of Workforce covered X 
28 Real Rate of Return to Discount Fully Indexed Benefits X 
29 Percentage of Lost-Time Claims Receiving Wage-Loss Bene its at the 
End of the 2 nd Year After the Accident Year 
X 
30 Percentage of Lost-Time Claims Receiving Wage-Loss Benefits at the 
End of the 6th Year After the Accident Year 
X 
31 Administration Costs per $100 of Assessable Payroll X 
32 Current Year Benefit Costs per $1 F0 of Assessable Payroll X 
33 Benefits Liabilities Expressed as a Multiple of Benefit Payments Made 
in the Year 
X 
34 Occupational Health and Safety Costs per $100 of Assessable Payroll X 
35 Current Year Average Benefit Cost per Lost-Time Claim X 
- 36 Administration Costs per Lost-Time Claim X 
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Transcript Coding Topics 
1. To whom is the WCB accountable 
2. How the WCB should be called to account 
3. Stakeholders' definition of accountability 
4. Wider performance outcome information 
5. Performance reporting 
6. Transparency and Accountability Act 
7. Financial reporting 
8. Strategic plan 
9. Annual report 
10. Role of the external audit 
11. Stakeholder consultation 
12. Round table meetings 
13. Board of Director representation 
14. Statutory Review (system review) 
15. Role of Ombudsman 
16. How the WCB should improve accountability 
17. Comparability of the WCB's stakeholder accountability with that of other 
public sector agencies 




The Stakeholder Model Applied to Other Government Agencies 
The model could be adapted for other government agencies. This firstly requires 
the identification of primary stakeholders specific to each agency. The following 
tables identify potential stakeholders for the NLHC, school boards and health care 
boards. 
NLHC Indicative Stakeholders 
Stakeholders Indicative Stakeholder Groups 
Consumers of electricity Public Utilities Board (Note 1) 
Citizens impacted by hydroelectricity City and Town Councils 
development projects Labrador Innu Associations 
Wildlife Federation 
Various environmental groups 
Business enterprises Chamber of Commerce 
Board of Trade 
Various Industry Associations whose 
members are impacted by 




Department of Natural Resources 
Note 1: Public Utilities Board is an agency established by government to regulate 
the rates charged by the NLHC and other utilities. 
Indicative School Board Stakeholders 
Stakeholders Indicative Stakeholder Groups 
Students and Parents Newfoundland and Labrador Federation of School Councils 
Local School Councils 
Board of Trustees 
Teachers Newfoundland and Labrador Teachers' Association 
Communities City and Town Councils 
Government (as Politicians 
funder and overseer) Treasury Board 
Department of Education 
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Indicative Health Care Stakeholders 
Stakeholders Indicative Stakeholder Groups 
Patients Board of Directors 
Various patient-oriented associations such as: 





Health care professionals Professional associations and unions representing: 
Nurses 
Physicians 






Communities City and Town Councils 
Government (as funder Politicians 
and overseer) Treasury Board 
Department of Health 
